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Abstract
This thesis charts the development of the political and diplomatic relations 
between England and the Holy Roman, Medieval or German Empire during the reign of 
Henry III of England, 1216-1272. This will be done before the wider background of 
contemporary European politics. Therefore, relations between the two realms have been 
viewed in the context of events and developments such as the papal-imperial conflict, 
the Mongol invasions, and the crusades. The actions of either Henry III or his Imperial 
counterpart cannot be understood without this background in mind, and without a 
comparison to the actions and undertakings of their contemporaries. As a result, it 
emerges that Henry Ill's policies towaids the Holy Roman Empire did not differ greatly 
from those of other rulers, such as Louis IX of France or Ferdinand of Castile, and that 
in his case, as in theirs, the immediate pressing needs of Henry's own kingdom formed 
and moulded the direction of his relations with the rulers of the Empire. As far as the 
Emperor was concerned, on the other hand, England was perceived to be a potential 
source of fiscal and diplomatic support, but was not considered worth any risks. At the 
same time, the dangers and challenges facing both rulers also forced them over and over 
again to confront each other's needs and ambitions.
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Note on Names and Terminology
Names are normally given in their modern English equivalent, that is Henry for 
Heinrich or Henri, Frederick for Friedrich, Cologne for Koln, etc.
Some of the terminology involved will cause difficulties. The Dukes of 
Brunswick will be referred to as such throughout this thesis, although they were not 
formally given their ducal title until 1235, and Henry Ill’s brother will frequently be 
described as Richard of Cornwall, or Earl Richard, despite the fact that he did not 
receive his earldom until 1225. Considering that these were the names under which they 
are commonly known, and in order to avoid confusion, this seemed the best possible 
option.
The term ‘Imperial’ presents similai* problems. The German term Reich normally 
refers to the German and North Italian parts of the Empire, but sometimes also to 
Imperial Burgundy, or only to Germany. In this thesis it will normally refer to the 
Empire as a whole, unless it is used in a specifically German context, such as during 
Richard of Cornwall’s reign in Germany, or to describe a specific group or institution, 
such as the Imperial princes (ReichsfUrsten), who were normally German.
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Introduction
During the fifty-six years of Henry Ill’s reign England underwent dramatic 
changes. When the young King succeeded to the throne in 1216, England was still 
reeling from the onslaught of civil war and foreign invasion. Henry’s reign stood 
under his father’s shadow. Magna Carta, symbolic of the conflicts besetting King 
John, haunted his government, making a frequent re-appearance during the political 
crises of Henry’s reign. 1 More importantly, the recovery of those lands lost by his 
father continued to dominate relations with Europe. John had lost Normandy, Anjou 
and Maine to the King of France in 1204. His grandiose schemes to recover these 
lands came to an end at the battle of Bouvines in 1214, when the combined forces of 
Emperor Otto IV and the King of England suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of 
Philip Augustus of France. This defeat, in turn, contributed to no small degree to 
John’s problems at home. From his accession in 1216 onwards, Henry thus found 
himself confronted with the consequences of his father’s failure: a rebellious baronage 
and an inheritance deprived of some of its most ancient and prestigious elements.
By the time of Henry’s death, in 1272, England was again, albeit slowly, 
recovering from internal unrest. In 1265, at Lewes, a group of barons under the 
leadership of Simon de Montfort had been defeated by a royalist force. However, this 
was merely the final stage of a struggle which had been dominating most of Henry 
Ill’s reign. The King had only reluctantly agreed to confirm Magna Carta, and 
consistently failed to adhere to it. In fact, the observance of the Great Charter soon 
became a political bargaining tool. In 1253, for instance, Heniy’s brother Richard had 
tried to solicit further taxes from the assembled barons and clergy in exchange for a 
promise that henceforth Magna Carta would be abided by. The King’s refusal to 
receive the counsel of his subjects, his eagerness to exploit his juridical rights for the 
administration of patronage, and for bettering his continuing financial malaise, feature 
highly in the complaints against his government. His patronage of foreign relatives, 
most notably the Savoyards and Lusignans, did little to ease aheady existing tensions. 
In 1258, this culminated in moves by a group of barons, under the leadership of 
Simon de Montfort, to expel the Lusignans from court. This was combined with 
demands for the reform of royal government, and Henry HI was forced to surrender 
control of some of the key posts in his administration to the barons. What had initially 
begun as a court intrigue soon developed a dynamic of its own and engulfed not only 
Henry IH’s domestic rule, but also his foreign projects and ambitions.
These domestic setbacks were aggravated by a lack of success abroad. Henry 
never managed to recover his father’s lands. In fact, in 1225, he suffered yet another 
defeat, when the new King of France, Louis VTII, occupied Poitou. Campaigns to win
1 Its significance for the early years of Henry’s reign has been assessed by Robert C. Stacey, Politics, 
Policy and Finance under Hemy HI (Oxford, 1987), 1-44.
back the county failed in 1230/1 and 1242/3. Nonetheless, efforts continued to undo 
these losses, and the need to find allies abroad soon dominated Henry’s diplomacy. 
How he pursued this aim, the setbacks he encountered, how he had to modify and 
change his plans will be a central aspect of this investigation. It will also become clear 
that, by about 1250, hopes for a military reconquest of lands once held by Henry and 
his family had been abandoned, and that new spheres of influence were sought, most 
notably in the MediteiTanean.
Throughout these years, the Empire featured highly in English diplomacy. 
Hemy III never abandoned the hope of repeating his father’s system of alliances, 
when Emperor Otto IV and King John had fought side by side against Philip Augustus 
of France. More importantly, even if he made little progress in his dealings with the 
Emperor, Frederick II, himself, many of his vassals had no scruples joining or 
supporting Henry. The King of England achieved some memorable successes. In 
1235, for instance, his sister Isabella married Frederick II, and in 1257, his brother 
Richard was chosen as Emperor-elect. Relations with the Empire thus present an ideal 
opportunity to study the development of English diplomacy in the thirteenth century. 
Unlike France, the Empire was not at the centre of English ambitions. Unlike 
Scotland, it did not found itself exposed to hostile overtures from Henry III, and, 
unlike the rulers of Castile, no territorial interests overlapped which could trigger 
belligerent exchanges. It mattered mainly as a potential recruiting ground for allies and 
supporters. At the same time, few medieval institutions are as suitable as the Empire to 
exemplify the way Henry Ill’s ‘European strategy’ developed and changed during the 
course of his reign.2 For the very nature of the medieval Empire demands that it and 
its relations are considered within as wide a framework as possible.
The Medieval or Holy Roman Empire defies definition. Although frequently 
referred to as the German Empire, and although Germany formed its political and 
economic core, its lands and territories encompassed the borders of the modern 
Netherlands, Belgium, eastern and southern France, Gennany, the Czech republic, 
Austria, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein and most of Italy. Among the 
languages spoken were various dialects of German, French, Provençal, Italian, and 
Czech. To varying degrees, all these lands played their part in Imperial affairs. 
Imperial politics cannot be understood without taking into account the communes of 
Northern Italy, and Imperial relations with France were often influenced by the affairs 
of Imperial Burgundy, those lands which stretch from francophone Switzerland to the 
Rhone and from there to the Mediterranean.
Originally, tlie German princes were tliose who mattered most to Henry m  and 
his father. The alliance formed in preparation for John’s campaign of 1214 included 
the Archbishop of Cologne and the Duke of Brabant, as well as Emperor Otto IV’s
 ^This follows Michael Clanchy, England and its Rulers, 1066-1272 (London, 1983), 230-40,
relatives in Saxony and along the Rhineland. Provence and Languedoc were of little 
concern, and few contacts were made with the towns of Italy. This was as much a 
reflection of the English court’s strategic needs - to attack France from two sides - as 
of the politics of contemporary Germany. The campaign of 1214 had aimed not only at 
undoing the Capetians’ recent successes in France, but also at settling the internal 
problems of the Empire. Both the French and the English court had had their German 
champions. Philip Augustus assisted Frederick of Sicily, a new claimant to the 
Imperial throne, while John sided with Emperor Otto IV.3 In order to understand the 
significance this was going to have for Henry Ill’s actions, it will be necessary to 
discuss the historical background leading up to the events of 1214, as weU as some of 
the elementally structures of Imperial politics and government.
The divisions in Germany evident in the build-up to the battle of Bouvines are 
sometimes referred to as the Welf-Hohenstaufen conflict, after the two families at its 
centre. The Welfs originated in Swabia, had come to prominence in Bavaria and 
expanded into the North and North-East of modern Germany during the twelfth 
century, when they inherited the duchy of Saxony. Their fortunes declined, however, 
with the fall of Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, who was deprived of 
his Imperial fiefs in 1180. The Welf lands were reduced to the areas around 
Brunswick and Liineburg, encompassing the later electorate of Hanover. To undo the 
damage suffered then, and to reclaim their status as one of the most prominent Imperial 
dynasties, remained amongst the aims of Henry the Lion’s descendants. He himself 
went into exüe at the couit of his father-in-law, Henry II of England, from where he 
continued to interfere in the politics and affairs of the Empire. In 1198, his family 
achieved a first major success. That year, the death of Emperor Henry VI triggered a 
division among the German princes, and led to the elevation of two rival kings. One 
was Philip of Swabia, a Hohenstaufen, the other Otto of Liineburg, Count of Poitou 
and formerly Earl of York, Henry the Lion’s second son.^ He had been reared at the 
English court, and was among the possible candidates for the succession of Richard 
the Lionheart.5 When Philip was murdered in 1208, Otto was crowned Emperor by 
Pope Innocent III. The Welfs’ restoration to power seemed complete. However, in 
1210 Otto attacked Sicily, the inheritance of Philip’s nephew, Frederick of 
Hohenstaufen, and a papal fief, and was therefore excommunicated. This forced Pope 
Innocent III to look for another champion, and led to the candidacy of Frederick of 
Sicily for the Imperial Uirone. Otto’s defeat at Bouvines marked the beginning of his
 ^ The connection between the Kings of England and Otto’s family went back several years, to tlie 
marriage between Hemy the Lion and Margaret, daughter of Hemy II of England: Jens Ahlers, Die 
Welf en und die englischen KOnige (Hildesheim, 1987).
 ^For the most recent study of Otto’s career: Bemd Ulrich Hucker, Kaiser Otto IV. (Hanover, 1990).
5 Ibid., 12-3, 16-8.
end.6 He was unable to stem Frederick’s progress into Germany, and died, largely 
confined to his domains around Brunswick, in 1218.^ Initially, at least, the support 
which Otto IV had received from the English court was to cause considerable problems 
for Hemy III in his dealings with the victorious Frederick II.
The Hohenstaufens, too, had their power-base in Swabia, having been 
awarded the ducal title in the eleventh century by Emperor Henry IV. From 1138 to 
1198 three members of die family - Conrad HI, Frederick I Barbarossa and Hemy VI - 
occupied the Imperial throne. By 1184, however, a new opportunity had presented 
itself.^ That year Emperor Frederick Barbarossa arranged a marriage between his son, 
the future Henry VI, and a sister of King William II of Sicily. At the time, this had 
primarily been a matter of settling the simmering conflict between the Nonnans and the 
Empire, and of depriving the papacy and its Lombard allies of potential supporters. 
However, when William died without any direct male heirs, his sister claimed the 
Sicilian throne. Suddenly new possibilities opened themselves, and it looked as if the 
Hohenstaufen could seize the Normans’ inheritance in Southern Italy and combine it 
with their imperial possessions in the north. Emperor Henry VI entered Sicily, where 
his son, Frederick, was born in 1194. This acquisition was to prove both the peak of 
the Hohenstaufens’ influence in Europe, and their undoing. When Henry VI died in 
1197, a new Emperor had to be chosen. However, the infant Frederick was ignored, 
and the papacy tried to ensure that no Hohenstaufen was to succeed Henry VI. 
Holding both the Imperial lands of Northern Italy and the main-land temtories of the 
Kingdom of Sicily, the Hohenstaufens posed a serious threat to the papal lands around 
Rome, endangering the political independence of the Holy See. That the Kingdom of 
Sicily, or regno, was a fief held from die Pope, mattered little. In practice, papal over­
lordship made itself rarely felt, and, unless backed up by military force, remained 
largely a legal fiction. As Innocent III himself was to experience, the curia’s influence 
in the kingdom of Sicily increased or diminished with its militaiy presence. Moreover, 
in the past the rulers of Sicily had all too often proved themselves to be a blessing as 
much as a curse. Although they could be counted upon to defend the pope against his 
German and Roman foes, the Norman rulers had proven themselves to be equally 
unwilling to let slip by an opportunity to expand their power into papal lands. In fact, 
even the title of King of Sicily had originally been the reluctant concession of an 
incarcerated pope. With this history in mind, and considering the equally volatile 
relations between the Holy See and the Hohenstaufen, a separation of the Imperial 
lands in northern Italy from the family’s inheritance in the South and Sicily may have 
seemed an opportunity as well as a necessity. The papacy’s success in pressing
 ^ Gerd Baaken, ‘Der deutsche Thronstreit auf dem IV. LaterankonziP, in: Klaus Berbers, Hans 
Henning Kortiim and Carlo Servatius (ed. ), Ex ipsis rerum documentis: Beitrüge zur MediCtvistik. FS 
Harald Zimmermann {Sigmmingen, 1991), 509-21.
7 Hucker, Otto IV., 303-30.
 ^Peter Csendes, Heinrich VI. (Darmstadt, 1993) for the following.
through the election and coronation of Otto IV was short-lived. In the end, although 
with some reluctance, and mostly for lacking a potent alternative. Innocent III had to 
abandon what he had gained in Sicily to preserve what he had won in the Empire, and 
declare his support for Frederick H. However, the young king’s elevation was not the 
end of the matter. Efforts to ensure a formal separation of the Empire from Sicily 
foimed a corner-stone of papal diplomacy for the next century and beyond.
Another major player in Imperial politics and in relations with England has to 
be considered: the Archbishop of Cologne. After the fall of Henry the Lion, the see 
had been awarded the duchy of Westphalia, that is the south-western parts of the 
former duchy of Saxony, roughly identical with the modern Land of North Rhine- 
Westphalia (the area surrounding Bonn), but stretching into Lower Saxony. The 
archbishops controlled much of the Rhineland and their wealth and political clout made 
them formidable players in English relations with Germany. In 1198, for instance, 
they had been instrumental in securing the election of Otto IV, and had taken an active 
role in arranging the alliance between the Emperor and King John.9 In fact, even most 
of the diplomatic contacts were arranged either directly by the archbishops, or by 
nobles and emissaries who had strong connections with the Rhenish prelates. They 
continued doing so until well into the reign of Frederick II, often in spite of and 
contiary to the Emperor’s declared plans and intentions. At the same time, their role 
has often been grossly exaggerated, and they assumed the role of a continuously 
available deus ex machina, there to explain whatever historians thought should have 
happened, or what they could not otherwise explain. Both their role as the leading 
ecclesiastical princes of Germany, as well as the ruler of a city at the centre of one of 
Europe’s most wide-ranging and active trade networks predestined the prelates to play 
an important part in Germany’s dealings with other realms. At the same time, their 
influence was open to fluctuations. In the case of Henry III, for instance, it diminished 
once the marriage between the king’s sister and Frederick II had been arranged in 
1235. During the remainder of his reign they were never to recover the standing and 
influence they had exercised before then. Consequently, although the significant role 
played by the archbishops of Cologne should not be ignored, it would be equally 
wrong to write a history of Anglo-Imperial relations based solely on contacts between 
England and Cologne. Other, equally important partner have to be taken into account 
as well.
All this is connected to some important structural differences between England 
and the Empire. Whereas Henry III and his father had little difficulty controlling the
 ^ Hugo Stehkamper, ‘England und die Stadt Koln als Wahlmacher Ottos IV. (1198)’, Mitteilungen 
aus dem Stadtarchiv KOln Ix (1971), 213-44; Sonja Zoller, Kaiser, Kaufmann und die Macht des 
Geldes. Gerhard Unmaze von Koln als Finanzier der Reichspolitik und der ‘Gute Gerhard’ des Rudolf 
von Ems (Munich, 1993).
Such an approach has most recently been taken by Joseph Huffman, Comparative History and 
the Anglo-German Connection: Cologne and Anglo-German Relations during the Central Middle 
Ages (1066-1307) (Ph. D., UCLA 1991), passim.
movements of their clergy and nobles abroad (Scotland, Wales and Ireland presenting 
- for various reasons - a slightly different picture), no such control could be exercised 
by the Emperor. The prelates and nobles of Germany, Burgundy and Italy pursued 
their ambitions and contacts with a large degree of autonomy. The Counts of Toulouse 
and Provence, for instance, frequently endangered relations with France by their 
actions,!^ and, as we will see, the Archbishops of Cologne could pursue projects 
which had long been abandoned by the Imperial court, and which ran contrary to the 
Emperor’s interests. This, in turn, leads to two further points requiring consideration 
here. First, a coverage of English relations with the medieval Empire cannot 
concentrate on the Emperor or a particular prince alone, but has to aim at taking into 
account the entirety of contacts and partners. Secondly, this seeming anomaly in the 
organisation of political contacts with foreign powers in the medieval Empiie has given 
rise to a debate whether it is possible at all to use teims such as ‘foreign’ policy in a 
medieval context.
Most doubts concerning the applicability of the term ‘foreign relations’ have 
been voiced by German mediaevalists.l^ It may be possible, however, that their 
perception has been coloured by the specific conditions of the Mediaeval Empire. 
These, however, were not necessarily typical for the rest of Europe. England, for 
instance, provides an example for the opposite e x t r e m e .  14 Leaving aside the special 
cases of Wales, Ireland and Scotland, the English Kings had established a sufficiently 
well developed machinery to control and direct their relations with neighbouring 
rulers. No English magnate had the freedom, power and opportunity of following 
Henry the Lion’s example and searching for allies and partners abroad, independently 
of the King. William the Marshal had to ask for peimission before he could enter into 
sepai'ate negotiations with Philip Augustus concerning his lands in France, despite tlie 
fact that he was one of the regents for the infant Henry III. One of the reasons for this 
particular development was the specific conditions created in England. Compared to 
the Empire, it was small, fitting several times into the territories presided over by the 
Emperor. As such, it was easier to control and govern. Furthermore, the 
administrative apparatus developed by the Noiman and Angevine Kings gave them an 
unprecedented control over their kingdom. An Emperor, on the other hand, had to
Walter Kienast, Die deutschen FUrsten imDienste der Westmüchte, 2 vols., (UUecht, 1924-31), 80- 
2, 105-7; note that Kienast has to be handled with great care, as he all too often distorts evidence to 
prove his underlying assumption that the German princes were inherently corrupt, and that the 
‘Western powers’ were ‘out to get’ the Empire. He later produced a revised version; Deutschland und 
Frankreich in der Kaiserzeit (900-1270): Weltkaiser und EinzelkOnige, 3 vols., (Stuttgai't, 1975).
A short survey has been given by Dieter Berg, Deutschland und seine Nachbarn 1200-1500 
(Munich, 1997), 47-57; and a very detailed discussion in his England und der Kontinent: Studien zur 
auswârtigen Politik der anglo-normannischen KOnige im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert (Bochum, 1987), 7- 
23.
1^  Kienast, Deutschland, passim.
14 France may provide an interesting example for a less strict separation of royal and baronial 
authority. In 1235, tlie Count of Ponthieu could negotiate with Henry III, independent of his King. At 
the same time, attempts by Hugh de Lusignan to form an English alliance were viewed as treacherous 
and punished accordingly. The degree of noble autonomy reflected that of royal control.
accommodate and balance different customs and rights. He could not press the same 
rights and claims in the Imperial cities of Germany and the communes of Lombardy, 
the King of Bohemia had to be treated differently from the Duke of Limburg. This, in 
turn, made it more difficult to control the Empire as a whole, and left individual 
princes a greater degree of autonomy in pursuing their own aims. This did not mean 
that an Emperor was bereft of authority. In 1242, for instance, some of the nobles in 
Imperial Burgundy still felt that they needed permission from Emperor Frederick II 
before they dared to attack the Capetians. However, an Emperor lacked the 
administrative apparatus available to die English King, and had to strive continuously 
to make his audiority felt and accepted. If he failed or if he was prevented from doing 
so, princely authority increased. This forms part of the background against which 
English relations with the Empire have to be understood. Contacting the Emperor 
alone was not enough. His subjects and vassals were of equal importance, and the 
latter frequently proved more amenable to English overtures than the foimer.
These differences between English magnates and Imperial princes were also 
rooted in theii* very different functions within their respective realms. The Holy Roman 
Empire was an elective monarchy, that is, rulers were elected by a group or groups of 
princes. The exact composition of that princely elite was unclear and often debated. A 
college of seven electors, consisting of the Archbishops of Cologne, Trier and Mainz, 
the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Saxony, the Count Palatine of the Rhineland and 
the Mai'graves of Brandenburg, was first mentioned in the context of the Double 
Election of 1257.1^ We may assume, though, that movements towards an electoral 
college had existed for some time. A King being elected by his princes was a concept 
not entirely alien to England. In 1135, for instance, the magnates chose between 
Mathilda and King Stephen, and Henry I and King John had ensured some kind of 
token ‘electoral’ consensus before they assumed the throne. However, this remained 
the exception, rather than the rule. Normally, a son succeeded his father.
In the Empire, structures developed differently. The succession was decided 
by a vote among the princes. In practice, this frequently meant that they elected an 
Emperor’s son. Frederick Barbarossa, Henry VI and Frederick II had ensured the 
election of their sons as successors during their life-time. Only when an Emperor died 
without male issue, or in politically fraught circumstances, such as in 1198, did they 
exercise their electoral rights independently. Nonetheless, the princes’ standing in 
relation to the monarch was greater than that of the English magnates. At the same 
time, the effect this had on Imperial politics is easily exaggerated. The Emperor did not 
face a united front of hostile princes, continuously emphasising their superior status
This has been one of the most hotly debated issues in medieval German history, with a literature 
too numerous to be listed here in its entirety. The classic account is tliat of Heinrich Mitteis, D ie  
deutsche KOnigswahl: ihre Rechtsgrundlagen bis zur Goldenen Bulle, 2nd ed. (Briinn, Munich, 
Vienna, 1944); in tlie context of the Double Election also useful: Wolfgang Giese, ‘Der Reichstag 
vom 8. September 1256 und die Entstehung des Alleinstimrmechts der Kurfiirsten’, DA xl (1984), 
562-90.
and stubbornly refusing to comply with his demands. In fact, most princes desired the 
exercise of stable authority as much as their English counterparts. However, the 
degree to which they were willing to submit varied, as did the degree to which they 
were expected to submit.
The electoral nature of Imperial Kingship was not the only limitation on an 
Emperor’s authority. Once a ruler had been elected and crowned, he assumed the title 
of King of the Romans. To become Emperor, he had to be crowned by the Pope in 
Rome. For most of the eleventh and twelfth century this was a formality. However, 
from Innocent III onwards, the papacy began to employ this second stage to press its 
claims. As the Pope had to choose an Emperor, he had to decide on the suitability or 
idoneity of the candidate. In practice, this was primarily an instrument to force 
guarantees for the integrity and defence of papal lands and rights. In part, this may 
have been a response to the Hohenstaufens’ recently assumed control over Sicily. To 
ensure the separation of Empire and regno was a recurrent feature in negotiations. 
Frederick II, for instance, had to promise that the Empire would pass out of Sicilian 
hands after his death, and in 1254, some of the conditions for the enfeoffment of 
prince Edmund of England with Sicily aimed specifically at avoiding a future union of 
the two realms. Moreover, an Imperial coronation also conveyed solemn obligations, 
most notably the duty to defend and assist the curia in its wider aims and ambitions.
In the thirteenth century, this frequently meant that the Emperor was intrinsically 
linked to the hopes and ambitions of the Holy See. Imperial cannot be separated from 
papal politics, and those form an important element of any coverage of the Empire’s 
relations with another reahn or rirler.
Nonetheless, although the specific structures and conditions of the Empire may 
to a large extent explain the doubts voiced by German medievalists, the problem 
remains that, so far, terms like ‘foreign relations’ and ‘foreign policy’ have been used 
without much discussion as to what they might signify in a medieval context. To what 
extent do medieval political entities confine to the modern definition of diplomacy as 
depending on a centralised authority which conducted relations with foreign realms or 
rulers ? Was there a concept of ‘foreign’ ? If so, to what extent would this con-espond 
to modern definitions of ‘nation’ or nationality ?
For once, the above definition was created to describe a system of alliances and 
treaties wliich only began to come into place and assume the place of standard regular 
framework for relations between states from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648
For these concepts as such: J. A. Watt, ‘Spiritual and temporal powers’, iu: J. H, Bums (ed. ), The 
Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350-c. 1450 (Cambridge, 1988), 367-423; his 
‘The theory of papal monarchy iu the thirteenth century: the contribution of the canonists’, Traditio 
XX (1964), 178-317; Alfons Stickler, ‘Imperator vicaiius papae: Die Lehren der franzdsisch-deutschen 
Dekretistenschule im 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahrhunderts iiber dieBeziehùngén zwischén Papst hud 
Kaiser’, M lO G  Ixii (1954), 165-212; and for a discussion of the intellectual foundations: Alan 
Cottrell, ‘Auctoiitas and potestas: a réévaluation of the coirespondence of Gelasius I on Papal-Imperial 
relations’. Medieval Studies Iv (1993), 95-109.
onwards. As such, it is certainly inapplicable as far as the Middle Ages are concerned. 
Nonetheless, some of its elements and structures, if redefined, can be a helpful tool in 
analysing contacts between rulers and realms in medieval Europe. Let us begin with 
the most basic assumption in the context of this investigation: that of ‘foreign-ness’. 
Certainly, ‘foreign’, in the sense of constituting a separate political entity, was still 
open to definition. Edwaid I and William Wallace, for instance, held very different 
views as to how ‘foreign’ Scotland was from England, and many English magnates 
administering their estates in Wales and Ireland may not necessarily have considered 
that to constitute anything like ‘foreign relations’. At the same time, from the mid­
twelfth century at the latest, western European kingdoms began to form an identity 
which, if still fluid, realised the existence of ‘foreign’ political entities, and acted 
accordingly. At the same time, these differences were not as stringent and coherent as 
we are accustomed to nowadays, but they remained fluid and subject to change. Nor 
would it be appropriate to view the medieval concept of ‘foreign’ along lines similar to 
that of ‘nation’. Although ethnic and linguistic differences began to emerge as a 
defining factor in the legal, religious and political conflicts of the thirteenth centuiy, the 
idea of a unity between ‘nation’ and ‘reahn’ would be anachronistic. 12 The example of 
the medieval Empire has already been cited. However, in England, too, the English 
‘nation’ meant less than the realm ruled over by the English king. The latter, for 
instance, included Gascony as well as Ireland and Wales. In short, we are dealing with 
a phenomenon that shifts shape so frequently that, although its existence may be 
beyond doubt, it still defies definition. The most pragmatic solution to this problem 
might therefore be to consider those realms as ‘foreign’, and as such subject to 
‘foreign policy’, which were perceived as lying outside the borders of a specific realm. 
In practice this means that, for instance, most English magnates may have had their 
doubts about Wales, but few would have disputed that Castile, France (with the role of 
Poitou or Normandy undergoing important changes in the course of the thirteenth 
century) or Flanders constituted foreign lands. This may fall short of the modern idea 
that only unified, sovereign and well-defined states could pursue foreign relations, but 
it coincides with and reflects the ambiguity of the medieval evidence. 18
Nonetheless, although the concept of foreign political entities was probably 
understood by the average medieval magnate, the question remains whether it is safe to 
speak of anything like ‘foreign policy’ or even ‘diplomacy’. Again, this remains a 
matter of perspective and of definition. We will look in vain for a White Paper on 
Henry Ill’s foreign affairs. Official pronouncements of long-term diplomatic strategies 
would have been grossly anachronistic. So, how is the term ‘policy’ to be understood 
? In the context of this investigation it will be used as the aims and ambitions
Some of these problems have been discussed by: Gabrielle Spiegel, ‘Defence of the realm: 
evolution of a Capetian propaganda slogan’, JMH iii (1977), 115-33.
Berg, Deutschland, 52.
underlying the dealings the English court had with foreign powers. This included 
formal treaties and alliances, as well as trading contacts or preparations for 
undertakings such as the crusades of 1227, 1239 and Henry Ill’s own campaign, 
declared in 1250. In addition, matters such as the King’s dealings with his foreign 
relatives will be considered, the patronage which they petitioned for and the support 
they received. For we have to remember that the borders between the King’s private 
and the realm’s affairs were still fluid. After all, it was not until the Napoleonic wars 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuiy that this differentiation began to be 
abandoned in theoiy as well as practice. We should therefore not be surprised if Henry 
I ll’s patronage of his Savoyards relatives will be treated as part of his general 
involvement in the affairs of the medieval Empire. At the same time, we have to avoid 
equating these two areas of the King’s policy. Relatives could be used to pursue 
certain aims and ambitions, but, in particular in England, they were just as frequently 
viewed as separate from the realm’s ‘public’ affairs. Tliis is a differentiation which we 
will frequently encounter with regard to Henry Ill’s patronage of his Lusignan half- 
brothers or his wife’s Savoyard uncles. It played an important part in the determining 
the course of the so-called Sicilian Business, Henry IH’s attempt to make his son 
Edmund King of Sicily from 1254 onwards, and it is implied in the reasoning the 
English magnates employed in objecting to the King’s 1242/3 campaign in Poitou. 
Once again, although a dividing line existed, it tended to shift in reference to the 
internal problems of England. In fact, one may want to argue that one of the problems 
Henry III faced was that he remained unable to make his private ambitions be 
understood as being one with the perceived needs of his kingdom. With these 
qualifications in mind it will be possible to speak of something hke a ‘foreign policy’, 
that is long-term plans which aimed at achieving particular ends, and the co-ordinated 
exercise of measures aimed at realising that goal, and which did so in relation to 
temtories other than the one presided over by a ruler other than the one whose actions 
will be a n a l y s e d .  19 More specifically, we could define the aims of a medieval ruler’s 
foreign relations as the need to secure one’s borders and to keep one’s enemies in 
ch eck . 20 This will allow us to include all the possessions of a king or ruler, such as, 
in Henry Ill’s case, Gascony or Poitou, as well as England, while still taking into 
account different political structures and conditions in these various domains. 
Moreover, with this definition trying to differentiate between ‘personal’ or ‘public’ 
ambitions will become unnecessary.
All tills has various implications for this study. To understand the reasons why 
English relations with the Empire took the course they did, the structures, objectives 
and pressures defining Imperial policy have to be taken into account. An approach
10
19 Ibid., 54.
20 Ibid., 53. See also the discussion in James der Derian, On Diplomacy: a genealogy o f Western 
estrangement (Oxford, 1987), 68-87, who similatly rejects tlie idea that concepts of diplomacy and 
‘foreign’ relations did not exist in pre-modern Europe,
which centres on Germany alone leaves out many of the most important developments 
during the reigns of Frederick II and his successors. Imperial Burgundy played a 
significant role, as did Northern Italy and, later, Bohemia. Similarly, concentrating 
solely on the Emperor or on one particular prince, ignores the other agents of Imperial 
policy, and the range and complexity of its aims. Nor are the internal pressures of 
Imperial politics the only issues which have to be dealt with. Wide-ranging as his 
domains may have been, Frederick II had concerns outside the Empire. These included 
relations with rulers of the eastern Mediterranean, most notably Cyprus and the Holy 
Land. The close proximity of Imperial and papal politics also make it necessary to 
consider wider issues such as the crusades, the Mongol threat, as well as, to a lesser 
degree, the fight against heresy. In one way or anotlier these issues conditioned the 
Emperor’s response to English overtures, and they informed the actions and 
undertakings of his princes. English relations with the Empire form part of a wider 
picture, which must not be ignored or left aside.
All tins puts us of course in danger of losing sight of intricacies and fine detail 
which a more narrowly focused investigation might bring to the foreground. Much of 
what will be said over the following pages will deal only cursoiily with such important 
matters as Henry Ill’s administration of England, Frederick II’s efforts at establishing 
stronger imperial control over Germany, culminating in the 1235 M ainzer 
Reichslandfrieden, or the niceties of relations between Castile and Aragon. Other 
matters, too, had to be left out, and have been or will be dealt with separately. 
Nonetheless, the advantages of this wider approach seem to outweigh its possible 
shortcomings. For once, it will be possible to see the inter-connections and inter­
dependence of European politics which otherwise is too easily overlooked. We 
actually see how the same issue or movement concerned England, as well as 
Germany, France, the Spanish kingdoms or the Christian lands in Outremer, and how 
this shaped the interaction between them. This also opens up a dimension previously 
ignored in the political history of medieval Europe. We will actually begin to see a 
complex net of mutual interests, of contradictory needs and desires and of pressures 
and forces wliich shaped and directed medieval political intercouise. Although much of 
this will take the form of sketching and outlining a complex problem, this will 
nonetheless provide the basis on which further and in their scope more limited studies 
could be built. In fact, by doing so this investigation does no more than follow 
Immanuel Kant’s postulate for the application of human reason in scientific work: that 
the detailed investigation of individual problems and the effort to find generalisations 
and basic systematic rules ought to complement rather than hinder each otiier.
There also remains a need for a broader survey of Anglo-Imperial relations 
which views them before the wider background of contemporary European politics.
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12For once, apart from a thesis published at Brefilau in 1 8 8 3 , 2 1  no monograph exists to 
chart the topic in the thirteenth century. And that concentrates largely on the period 
between 1 2 3 5  and 1 2 6 8 ,  and does so from an ‘Imperialist’ perspective, i.e. aiming to 
justify Frederick II, and fails to analyse either the broader background or the earlier 
history of Anglo-Geiman contacts. Fritz Trautz’s magisterial work on Anglo-Geiman 
relations concentiates on the fourteenth century, and contains only a small and cursoiy 
outline of events prior to t h a t . 2 2  Most of what we have in English are two virtually 
identical articles by Benjamin Arnold,^^ charting on less than fifteen pages how 
relations developed over 4 0 0  years. We thus would be severely disappointed if we 
expected much detailed analysis. In addition, Joseph P. Huffman’s research gives a 
detailed outline of English relations with Cologne, but it fails to take into account any 
of the wider English, German or European context, and all too often limits itself to 
repeating what older generations of historians have pronounced on the subject. Even 
on a more immediately local level Jens Abler’s research on the Welfs and England 
stops in 1 2 3 5 ,  a perfectly appropriate date from his perspective, but unfortunate from 
o u r s . 2 4  Amongst the other players, the Duke of Brabant and his dealings with 
England have been given some, although not much c o v e r a g e . 2 5  There is thus room 
for a history of Anglo-Imperial relations during a time when contacts between the two 
kingdoms reached an unprecedented degree of interdependence.
Moreover, there also is the need for a political history of relations between the 
two realms. Political history in general and diplomatic history in particular have fared 
rather badly over the last fifty years. To a large extent this is understandable. Much of 
this kind of history had been dominated by a perception of the Middle Ages which had 
aimed primarily at justifying the states and systems found in place by the nineteenth 
century. As a result, it frequently has an unpleasant taste of national pre-destination to 
it.26 Furthermore, it was pursued to the exclusion of other areas of medieval life and 
thought, and only gave a myopically distorted picture of the Middle Ages. Not 
unsurprisingly, therefore, what is often called political history has remained a 
comparatively barren field over the last generation or two. However, as a result, we 
now often find ourselves in the awkward situation of pursuing research which aims to 
distance itself from what is called the history of political events, while at the same time 
relying on that very histoire evenementielle for its own immediate frame of reference.
21 Felix Wissowa, Politische Beziehungen zwischen England und Deutschland bis zuni Untergang der 
Staufer (Bresslau, 1889).
22 Fritz Trautz, Die KOnige von England und das Reich, 1272-1348 (Heidelberg, 1961)  ^-
23 Benjamin Arnold, ‘Germany and England’, in: Nigel Saul (ed.), England in Europe 1066-1453 
(London, 1994), 76-87; the same, 'England and Germany, 1050-1350’, in: Michael Jones and 
Malcolm Vale (ed.), England and Her Neighbours, 1066-1453: essays in honour o f Pierre Chaplais 
(London, 1989), 43-52.
24 Jens Ailiers, Die Welfen und die englischen KOnige 1165-1235 (Hildesheim, 1987).
25 Jean de Sturler, Les relations politiques et les échangés commerciaux entre le duché de Brabant et 
l ’Angleterre au Moyen Age (Paiis, 1936).
26 For tlie concept as a whole: Frantisek Graus, Lebendige Vergangenheit: Überlieferung im 
Mittelalter und in den Vorstellungen vom Mittelalter (Cologne and Vienna, 1975).
For, as much as we may dislike political history, it were nonetheless the actions and 
undertakings of kings and rulers which created the conditions within which others -  be 
they merchants, scholars, farmers or artists -  acted. It is this very framework, 
however, for which we aU too frequently rely on dated and often wrong interpretations 
of medieval Europe’s political history. That, though, is too important an aspect of 
medieval society and culture to be put aside lightly. We have to remember that earlier 
generations of historians had abandoned the idea of a history of political events not 
because their forefathers had reached definite and final conclusions, but because they 
had ignored other, equally relevant fields of research. Ignoring the history of political 
events would therefore mean that, rather than amending, we repeat their mistakes.
Furthermore, not only the subject matter of this work, but also its presentation 
will be slightly old-fashioned. Most of the following pages contain what is effectively 
a political narrative. This is done largely with two things in mind: the reader’s comfort 
in perusing this text, and the requirements and needs of the subject-matter. For it 
remains the aim of this thesis to trace and investigate the changing pai ameters within 
which Henry III and his court acted, and to place them in relation to the needs and 
ambitions of his partners and opponents. In short, this is a history of events. As such, 
its naiTative sti'ucture is formed by the very matter, i.e. the events, it seeks to describe 
and analyse. Only thus will it be possible to work out the subtle changes and 
modifications which occuiTed across the various levels of activity treated in this thesis, 
while avoiding a teleological and deterministic interpretation of events. Over the 
following pages, individual chapters will therefore noimally consist of three sections. 
A general outline of the affairs of the Empire, and a survey of Henry Ill’s relations 
with France and of the opportunities or challenges he faced at home, will be followed 
by an analysis of his dealings with the Empire. Thus, it is hoped, the broader 
European context will become more clearly visible, while at the same time it will 
emerge how actions abroad were formed and conditioned by a mixture of external 
objectives and internal pressures. At the same time, a certain degree of selectivity could 
not be avoided. The following does not aim at listing each and every encounter either 
Henry III or his various partners ever had with outside rulers or movements. Any such 
undertaking would be futile and little more than a listing of dates and names. Over the 
following pages, our focus will follow that of Henry III. When the emphasis of his 
dealings lay with the Empire, we wül concentrate on the Emperor. Once Henry IE and 
his family became involved in the affairs of what was the Hohenstaufens’ Empire, our 
focus will shift towards the objects of their respective ambitions. In the case of Henry 
this wiU be the Empire in Sicily, and in Richard of Cornwall's tliat in the Rhineland. In 
the past, the focus has normally been on the ralers of Germany and their expectations 
of the kings of England. As subsequent chapters will show, this ignores some of the 
more intriguing and impressive aspects of Henry I ll’s reign and government. 
Moreover, it seemed a challenging task to show that, even in thirteenth century, the
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14rulers of England were still an integral part of a wider European community of princes 
and rulers.
Once again, however, it may be necessaiy to point out that this is not a study 
of Henry IH’s foreign relation in their entirety. We will deal only with a faction of the 
contacts which the King of England had with foreign rulers, and we will concentrate 
on the lands of tlie medieval Empire. Tims, any reader of these pages will look in vain 
for a detailed coverage of Heniy n i’s relations with Flanders, for instance. Not only 
was Flanders firmly under Capetian control ever since Count Ferrand had been 
captured at the Battle of Bouvines in 1214, but Henry III also forged closer ties with 
those who could have given him what he wanted more easily, efficiently and willingly 
than the Counts of Flanders: the Emperor and his allies. When this changed, from 
about 1250 onwards, Henry’s objectives had begun to change as well, and the 
recovery of his inheritance was increasingly replaced by the preparations for his 
crusade or the wish to expand his own family’s influence into the Mediterranean. In 
this context, trying to get involved in the affairs of Flanders would have been futile, 
unhelpful and ultimately dangerous. Not only was the county torn apart by civil war, 
but Henry’s involvement would have alienated the one figure he needed more than 
anyone else in order to pursue his ambitions in tlie South: Louis IX of France.
One last metliodological aspect of this thesis needs to be addressed: the use of 
sources. For the following, we will rely mostly on chronicles, letters and the contents 
of the English royal archives. Unfortunately, nothing comparable to the Public Record 
Office survives for the rulers of the medieval Empire. What remains are isolated 
charters and documents, letters penned down by monastic scribes trying to put 
together foimulaic collections for their own use, bits and pieces surviving in cartularies 
or the archives of recipients. This leads to a occasionally awkward situation. For 
instance, we only know of some of the contacts between Frederick H and the King of 
Castile during the 1240s, because Castilian envoys passed through Gascony during 
Henry’s presence there, and so they were recorded by English administrators. In fact, 
the wealth and sheer variety of English governmental records allows us to trace 
missions and undertakings of which very little is recorded elsewhere. We have 
accounts for the expenses of envoys to and from the royal court, provisions of wine 
and horses, falcons and ships. At the same time, much of this is superficial. All too 
often we do know that a mission was sent, we even know who participated, and we 
may know about the gifts and presents made on the occasion, but we do not always 
know what matters were or had been treated. With a teasing degree of frequency, the 
records simply state that relevant information would be conveyed separately or even 
orally. In such cases, we will have to reach a plausible conclusion mostly from 
circumstantial evidence, and it is then that chronicles become of major importance. 
Especially in thirteenth century England, some contemporary historians were 
exceptionally well informed. Sometimes, this allows us to glimpse how certain events
were interpreted by a court and this in turn makes it possible to speculate about the 
wider purpose of some of these missions. At the same time one has to beware of a 
positivist approach which takes sources unquestioningly at face-value. As often and 
frequently as possible we will have to ask what the background and what the intention 
of a writer had been. Unfortunately, to do this for all the roughly 85 chronicles used 
for this investigation would far exceed its scope. At the same time, what this 
investigation is looking for are political facts. A writer’s or a group of writers’ 
personal stance, their Weltbild and conception of history will play only a subordinate 
role in what follows, and will be dealt with only inasmuch as they are of relevance to 
the subject of this analysis. Interesting as such questions are, they fall outwith the 
scope of this project.
What follows will tell tlie story of a King of England and his dealings with the 
mlers of the medieval Empiie. It tries to show how this was embedded within a wider 
European framework, and will ask persistently and repeatedly how the King of 
England’s policies echoed and formed this background.
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Chapter I 
Diverging Goals 
( 1216- 1231)
In July 1214 two armies met at Bouvines in north-east France. 1 The resulting 
battle shaped Europe for a generation to come. Emperor Otto IV lost his throne, and found 
himself replaced by an upstart prince from Sicily, the future Frederick 11.^  King John of 
England was forced to abandon his efforts at reconquering Normandy, Anjou and Maine 
which he had lost to Philip Augustus of France in 1204. Moreover, he soon faced a 
rebellion in England, to no small degree exacerbated by his handling of baronial demands, 
and even found prince Louis of France leading an expeditionary force across the 
Channel.^ The inheritance he bequeathed his infant son in 1216 was, thus, weakened, 
disputed and fragile.4 The main beneficiaries of Bouvines were the Capetian kings of 
France, finding themselves elevated to the leading ranks of European politics, a position 
which they managed not only to maintain, but also to extend.^
The relations of John’s successor, Henry III, with the rulers of continental Europe 
have to be considered within this context. To regain the lands lost by his father remained 
among his and his regents’ overriding ambitions. However, when Louis VIII succeeded 
his father to the French throne in 1224, he sought to emulate Philip Augustus’s expansion 
of Capetian territories, and did so by attacking both the Plantagenets, and his neighbours 
south of the Loire. Frederick II, on the other hand, had to establish his authority in 
Germany, a country alien to him, while still faced with opposition in Sicily. These 
diverging aims defined the direction of English diplomacy. The young King and those 
leading his government faced no easy task. They presided over a kingdom but slowly 
recovering from civil war and foreign invasions. However, Henry III and his government 
showed an astonishing resilience in their efforts to undo what they perceived as unjust, 
and to reclaim what they maintained to be rightly theirs. It was in the context of these 
undertakings that Germany began to play a major part in English diplomacy, and it is to 
this background that we must now turn.
I .l England and France
 ^ Georeg Duby, Der Sonntag von Bouvines, 27. Juli 1214, trans. G. Osterwald (Berlin, 1988), for a somewhat 
peculiar narrative.
2 Theo Holzapfel, Papst Innozenz 111., Philipp II. August, Konig von Frankreich und die englisch-welfische 
Verbindung 1198-1216 (Frankfurt/Main, 1991), 306-8; John W. Baldwin, The Government o f Philip 
Augustus: foundations of French royal power in the Middle Ages (Berkeley et al, 1986), 332-42.
 ^James C. Holt, Magna Carta, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 1992), 188-266; Ralph V. Turner, King John (London, 
1994), 225-37, 249-56.
4 David Carpenter, The Minority of Henry 111 (London, 1990), 5-238.
 ^Hiestand, Rudolf, ‘Von Bouvines nach Segni’, Francia xxii/1 (1995), 59-78; Joachim Ehlers, ‘Die 
franzdsiche Monarchie im 13. Jahrhundert’, in: Egon Boshof and Franz Reiner Erkens (ed.), Rudolf von 
Habsburg: eine Konigsherrschaft zwischen Tradition und Wandel (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 1993), 165- 84.
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It had taken two years of intermittent warfaie and increasing papal pressure before 
Louis withdrew from England.^ In 1220 Philip Augustus agreed to a truce for four 
years.^ Henry Ill’s regents immediately set out to restore royal government, and to 
ensure a peaceful settlement with those willing to accept the new regime. Foreign affairs 
were dealt with, Gascony and Poitou secured, matters of ecclesiastical hierarchy were 
treated. The promise of a new start was made when, in 1220, the King was crowned for a 
second time, acknowledged now, too, by those who in 1216 had sided with prince 
Louis.^ England looked set for a slow, but persistent recovery. However, in 1223 fate 
struck again, and Philip Augustus died. Initially, this seems to have caused a surge of 
optimism at the English court, in the - mistaken - belief that now was the opportunity to 
claim back the young king’s inheritance. The Archbishop of Canterbury was sent to 
France to demand a return of Normandy,^ while Henry requested support from Honorius 
111,1  ^ and Pandulf, the former legate. ^  However, this optimism was ill-founded. Not 
only did Philip’s successor, Louis VIII, refuse to comply with English demands, but he 
posed an even greater threat than his father.
In spring 1224 an English embassy was sent to Paris, to negotiate an extension of 
the truce which had been agreed in 1 2 2 0 . The King of France, however, seized the 
opportunity, and gathered troops. In June, while the English court, still not suspicious 
of Louis’ moves, concentrated its resources on the siege of Bedford c a s t l e ,  14 the attack on 
Poitou began. Deprived of English support, the county succumbed quickly, and by 
August La Rochelle, the key fortress in the county, had fallen. Even Gascony, the sole 
remaining territory on French soil under Plantagenet control, was in danger. This was to 
be a momentous event in the histoiy of English relations with the continent. From then 
until the Treaty of Paris (1259), the recovery of lands lost in 1204 and 1225 dominated 
Henry’s actions. The rulers of Flanders, Germany, Spain and Languedoc found 
themselves repeatedly at the centre of English overtures to enter, support or join alliances 
against the Capetian kings of France.
The events immediately after the loss of Poitou may serve as an example. Once 
news of Louis’ successful attack had reached England, papal support was enlisted, and a 
search for potential allies began. In August 1224 Honorius III wrote to Louis VIII,
 ^Pietro Pressutti (ed.), Regesta Honorii Papae III (Rome, 1889), nrs. 1000-1; M. Tyson (ed.), ‘The Annals of 
Southwark and Merton’, Surrey Archaeological Collections xxvi (1925), 24-57, at 50; Carpenter, The 
Minority, 27-44,176-9; Nicholas Vincent, Peter des Roches: an alien in English politics 1205-1238 
(Cambridge, 1996), 135-41, 163-5.
7 DD, nr. 67.
® Carpenter, Minority, 200-3; Richard Bales, ‘The political setting of the Becket translation of 1220’, Studies 
in Church History xxx (1993), 127-39, at 130-9.
 ^Chronica Johannis de Oxenedis, ed. Henry Ellis, RS (London, 1859), 148.
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reprimanding him for his actions, and demanded an immediate t r u c e .  15 similar 
exhortations were issued in February and during the summer of 1225A ^  Even Frederick 
II was called to Henry’s aid.l^ The King of France, however, refused to comply. 1  ^By 
December 1224 it became clear how little hope there was that Louis would surrender his 
gains voluntai'ily. The Dunstable annalist describes how Louis VIII’s representatives at the 
papal curia declared that not only would their King hold on to the lands already seized, but 
that he would also conquer England. The English court is said to have taken this threat so 
seriously that sea-towns were fortified and hostages demanded from the Cinque P o r t s .  1 9  
This picture is confirmed by other sources. In late December 1224, English proctors at the 
curia sent a report, detailing how French envoys had declared that King Louis VIII would 
instantly cross over to England, should the Pope decide against him. They also brought 
other, worrying news: the papal legate in France was planning to arrange a marriage 
alliance between the Empire and France.^^
Henry Ill’s court prepared for action. A mission, led by Walter Mauclerk, Bishop 
of Carlisle, was sent to Germany to arrange a marriage alliance between Henry Ill’s sister 
and Frederick IPs son, thus undermining French efforts at forging closer links with the 
Empire. In addition, attempt were made to form a coalition of all those who had been 
wronged by the Capetians. The fear with which Henry’s court faced Louis VIII is 
underlined by its odd choice of allies. In August 1225, for instance, Henry III wrote to 
Count Raymond of Toulouse, emphasising that both his ancestors and Raymond’s had 
been persecuted and robbed by the French crown. Therefore, they should work together 
and stand firm against the Capetian threat. The moment was well chosen, as Raymond had 
just begun to recover ground lost during the Albigensian Crusade,^ ^  while Louis VIII 
was exerting all his influence to receive papal permission to lead yet another campaign 
against him.^2 The Count was still suffering from the losses inflicted by Simon de 
Montfort, while facing the prospect of yet more attacks on his domains. Henry III seems 
to have been aware of the dangers close proximity to Raymond could pose, and strict 
precautions were taken to keep the pact s e c r e t . ^ 5  This proved a wise move when the 
Count was excommunicated the following y e a r , ^ 4  while Henry III received a stern 
waining from Honorius III that he would face similar punishment should he persist in his 
dealings with R a y m o n d .^ 5  However, this was not the only peculiar choice made by the 
young King’s regents. A curious letter from Heniy III to the Count of Flanders survives.
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in which the King suggested that they should join forces against their common foes, 
probably referring to the Capetians.26 This was a peculiar suggestion, as the Count of 
Flanders, Ferrand of Portugal, was still in French captivity, where he had been since 
1214. However, also in 1225, a ‘false Baldwin’ made his appearance.H is supporters 
maintained that he was Count Baldwin, first Latin Emperor of Constantinople, who had 
been missing since 1205. Should this pretender have been the addressee of Henry’s letter 
- which seems the most plausible explanation - this would illustrate not only the often 
desperate measures the English court found itself forced to take, it also sheds new light on 
the English mission to Germany, negotiating with the Archbishop of Cologne. After all, 
the Archbishop played an important, though murky, role in the affairs of the pretender, 
being amongst those approached by ‘Baldwin’ when he began to look for allies.
However, the German marriage did not materialise, nor did the restoration of 
‘Baldwin’ have any lasting success. The rulers of Languedoc and Imperial Burgundy, on 
the other hand, continued to play an important role. In May 1226, an alliance was 
concluded with the Count of T o u l o u s e . ^9 the meantime, though, Louis VIII had begun 
to lead a crusade against the Cathai* heretics in Languedoc, thus enjoying papal protection 
which made any successful English initiative unlikely.50 Consequently, Henry’s court 
sued for peace.51 In 1226 events took yet another turn: Louis VIII died.52 When this 
coincided with a revolt amongst the French nobility,55 Henry III instantly entered into 
negotiations with the rebels.54 Furthennore, Ferrand of Flanders, recently released from 
captivity, received confirmation of his English fiefs,55 suggesting that he was to be part 
of an imminent campaign. An opportunity had presented itself to reclaim by force what 
diplomacy had failed to win: the recognition of Henry’s claims to Normandy and Poitou. 
However, plans for a campaign had to be abandoned when his most important ally, Hugh 
de Lusignan, decided to abandon the English cause. The King had to send his younger 
brother, Richard, to conclude a truce for two more years. In 1228, when the truce came 
up for renewal, the English court had little chance but to comply with the papal pressure it 
found itself exposed to, and agreed to extend it by another year.56
By November 1228 a new opportunity presented itself. Raymond of Toulouse 
wrote to Henry III, and insisted that their agreement of 1225 be fulfilled.57 He was not
26 Foedera, I, 177.
27 Robert Lee Wolff, ‘Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault, first Latin Emperor of Constantinople: his life, death 
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alone. During the Christmas court at Oxford in 1228, the Archbishop of Bordeaux 
arrived, speaking on behalf of the aristocracy in Gascony, Aquitaine and P o i t o u . 5 8  
Independently, nobles from Normandy sent representatives, and asked for Henry’s 
support. Suddenly, the English court found the support within France it had been lacking 
for so long. However, sensitive to papal demands, a good reason had to be found before 
war could be declared. After some sabre-rattling in March, when Henry complained about 
recent infringements on the pro forma negotiations began. The stakes, however,
had been raised. A document survives, in which Henry III outlined the demands to be 
made by his proctors in France.40 He proposed three possible solutions. First, the King 
of England would receive back all his lands, except for Normandy. There, his holdings 
were to be limited to one or two dioceses which, however, could be surrendered, if need 
be. Alternatively, a French prince could marry Henry’s sister Isabella, who was to receive 
Normandy and Anjou as her dowry. Finally, Henry III offered to buy back his lands. If 
accepted, Louis’ government would have surrendered lands which had been held 
successfully for neai'ly 25 years, despite the numerous English attempts at undoing the 
result of 1204. The terms put forth would have been acceptable only if Henry had been 
able to inflict a decisive defeat on his French opponent. Unsuiprisingly, therefore. Queen 
Blanche, the regent, decided to call his bluff, and rejected English demands. Henry took 
his time, and did not set out for France until Easter 1230.41 The ensuing campaign was 
inglorious. Henry’s troops proceeded amidst much joy, but to little effect. In the end, all 
he was able to show for his efforts was the continuing homage of the Count of 
B r i t t a n y .42 Queen Blanche’s regime was stronger than before, and it took twelve more 
years before another campaign to Poitou was mooted.
What may appear to be no more than a sheer endless list of failed campaigns and 
botched battles, nonetheless reveals a number of important issues. We learn not only of 
the political pre-occupations of Henry’s court, but also of its methods and approach. 
English diplomacy was dominated by a desire to recover the lands lost in 1204 and 1224.
To win the necessary military or diplomatic backing to press these claims was its main 
objective. To this purpose, the papacy was called upon, as were the rulers of Languedoc, 
Imperial Burgundy, Flanders and Germany. It is important to note the chronology of 
events. Although truces were frequently declared, they were viewed as an opportunity to 
prepare for war, not as a step towards peace. Prolongations of such agreements were 
forced upon Henry III, rather than sought by him. The approaching expiry date of a truce 
normally coincided with renewed diplomatic efforts to press Plantagenet claims, with 
Louis VIII’s death in 1226 and the years immediately prior to the 1230 campaign as the 
most important dates. As will become cleai*, these were also the years in which English 
relations with Germany peaked.
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1.2 Frederick II, the Papacy and the Crusade
England was the least of Frederick’s worries. Once he had established his 
authority in Sicily and Germany, more pressing matters had to be dealt w i t h . 4 3  Foremost 
amongst these were his planned campaign to the Holy Land, and the subjugation of his 
restive Lombard subjects. Germany, by comparison, posed little danger. After Bouvines, 
Emperor Otto IV found himself deprived of support and friends, and led a shadowy 
existence until his death in 1218. By 1220 Frederick had safely established himself, and 
was crowned Emperor by Honorius 111.44 pyg also coincided with a dynastic decision 
which was to have considerable impact on Anglo-Imperial relations. Otto IV, originally 
the Pope’s champion, had been abandoned once he began to lay claims to Sicily, thus 
threatening to encircle the papal state in central Italy. Having rid itself of Otto, the curia 
soon found that its championing of Frederick II had in fact exacerbated the problem. The 
young Hohenstaufen was still King of Sicily, as well as King of the Romans, and on his 
way to becoming Emperor. In fact. Innocent had created the very conditions which he had 
sought to avoid by supporting Otto IV against his Hohenstaufen rival. A solution had to 
be found, and a compromise was agreed. When Frederick II was crowned Emperor in 
1220, he promised to make his son, Henry (VII), King of the R o m a n s ,45 to be left in 
Germany under the supervision of Archbishop Engelbert of Cologne and the Bishop of 
Speyer. In theoiy, the Hohenstaufen domains had thus been split between Germany, 
where a future Emperor was reared, and Sicily, with Frederick’s claims to Imperial 
authority to be weakened once Hemy (VII) assumed proper control over his realm.
One of the first initiatives taken by Frederick after his coronation as Emperor was 
to ensure continuing friendly relations with the Capetians. In November 1223 Louis and 
Frederick II concluded the treaty of Catania. The main clause of the document stipulated 
that neither Louis nor Frederick would assist rebels or those who waged war against either 
of them, but it also made specific reference to Henry III: the Emperor was not to enter 
upon an alliance with the King of England or his heirs, nor would he allow anyone in his 
power to do s o . 4 6  To keep his word, Frederick insisted that his son’s regents, too, sign 
the a g r e e m e n t . 42 This was to cause considerable friction between the regents and the 
Emperor, and an opportunity, willingly to be seized upon by the English court. In the 
meantime, however, Louis was free to seize what was left of Plantagenet lands in France, 
and would not have to fear a repeat of the Anglo-German alliance of 4209-1214. 
Although, at first sight, Frederick gained very little himself, his decision paid off
43 The best coverage of Frederick’s early years is provided by Wolfgang Stiirner, Friedrich II. Teil I: Die 
Kdnigsherrschaft in Sizilien und Deutschland 1194-1220 (Darmstadt, 1992), 212-53; also useful: David 
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eventually. In August 1227, a similai' agreement was concluded with the regents of Louis 
V lir  successor, the infant Louis I X .48 Shortly afterwards, Frederick was 
excommunicated, and faced not only a papal invasion of Sicily, but also attempts at 
establishing an anti-King in Germany. However, no French support was forthcoming, 
thus depriving any potential rebel of much needed military, financial or political 
assistance.
The most important issue in Imperial politics during these years, and the one 
which ultimately led to Frederick’s excommunication, was the crusade.49 in 1215 
Frederick had bound himself to lead and equip a new expedition to the Holy Land. 
Initially, the papacy had ignored his vow, but during the 1220s declining fortunes in the 
East forced a change of policy, and Frederick was repeatedly urged to hasten his departure 
for Jerusalem.50 By 1223 the Fifth Crusade had come to a disastrous end, when the 
Christians were forced out of their recently seized stronghold at Damietta. Their defeat 
was largely blamed on the inactivity of the Emperor, and the inability of both Frederick 
and Honorius III to settle remaining points of conflict.51 It would be wrong, however, to 
blame the Emperor alone for his continuing delays. He did indeed face political problems 
which very frequently left him little option but to prevaricate. His crusading plans during 
the 1220s may serve as an example. By April 1223 the Pope announced to various 
European princes that Frederick had promised to lead a new expedition by the summer of 
1225.52 However, as the date of departure approached, it became obvious that there was 
little probability of the Emperor being able to muster a sufficiently strong contingent to 
lead it to Palestine.53 In May/June 1225, Frederick opened negotiations with Honorius. A 
final agreement was not reached until August, and it contained some of the most severe 
clauses of any crusading contract.54 Frederick would be excommunicated should he not 
set sail for the Holy Land by August 1227, while detailed provisions were made for the 
number of ships and the funds he had to provide.55 To add a further incentive, he married 
Yolanda/Isabella, heiress of the kingdom of Jerusalem.56 He thus had an interest in the 
affairs of Palestine based not only on his crusading vow, but also on his territorial 
interest. Failing to set out again, Frederick would have incurred not only the opprobrium 
normally associated with a crusader who did not fulfil his vow, but also, and even worse, 
that of a King who failed to defend his kingdom.
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There is little doubt as to the significance the crusade assumed in Frederick’s 
actions. He busied himself with equipping, providing and prepaiing for his campaign and 
those of others.57 Equally, Frederick’s relations with his neighbours were overshadowed 
by the needs of his planned expedition. In 1224, for instance. King Waldeniar of 
Denmark had been captured, thus providing an opportunity to reclaim lands in north 
Germany now under Danish rule. However, overriding objections put forth by Henry 
(VII)’s regents, the Emperor ensured Waldemar’s release, provided he would attend 
Frederick’s crusade.58 Similarly, when a peace agreement was reached with the Lombard 
communes in January 1 2 2 7 ,59  the Emperor was content with their promise of providing 
400 knights for his expedition.50 The needs of the cmsade remained paramount, and the 
Emperor refused to employ resources which were better be used for the liberation of the 
Holy Land.
Similar considerations guided Frederick’s involvement in Anglo-French affairs, 
where he acted in close co-operation with the curia. This was born out of inclination as 
much as necessity. Honorius III left little doubt as to the connection between a successful 
crusade and peace in Europe. This was made explicit in a letter to Philip Augustus from 
April 1223: as a secular vassal would lose his honour and rights if he did not defend his 
lord’s possessions against his enemies, so should all Christians take up arms against the 
heathen. However, to lead such a campaign successfully, the Christians had to observe 
peace amongst themselves. Therefore, Philip was to seek an understanding with Henry
III. 51 About a week later, similar words were addressed to the King of E n g l a n d .  52 with 
their petty squabble, Henry and Philip endangered the far more important project of 
freeing the Christians in Palestine. These concerns were shared by Frederick II. In Maich 
1224, he wrote to Honorius III, and complained of the manifold problems he f a c e d . 53 
Chief amongst these was that few of the great men of England and France seemed willing 
to further the affairs of the Cross, unless peace were first arranged between their rulers.
This was swiftly taken up by the curia. On 4  April, Louis was asked to enter on a firm and 
permanent truce with Henry. The request was repeated in August 1 2 2 4 .  The King of 
France was to prolong his truce with England, if not out of reverence for Honorius, then 
out of respect for the planned campaign in North A f r i c a . 5 4  Similarly, in February 1 2 2 5 ,  
instead of fighting against the King of England, Louis was exhorted to help Frederick
1 1 . 5 5  At best, the continuing wars between England and France were considered to be a 
nuisance, at worst they endangered the precarious state of Christendom in Palestine. It
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was in Frederick’s best interest to avoid being drawn into their conflict. Even without that, 
he faced problems enough already.
The Emperor’s haidest and ultimately fatal stmggle also sprang from his crusading 
plans. Foremost amongst the preparations for any crusader were efforts at resolving 
disputes and feuds, ensuring the safety of lands and possessions in the crusader’s 
absence, or the continuation of his dynastic line. By 1220, Frederick’s son was safely 
established as King of the Romans, and internal opposition in Sicily had largely been 
overcome.56 His attention, thus, turned to Italy, where his recent efforts to manifest 
Imperial rights and privileges had run into difficulties. To deal with these matters, as well 
as the planned expedition to the Holy Land, he called a diet to Cremona in 1225.57 
However, relations between Frederick and the north Italian communes in particular had 
been uneasy for some time. Whereas Frederick insisted on a literal interpretation of the 
1183 treaty of Constance,58 which had settled the Lombard Wars of Frederick 
Barbarossa, some towns insisted that, as Imperial rights had not been exercised, they had 
lapsed. Frederick did little to allay their fears. He made no secret of his hostility towards 
towns and communes. In June 1226, for instance, the commune recently formed at 
Cambrai had been outlawed, and in October, communes were banned throughout Imperial 
Burgundy.59 I n  November, the Rhenish league of cities was dissolved by Henry ( V I I ) .75 
Lombardy, it may have seemed, was next. The diet at Cremona had been designed as a 
major stepping stone towards Frederick’s crusade - Henry (VII) was to attend with a 
major contingent of German princes, and Italian support was to be mustered. However, 
the veiy presence of German troops, and the fact that the settlement of Imperial affairs was 
to be among the points of the agenda, caused unease amongst some communes. It is 
therefore not surprising that, prior to the diet, the Lombard League was refounded. 
Alarmingly, even moderately pro-imperial towns such as Mantua were now amongst the 
allies of Milan. The communes prevented Henry (VII) from attending by blocking the 
Alpine passes. What followed has often been seen as an indication of how Frederick used 
his crusading status primarily to serve his political ends. In June the Lombard cities were 
excommunicated for obstructing the business of the Holy Land by a group of German 
prelates,71 and in July the Emperor outlawed Milan and its allies for betraying the Holy 
Church and the Catholic Faith.72 it would be mistaken, though, to view this as yet
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another attempt at cynically manipulating the planned crusade. Frederick could ill afford to 
alienate Honorius III yet again. In fact, it seems that the planned meeting at Cremona had 
been intended to be little more than a formality, designed to whip up support for the 
Emperor’s imminent departure. Nor was Frederick in a strong enough militaiy position to 
press his c l a i m s . 7 3  jjad the meeting at Cremona been intended to mark the opening of a 
campaign against the Lombard communes, it was not only ill-timed, but also ill-equipped. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Frederick asked the Pope to m e d i a t e , 7 4  and negotiations began 
in October, with a final agreement reached by March 1 2 2 7 . 7 5  Frederick was left with no 
excuse. His opponents agreed to safeguaid his claims and possessions, and to send troops 
for his c r u s a d e . 7 6  No conceivable reason remained to delay his expedition to the Holy 
Land yet again. In fact, if Frederick failed to make true his promises again, it could only 
be a sign of his insincerity and infidelity.
This certainly was the attitude taken by Honorius’ successor, Gregory IX. The 
Emperor left for Palestine in August 1 2 2 7 .7 7  However, three days into the journey, he 
was taken ill, and returned. To the Pope this was yet another false excuse, and in 
September the Emperor was excommunicated. In the end, Frederick decided on a high- 
risk strategy, and, by June 1228, set sail for Palestine regardless.78 A military conquest 
of Jerusalem, however, had to be ruled out. The illness which had struck the Emperor 
also decimated his entourage, and the situation in the Holy Land, with the nobles and 
military orders split in their attitude to Frederick’s campaign, remained volatile. 
Consequently, diplomatic means had to be considered. Al-Kamil, the sultan of Egypt, had 
been eager to recruit ti'oops against his rival in Damascus, and had made friendly overtures 
towards the Christians.79 Even before Frederick’s departure, a regular exchange of 
envoys had taken place, thus preparing the ground for negotiations. In February 1229, an 
agreement was reached, awarding the Christians control over Jerusalem and a ten-yeai* 
t r u c e . ^ 5  Although it had been achieved by highly unorthodox means, Frederick could 
claim that he had achieved more than previous campaigns led by the papacy, and did not 
hesitate to utilise his success when he returned to Sicily.^ 1 Gregory IX found it 
increasingly difficult to keep up a united front against the man who could claim to have 
freed Jerusalem, and by 1231 Frederick’s excommunication was ended.
1.3 England and Germany
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Henry Ill’s regents realised that Frederick had little inclination to support Henry 
III against Philip Augustus or Louis VIII. The Imperial court, thus, played a subordinate 
role in English diplomacy. Most contacts with the Empire were arranged via Henry (VII) 
and Archbishop Engelbert of Cologne, or the Dukes of Brabant, Brunswick and Austria, 
as well as the King of Bohemia. Similarly, the timing of English embassies is relevant. 
They increased in frequency during the aftermath of Louis’ attack on Poitou in 1224/5, in 
1227, when Frederick’s imminent cmsade, Henry (VII)’s coming of age and the princely 
rebellion against the regency of Queen Blanche combined, and in 1229/30, during the 
Emperor’s excommunication. Henry’s regents knew that the only hope to resurrect the old 
alliance against France rested with the government of Germany. In this hope, however, 
they were repeatedly disappointed. Frederick would not let the separation of his domains 
be more than a formality, and continued to dominate German affairs.
Bouvines did not end relations between England and the Empire.82 Regular 
contacts were maintained with Otto IV’s half-brother, the (titular) Duke of Saxony,83 
while new links were established with princes such as the Duke of Austria. ^ 4 The 
German regency, too, continued to be in communication with the English court.85 The 
initiative appears to have frequently been taken by the Heniy (VII)’s government, and was 
often related to matters of mutual concern. In 1223, for instance, shortly after the Treaty 
of Catania had been r a t i f i e d , ^ 5  ^ group of envoys arrived, led by Bernard of Horstmar 
and Arnold of Gymnich.87 Their mission was probably concerned with that recent 
agreement, as Archbishop Engelbert of Cologne, head of the regency c o u n c i l , ^  8
82 Fred Cazel (ed.), Roll o f Divers Accounts for the Early year of the Reign of Henry III (London, 1982), 34.
83 DD, nr. 28.
84 Foedera, 166. The envoy has been identified as Master Bernard, provost of St Bartholomew’s in Friesach, 
chaplain of duke Leopold VI. Erich Zoliner, ‘Das Projekt einer babenbergischen Heirat Konig Heinrichs III. 
von England’, ArchivfUr Osterreichische Geschichte cxxv (1966), 54-75, at 58.
85 RLC, I, 471. Although the messenger, Conrad, provost of Speyer, was listed as ‘envoy of the Emperor’, 
this is misleading. The Bishop of Speyer was, next to the Archbishop of Cologne, a leading member of the 
regency for Henry (VII), having previously been Imperial chancellor: Kienast, Die deutschen Fiirsten, II, 6; 
Friedrich Bienemann, Conrad von Schaifenberg: Bischofvon Speier und Metz und kaiserlicher Hofkanzler
1200-1224 (Strasbourg, 1886), passim. Similarly, Conrad is regularly attested as being in the Bishop’s 
presence, ranking amongst his closest confidantes: Franz Xaver Remling (ed.), UB zur Geschichte der Bischofe 
zu Speyer, 2 vols., (Mainz, 1852-4), I, nr. 139. This included both the early years, spent in the Emperor’s 
entourage:^/, nrs. 982, 1038, as well as the young king’s regency:/?/, nrs. 3865, 3694, and his early 
government,^/, nr. 4108, where he remained after the Bishop’s death:/?/, nr. 4106. Conrad, thus, was an 
envoy of the regency, rather than the Emperor; also, in summer 1222, RLC, I, 506, an otherwise unidentified 
Brother Hamo was sent to England; one may assume that the abbot of St. Augustine at Canterbury was also 
dealing at least with some matters of diplomatic importance when, in May 1223, he received a safe-conduct to 
go on pilgrimage to Cologne:C/*/? I2I6-I225, 372.
86V5M, I, 1183-4.
87 RLC, I, 578. Bernard, a member of Engelbert of Cologne’s inner circle, having been among Richard the 
Lionheart’s companions during the king’s captivity, had also assumed a leading role in Otto TV’s negotiations 
with King John: Julius Ficker, Engelbert der Heilige: Erzbischof von Koln und Reichsverweser. (Cologne, 
1853; reprint Aalen, 1985), 137-9; also his ‘Herr Bernhard von Horstmar’, Zeitschriftfur vaterlandische 
Geschichte und Alterthiimskunde, iv (1853), 291-306. Bernard thus represented a link with an older tradition of 
Anglo-Imperial relations. Arnold, on the otlier hand, had been amongst Frederick’s earliest supporters, /?/, nr. 
822, and continued to enjoy strong links with the Imperial court. Although mostly active in the area around 
Aachen, Erich Meuthen (ed.), Aachener Urkunden II0I-I250, (Bonn, 1972), nr. 251; Lacomblet, II, nr. 99, he 
also appears on the witness lists for some of Frederick’s Italian charters in 1222/3: /?/, nrs. 1423, 1435, 1459.
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continued to oppose closer relations with F r a n c e . 8 9  It also opened preparations for one of 
the most ambitious projects undertaken by the English regency: a double-marriage 
between Henry IIFs sister Isabella and Henry (VII), and between Henry III and one of the 
Duke of Austria’s daughters.95
The earliest evidence for the project coincides with alarming news from the curia.
In December 1 2 2 4 ,  as already mentioned, Louis VIII’s proctors had threatened an 
invasion of England. On 3  January 1 2 2 5 ,  an English embassy, led by Walter Mauclerk, 
Bishop of Carlisle, was announced to Engelbert of Cologne and the Duke of A u s t r i a . 9 1  
Although the two were connected, Walter’s mission had been in the planning for some 
time. When he arrived in Cologne, he already found one of his clerics waiting for him, as 
well as Henry de Zudendorp, one of the Aichbishop’s ministeriales, and scion of a family 
with a commendable record in Anglo-Imperial d i p l o m a c y . 9 2  it would, therefore, be safe 
to assume that Walter’s mission had been preceded by preliminary negotiations. It may 
even have been amongst the issues discussed in July 1 2 2 4 ,  when Richard de Zudendorp 
was in E n g l a n d . 9 3  Much of what we know about the ensuing negotiations is based on a 
letter by Walter to Henry III from early February 1 2 2 5 . 9 4  When Walter first met the 
Archbishop, Engelbert pointed out that the English King was not the only one who 
wanted to have Henry (VII) as an in-law: recently 4 5 , 0 0 0  marks had been offered if he 
married a Bohemian princess, not to speak of proposals made by the King of Hungary. It 
should also be remembered that Louis VIII, too, was pressing for a marriage a l l i a n c e . 9 5  
Nonetheless, the Archbishop remained optimistic, and had already taken steps to ensure 
the Emperor’s consent. As far as the Austrian marriage was concerned, however, 
progress was less smooth. In March, Hemy de Cornhill, the chancellor of London and 
Henry’s envoy to Austria, gave an account of his many tribulations. He hardly managed 
to reach the duchy alive. In fact, he would rather be sent to Acre, than have to spend any a 
more time with the Austrians, whom he described as a ‘furious people, lacking both in 
modesty and reason’. As far as his dealings with the Duke were concerned, his offer had
88 Engelbert has triggered a relatively rich literature on his life. Most recently: Josef Lothmann, Erzbischof 
Engelbert!, von Kbln (1216-1225): Graf von Berg, Erzbiscchof und Herzog, Reichsverweser (Cologne, 1993); 
also: Bernd Fischer, ‘Engelbert von Berg (1185-1225), Kirchenfiirst und Staatsmann.’, Zeitschrift des 
Bergischen Geschichtsvereins xciv (1989-90), 1-47.
89 Kienast, Deutschland, III, 587-9.
96 For a more detailed coverage, Zollner, ‘Das Projekt’, passim; Huffman, Comparative History, 286-302; 
Bjdrn Weiler ‘Henry IH’s Plans for a German Marriage (1225) and Their Context’, TCE vii (1997), 173-88, 
parts of which have been abridged for this chapter.
61 CPR 1216-1225, 558.
92 Joseph Huffman, ‘Prosopography and the Anglo-Imperial connection: a Cologne ministerialis family and 
its English relations’. Medieval Prosopography xi (1990), 53-134, 59, 63. They also held lands in England: 
CChR 1226-57, 215. On 24 November 1235 Richard de Swinesthorp, identified as one of the Zudendorps by 
Huffman, received confirmation of a grant by the Duke of Lorraine of the town of Laxfeld in the honour of 
Eye. However, at the time these lands were held by Richard earl of Cornwall: CChR 1226-57, 129 (4.2.1231) 
and 139 (10.8.1231).
93 R f nr. 10923. This was followed by frequent exchanges of envoys: an English envoy was sent to Germany 
in July, and in October and December German messengers arrived in England: RLC, 1 ,465,471, 483, 495.
64 Royal Letters, I, nr. 213.
65 d D, nr. 153. Also, for the context, Falko Neininger, Konrad von Urach: Zahringer, Zisterzienser, 
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been received coldly.95 The reasons for this unexpected change of attitude - after all, the 
proposal had first been made by the Duke himself -97 are illuminated by the Chronica 
Reinhardsbrunnensis. According to this later source, Henry (VII) had been supposed to 
marry a Bohemian princess. As the couple were too closely related, the Duke was to take 
care of the princess, while a papal dispensation was to be secured. However, the Duke 
secretly sent his own messengers, and asked for papal dispensation on behalf of his 
daughter. These envoys are said to have been dispatched by early March, at about the time 
when the English mission arrived.98 Duke Leopold is known to have been at the Imperial 
court, and later Bernard of Horstmar, who had been despatched to the Emperor by 
Engelbert,99 referred to the role which the Duke played in the negotiations for the planned 
marriage. It is possible that the Duke was already planning to arrange a match between his 
own daughter and Henry (VII). Under these circumstances, the presence of English 
envoys may have been viewed as a cumbersome hindrance, and would explain the 
coldness with which the chancellor of London found himself received. This did not bode 
well for the project as a whole. Walter stayed in Cologne, increasingly frustrated and 
eager to r e tu r n , 150 while the Archbishop and Bernard of Horstmar assured Henry’s court 
that matters were progressing well, and that a (positive) decision was imminent. 151 
Walter was still at Cologne in July, 152 and it was not until August that he was allowed to 
set out for England. 153 By that time it must have become clear that the project was 
unlikely to succeed. Any hope that the maiiiage might yet be salvaged was shattered when 
Engelbert was murdered on 7 November 1 2 2 5 . 1 5 4  On 1 8  November Henry (VII) married 
Margaret, daughter of the Duke of Austi*ia,155 and the following year the German King, 
too, ratified the Treaty of Catania. 156 Not for the last time, Henry Ill’s efforts had been 
frustrated.
The episode as a whole, however, reveals a series of underlying structures which 
continued to dominate exchanges between England and Germany. Foremost amongst 
these were the political considerations of Henry III and his regents. That Walter’s 
negotiations dealt as much with the loss of Poitou as with the King’s maiiiage had never 
been a secret. When the Bishop of Carlisle first met Engelbert, he opened their 
conversation with a request to prevent a Franco-Imperial alliance, and he ended his 
account of the meeting by reporting that the Aichbishop had been optimistic about Henry’s
66 d D, nr. 163.
97 Zollner, ‘Das Projekt’, 58-9.
^^Chronica Reinhardsbrunnensis, MGH SS xxx, 607.
99 Royal Letters, I, no. 213.
100 Ibid., I, nr. 217; DD, nr. 172.
101 Ibid., nrs. 188-9.
lO^Leonhard Ennen and Gottfried Eckertz (ed.), Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Koln, 6 vols., (Cologne, 
1860-79), II, nr. 87.
103 The letter has been dated 17 August in Foedera, I, 190, and 27 August HB, II, 851.
104 Annales Elwangenses, MGH SS x, 20.
Burchardi et Cuonradi Urspergensis Chronicon: Continuatio, MGH SS \x ïù , 3S\] A nnales  
Scheftlarienses, MGH SS xvii, 338.
106 Constitutiones, nr. 290 (11.6.1226).
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chances of recovering his lost inheritance - a reference to Normandy, Anjou and 
P o i t o u .  157 A marriage between Isabella Plantagenet and Frederick IPs only son would 
have strengthened Henry Ill’s position against Louis VIII. If war broke out, Louis would 
have been forced to divide his troops between two enemies. In itself, this was a rather 
conservative choice of strategy. Something similar had been attempted by King John in 
the aftermath of the loss of Normandy, when he had allied himself with Emperor Otto IV.
As such, Walter’s embassy may symbolise the conservatism prevalent at Henry’s court; 
After all, those who in the past had brokered the deal with the Welfs, were now those who 
sought to utilise the victorious Hohenstaufen in the recovery of Henry’s lost possessions.
The personnel, as well as the means, of Henry’s early diplomacy were the same as they 
had been in the reign of his father. The successful conclusion of Walter’s mission would 
have eased the way for a recovery of the King’s continental inheritance. Even if Henry III 
abstained from militaiy action against France, the political advantages to be gained from 
such a union would have put him in a strong bargaining position. Thus, even if the 
chances for success looked increasingly slim, the potential prize to be gained was well 
worth holding out for.
Similarly, the English court tried to exploit the rifts between the German regency 
and the Emperor, and it did so at a well-chosen moment in time. Engelbert had little reason 
to support Louis VIII. In the early thirteenth century, the French crown expanded its 
territory not only westwards, against the Plantagenets, but also eastwards, into Imperial 
Burgundy and the Maas region, the latter an area where the see of Cologne had long­
standing c l a i m s .  158 a  marriage between Henry (VII) and a Plantagenet princess could 
well have been perceived as a ploy to counter French influence in that region. Engelbert’s 
murky role in the affairs of the ‘false’ Baldwin seem to justify this interpretation: he was 
seen as someone willing and able to assist those who opposed the Capetians. Other 
reasons, though, have to be taken into account as well: Cologne’s traditionally strong 
trading links with England had come under increasing competition from other German 
t o w n s ,  159 and closer political ties with England arranged via Cologne might thus have 
been viewed as a way of countering increasing competition from places like Ltibeck, 
Hamburg and Bremen, or the domains of the Duke of B r a b a n t .  115 Furthermore, 
Engelbert’s championing of an Anglo-German alliance could be viewed as an attempt by 
the regency council to escape the increasing domination of its affairs by the Emperor. 1H
6^7 Royal Letters, I, nr. 213.
108 Wolfgang Stiirner, ‘Der Staufer Heinrich (VII): Lebensstationen eines gescheiterten Konigs.’, Zeitschrift 
filr  Wiirttembergische Landesgeschichte liii (1993), 13-33, at 21 for the increasing hostility; Hugo 
Stehkamper, ‘Der Biscliof und Territorialfiirst (12. und 13. Jahrhundert)’, in: Peter Berglar/Odilo Engels (ed.), 
Der Bischof in seiner Zeit: Bischofstypus und Bischofsideal im Spiegel der Kolner Kirche. Festschrift Joseph 
Kardinal Hoffner (Cologne, 1986), 95-184, at 133-8 for Cologne’s territorial interests.
109 This is elaborated in more detail by Huffman, Comparative History, pp. 438-463.
Natalie Fryde, ‘Deutsche Englandkaufleute in friihhansischer Zeit’, Hansische Geschichtsblatter xcvii 
(1979), 1-14, at 6.
1 ^  * Werner Goez, ‘Moglichkeiten und Grenzen des Herrschens aus der Feme in Deutschland und Reichsitalien 
(1152-1220)’, Kôlzer (éd.), Die Staufer im Siiden, 93-112, at 97-9, for some of the problems in governing 
Germany.
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Although in theory Frederick had handed over the affairs of Germany to his son, in 
practice he continued to dictate the young king’s actions. ^  When Henry (VII) came of 
age, this led to renewed conflicts between father and son, but even during his minority, 
tensions occurred, as exemplified by the events surrounding Waldemar of Denmark’s 
imprisonment and r e l e a s e .  Engelbert’s insistence on pursuing the project of an Anglo- 
German mairiage, and his efforts to block attempts at forcing Henry (VII) into Frederick’s 
system of pro-French treaties, may thus have been an attempt to assert the independence 
of the regency council against the Emperor. Henry’s court could not have chosen a better 
moment, either. Henry (VII) had reached a marriageable age, while his father was under 
considerable pressure to complete his cmsading preparations. Traditionally, these included 
the continuation of a crusader’s dynastic l in e .   ^14 similai' considerations were to play an 
important role in England: Richard of Cornwall, Henry Ill’s younger brother, was not 
allowed to leave England while the King remained without heir,l 15 and Henry III was to 
include his son’s marriage amongst the preparation for his crusade in 1254. Walter was 
thus sent when the Emperor could be expected to have other things on his mind than 
meddling in the affairs of Germany, having to face an increasingly irate Pope about 
postponing an expedition to Palestine yet again, and at a time when he would be eager to 
marry off his son.
However, the very same reasons also caused the failure of Henry’s plans. His 
court may have suspected as much. After all, although negotiations in Germany were 
frequent and wide-ranging, no evidence survives for an English mission contacting 
Frederick himself. By accepting the overtures of either Louis or Henry, Frederick would 
have risked being perceived as supporting one against the other. This would have posed 
dangers not only for Frederick’s crusade, but also to his authority in Germany. Taking 
sides could have exposed the Emperor to the danger of repeating the events of 1198, when 
Philip Augustus and King John had tried to utilise the German Double Election by 
supporting rival candidates. Neither Otto IV nor Frederick would initially have stood 
much of a chance without the backing they received from their English or French 
supporters. This was no mere speculation. When Henry (VII) rebelled against his father in 
1234/5, he tried to secure supporters, amongst others, by suggesting a marriage alliance 
with the C a p e t ia n s .  1 ^6 Furthermore, alienating Louis VIII would have gained Frederick 
little. Although relations with Louis were less cordial than they had been with Philip 
A u g u s t u s ,  117 Henry III, ‘an impecunious minor’, as Louis’ envoys allegedly had put it, 
had nothing to offer in exchange. Neither could have contributed either to the Emperor’s 
crusading preparations, or to a strengthening of his and his family’s position in Germany.
112 Werner Goez, ‘Friedrich II. und Deutschland’, Klaus Friedland, Werner Goez, Wolfgang J. Müller (ed.), 
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Frederick saw no reason for wasting his sparse resources on supporting Henry III against 
his old friends and patrons. This was a lesson, however, which the English court was 
slow to leain.
In 1227, an Imperial marriage was on the agenda again. This time, however, 
circumstances seemed more promising. Frederick was expected to leave for Palestine at 
any moment, while Henry (VII) was at last taking personal control of his kingdom. Once 
again, the initiative appears to have been taken by the Archbishop of Cologne. Although 
the Duke of Bavaria had taken over as regent after Engelbert’s murder,^ 18 the prelate’s 
successor continued to dominate exchanges. This is borne out by the appearance of such 
familiar figures as the Zudendorps or Conrad of Speyer amongst Imperial envoys, but 
even stretched into previously uncharted territory. 119 Both Henry III and his German 
contacts looked to the Rhenish prelates for guidance and advice. Whoever wanted to enter 
into close relations with England had to ensure the services of the Archbishop. Count 
Arnold of Hückeswagen, the envoy who was to negotiate a planned marriage between 
Henry III and a Bohemian princess in June 1227, may seiwe as an example. 120 Although 
he played an important role at the Bohemian court, 121 it is also worth noting that his 
family originated from the Lower Rhineland which had brought them into close contact 
with the see of Cologne. 122 His father appears on the witness-lists of Adolph of Cologne 
in 1205, while Ainold himself witnessed a grant by Engelbert to the abbey of Altenberg, 
made at some point between 1218 and 1225.123 Arnold’s son and heir, in turn, joined the 
chapter of St Gereon at Cologne. 124 it seems, therefore, safe to assume that Arnold had 
been selected both because of his eminent position at the Bohemian court, and because he 
had close links with Cologne. Even in distant Prague, it had become clear that relations 
with England were more likely to succeed, if the Rhenish prelates lent their support. The 
Archbishop’s role is also underlined when Henry III asked him specifically for his advice 
about how to proceed in his marriage negotiations. 1^5 Even if Engelbert had failed to 
assert his independence from Frederick, he had certainly enshrined his dominant role in 
relations with England.
Although negotiations about the planned marriage had been conducted for some 
time, prior to Arnold’s arrival, 126 Hemy was to remain without a spouse. After leaving
^^ 8 Burchardi et Cuonradi Urspergensis Chronicon: Continuatio, MGH SS xxiii, 381.
119 CLR ]226-40, 15, 17: Gerard de Colonia.
120 Ibid., 36.
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suggest some importance: Karl Jaromir Erben (ed.), Regesta Diplomatica nee non Epistolaria Bohemiae et 
Moraviae 600-1253 (Prague, 1854), nrs. 833, 862, 873, 889, 923, 932, Appendix nr. 9.
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1281.’, in his (ed.). Die mittelalterliche Stadtebildung im sUddstlichen Europa (Cologne/Vienna, 1977), 90-129, 
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England in June 1227,^^7 one of the Count’s envoys returned in February 1228,1^8 
while Ainold himself came back in A p r i l ,  ^ ^9 to be joined by another messenger later that 
s u m m e r .  150 June 1228 letters were sent to the King and Queen of Bohemia, in which 
Henry III referred to a report he had received from their envoy. However, several 
questions had arisen which he wanted to discuss with Arnold, and the King and 
Q u e e n .  151 Arnold left in N o v e m b e r ,  152 and did not return until 1 2 3 3 .1 5 3  Once again, 
the reasons for this may be connected to the wider context of political contacts with 
Germany. After all, in 1227 Henry III seemed set to obtain what he had failed to achieve 
before: a mairiage, as well as a political alliance with the Empire.
In April, he wrote to Henry (VII), the Duke of Bavaiia and the Archbishop of 
Cologne, acknowledging the mission of Conrad of Speyer, and the offer of a 
confederation with the E m p i r e .  154 r  seems that the initiative had been taken by the 
German court. In his letter to the young King, Henry III referred to the proposal as having 
first been made by Conrad of Speyer, while the Duke of Bavaria was assured of the 
king’s gratitude for his promise to ensure the alliance’s conclusion. Once again, though, 
the King was to be disappointed. In September 1227, Henry III announced to the prelates 
and princes of the Empire assembling at Antwerp that he would send a high-ranking 
embassy, including the Archbishop of York, the Bishops of Norwich and Coventry, as 
well as the earls of Gloucester, Pembroke and Albemarle to conclude the planned 
a l l i a n c e .  155 However, no further record survives, either for the planned meeting or the 
proposed confederation.
As in 1225, these negotiations failed for the very reason which had given rise to 
hopes for their successful conclusion. As far as the English court was concerned, they 
formed part of attempts at utilising the troubled situation in France for a recovery of 
Henry’s lands. Louis IX, an infant whose government was controlled by his mother, 
faced serious unrest amongst the baions of France, coinciding with plans for an English 
invasion. After all, the Count of Toulouse, as well as leading members of the French 
nobility, had been in contact with the English court. Even if Henry (VII)’s government 
would not participate in an attack on France, friendly relations with Germany would have 
isolated Louis IX politically and militarily. Furthermore, with Frederick set to sail for the 
Holy Land by mid-summer, it seemed plausible that Henry (VII) would be able to act 
more freely, unfettered by his father’s continuing interference. The Emperor would have 
been too busy fighting pagans to mettle in the affairs of Germany. It seems plausible that 
motives on the German side were similar to those in 1225: an attempt to assert Henry
127 CLR 1226-40, 36.
128 Ibid., 68.
129 Ibid., 76.
130 Ibid., 88.
131 CR 1227-31, 107-8.
132 CLR 1226-40, 110.
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(VII)’s independence, as well as the need to strengthen Cologne’s position not only within 
Germany, but also in economic relations with England. However, these circumstances 
were also to bring by the failure of these negotiations. Frederick’s imminent departure 
certainly offered the opportunity for Heniy (VII) to act more independently. By September 
1227, however, when the proposed meeting was to take place at Antwerp, the Emperor 
had just returned to Sicily, and was soon to be excommunicated by the Pope. Under these 
circumstances, Frederick not only continued to dominate German affairs, it had also 
become politically inopportune to alienate the Capetians. As the immediate future was to 
show, the last thing Frederick II needed was French support for a hostile papacy. Equally, 
Gregory IX warned Henry III that he would not tolerate an attack on France. The curia 
was willing to mediate, but it would not permit open war. The Pope said as much when he 
wrote to Louis IX and Henry III in May 1227. Louis was encouraged to do justice to the 
King of E n g l a n d ,  156 while Henry was warned that the King of France was under the 
Pope’s special p r o t e c t i o n .  157 ytiig had the desired effect: in June, Henry suggested a 
continuation of their truce to Louis IX. 158 The King of England found himself 
disappointed, not because of his government’s incompetence, but because of 
circumstances and developments well beyond his control.
Frederick’s excommunication threw English diplomacy into turmoil. Henry III 
tried to avoid being drawn into the papal-imperial conflict, without alienating either party.
The closest evidence for active English involvement is presented by a letter sent to the 
Sultan of Damascus, in which the Muslim ruler was requested to set free Christian 
p r i s o n e r s .  159 Apart from this, which was by no means unusual, Henry preferred to 
mediate. In February 1228 he wrote to Gregory and Frederick, warning that the enemy of 
Mankind was jeopardising the crusade by sowing discord between Frederick and the 
Church. 140 Henry III implored the Pope to consider that it would be impossible to lead a 
crusade without the Emperor. Therefore, Frederick should be taken back into the 
Church. 141 In July, after the Emperor had departed for the Holy Land, Henry exhorted 
him to make his peace with the papacy, and to petition humbly to be taken back into the 
Christian f o l d .  142 However, neither Pope nor Emperor would allow the English court to 
remain neuti'al.
As soon as Frederick had left for Palestine in 1228, Gregory IX declared him 
deprived of the Sicilian throne, and sent an army against the regno, led by the Emperor’s 
estranged father-in-law, Jean de Brienne, and manned mostly by the Lombard
136 Registres Grégoire IX, nr. 86.
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communes. 143 However, to sustain momentum it soon became necessary to solicit 
additional funds. Gregory IX, therefore, quickly began to muster the Church’s resources, 
requesting subsidies from across Christendom. 144 in France, for instance, the clergy had 
to hand over the Tenth originally collected for Louis VIII’s Albigensian crusade. 145 in 
1229, it was England’s turn. 146 in April, the collection of a tenth on all the goods of the 
clergy began, ‘for the sustenance of the war against Frederick, Emperor of the 
Romans.’147 That proved insufficient. 148 For 29 April 1229 a meeting was called to 
Westminster, where the papal chaplain overseeing the taxation tried to whip up support.
The clergy agreed reluctantly to contribute, but the laity refused. It would be mistaken, 
though, to view this as a token of sympathy for Frederick. The objections raised were 
directed not at the purpose to which these funds were raised, but against an additional 
burden of taxation, so soon after the subsidies granted in 1225.149 Also, agreeing to a lay 
subsidy for papal campaigns may have been viewed as setting a dangerous precedent.
Nor was Henry III willing to send troops. No record survives for English knights fighting 
alongside papal armies against the Emperor in Southern Italy. Equally, Frederick’s 
propaganda fell on deaf ears in England. Not that he did not try; complaining of the 
injustice inflicted upon him by the Holy See, the Emperor drew parallels between his 
sufferings and those of King John. After Innocent III had encouraged the barons to take 
up arms against their ruler, he then forced John to take back his kingdom as a papal 
fief. 150 Henry III, too, his argument ran, was a victim of papal greed. Therefore, the 
King of England should assist the Emperor. Henry, though, was not to be swayed.
Gregory’s actions were not confined to sending troops against Sicily. Efforts were 
undertaken to undermine the Emperor’s support in G e r m a n y ,  151 although they met with 
little s u c c e s s .  152 A legate was sent to Germany whose mission has frequently been 
associated with attempts at replacing Henry (VII) with Otto of Lüneburg, heir to the 
W elfs c l a i m s .  155 Traditionally, it has been assumed that Henry III played a major part in 
these p r o c e e d i n g s .  154 This inteipretation rests on a series of letters written by the King on
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behalf of his German relative. On 6 March 1229, Henry III wrote to O t t o ,  155 probably in 
response to an embassy he had recently received from B r u n s w i c k .  156 The King 
expressed his joy at hearing of Otto’s recently obtained liberty, and went on to elaborate 
on their similar fortunes: Otto had been prevented from claiming his rights, and Henry 
from obtaining his inheritance. However, Henry promised to recover for both of them 
what was rightly theirs, thus elevating Otto to a status similar to his own. The latter may 
also refer to yet another marriage project pursued by the English court, as Henry declared 
that he would not enter into a marriage alliance with the Duke of Anhalt, whose relatives 
had shown themselves to be Otto’s enemies. Furthermore, the young Welf was requested 
to send envoys by Pentecost so that Henry III could enter into further communication. 
Most recently, attention has been drawn to the phrase:
‘Scire etiam vos volumus quod prompti sumus et semper parati ad quecumque commodum vestrum respiciunt et honorem, quern a nostro non reputamus alienumL
This passage has been interpreted as indicating plans to elevate Otto to quasi-royal status, 
thus suggesting that the King of England was part of papal plans at promoting the young 
Welf as King in Henry (VII)’s s t e a d .  157 Some credence has been given to this argument 
by the steps Henry III was to take next. After receiving an envoy from O t t o ,  158 the King 
wrote to Gregory IX in April 1 2 2 9 . 1 5 9  Thanking the Pope for his support in freeing Otto 
from captivity, he then requested that the young Welf, who was praised for his piety and 
undoubted loyalty to the Holy See, be recommended to the Imperial princes. This, it has 
been argued, suggests that Henry III was taking the initiative in promoting Otto’s 
presumed candidacy. 160
However, the phrasing of Heniy Ill’s letters is vague and inconclusive, and easily 
allows for a different interpretation. More importantly, the King of England lacked a 
motive. Henry (VII) had displayed considerable eagerness to form an alliance with 
England, and had thus given little reason for Heniy III to wish for his instant demise. 
Turning to Henry Ill’s letters, the question remains what he referred to when writing 
about Otto’s ‘recent captivity’ and the rights he had been denied. Otto the Child, as he is 
commonly known, was the surviving son of Emperor Otto IV, 161 and sole heir to the 
remaining Welf domains in Germany. However, in 1227, he had been captured in battle, 
and was not to be released until 1229, and even then only after considerable pressure from
Lorenz and Ulrich Schmid (ed.), Von Schwaben bis Jerusalem: Facetten staufischer Geschichte (Sigmaringen, 
1995), 89-116.
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Gregory IX. By then, Otto faced strenuous opposition to his ducal title and to his rights to 
several lands he claimed as his inheritance. This forms part of the context within which 
Henry Ill’s efforts have to be considered. The King of England had promised to assist the 
young prince in asserting his rights and inheritance, and so he did. Otto may have turned 
to his English cousin because of the strong links between the English court and Henry 
(VII)’s government. That Henry III turned to the curia may have been based on the 
assumption that Gregory’s influence with the German princes was indeed as fai-reaching 
as proclaimed. Moreover, the main challenger to Otto’s claims continued to be the 
Archbishop of Bremen. Thus, the Pope would have been the appropriate addressee of any 
intervention on the Welf’s behalf. Finally, when Frederick initiated the process which led 
to the restoration of Otto’s rights and title in September 1234, the phraseology used was 
similar to that employed by Henry H I. 162 That Henry III was willing to assist his cousin 
in reclaiming his inheritance is an explanation, at least as likely as the possibility that the 
English court was meddling in German affairs yet again. In addition, Otto’s restoration to 
his ducal lands and title would have added yet another influential name to Henry’s 
burgeoning list of allies in the Empire.
Otto himself rejected any suggestion of leading papal forces against the 
Hohenstaufen. However, he continued to remain in close contact with Henry III. He sent 
envoys to England in September 1229,163 and arrived himself in July 1230.164 He 
certainly was not treated as a prospective fellow-royal. When he arrived, Henry was 
campaigning in France, and so Otto had to stay in L o n d o n ,  165 where, as one chronicler 
puts it, his great length and height provided an amusing spectacle for the m a s s e s .  1 6 6  
Henry did not hasten his return, and Otto was forced to wait until October before he met 
the King. His visit’s most palpable result were trading p r i v i l e g e s .  167 Otto’s primary 
concern was probably to utilise Henry’s extensive contacts in Germany, taking up the 
promise made of supporting him in recovering his rights and inheritance. One may also 
speculate whether he may have aimed at reclaiming some of the lands once held by Otto
I V .  168 Considering that Emperor Otto had once started out as count of Poitou, the timing 
of the young Welf’s visit, coinciding with Henry Ill’s Poitevin campaign, may be 
suggestive. Should this have been the case, no record survives, not the least so, because 
Henry’s expedition failed to achieve its aim. All this seems an explanation at least as likely 
as consultations concerning Otto’s prospective resurrection of Welf royal claims.
There is little indication that Henry III actively promoted Otto’s candidacy aiiaongst 
his German contacts. No reference to his affairs was made in dealings with the King of
'62 Constitutiones, nr. 186.
'63 CLR 1226-40, 143.
'64 CR 1227-31, 366.
'65 Annals o f Dunstable, AM  III, 125.
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'68 Ahlers, Die Welfen, 169-78; Hucker, Otto IV., 13-21; Robert Favreau, ‘Otto von Braunschweig und 
Aquitanien’, Heinrich der Lowe und seine Zeit. Herrschaft und Reprasentation der Welfen 1125-1235, 
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Bohemia or the Archbishop of Cologne. In fact, the English court was quite willing to let 
slip by opportunities for mustering support, as illustrated by its dealings with the Duke of 
Brabant. Despite regular contacts, the issue of the Duke’s English fiefs overshadowed 
relations between Brabant and E n g la n d .  ^69 As the Duke had sided with Philip Augustus 
after Bouvines, he had been deprived of the honour of Eye, his main possession across 
the Channel. In the early 1220s efforts were made to improve relations with England. A 
series of letters from the D u k e  170 and Engelbert of C o l o g n e  171 survive, written at some 
point between 1216 and 1224, petitioning the English court to restore the Duke’s lands.
On 6 October 1229, however, Hubert de Burgh received Eye in safe-keeping for the 
Duke’s h e i r s .  172 This was probably based on some misinformation, as Duke Henry did 
not die until 1235. This grant seems to have caused some unease at the ducal court, as a 
safe-conduct from December 1229 survives for the Duke and his son on coming to 
E n g l a n d .  173 Whether this visit was completed remains doubtful, the only indication being 
a trading privilege granted in February 1230 at the Duke’s instigation, which did not 
necessai'ily require his presence at the English c o u r t .  174 i n  itself, the grant only confirmed 
privileges already made out in October 1229.175 The Duke’s visit would have provided 
an opportunity to extend relations with Germany, and to utilise them on Otto’s behalf. 
However, the surviving evidence does not suggest that either Otto’s candidacy or the 
general situation in Germany had been given any consideration.
However, some evidence exists for a pause in contacts between England and 
Henry (VII)’s government. Several messengers from Frederick II or his son are listed 
between February and July 1228,176 but then diplomatic exchanges paused until 
February 1230.177 At the same time, this need not necessarily be a sign of growing 
hostility. During these months papal efforts to undermine Frederick’s regime were at their 
most intensive, while the English court was primarily concerned with finding allies for the 
imminent campaign in France, an undertaking to which the Hohenstaufen seemed unlikely 
to be able to contribute. Hemy (VII) would have been unable to give what Henry III really 
wanted: military or diplomatic backing. Finally, the question has to be considered what 
possible interest Hemy III could have had in undermining the Hohenstaufen in Germany. 
After all, Henry (VII) had shown great eagerness to forge closer links with England. That 
these plans failed repeatedly was less the young king’s fault than his father’s. Henry (VII) 
was more likely to prove a reliable ally than a reluctant anti-King who lacked both the 
military basis and the political support necessary to make true his claims. More 
importantly, the situation gave an uncomfortable echo of the events after the death of
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Henry VI, when Richard had allowed himself to be dragged into the quagmire of Imperial 
politics, an involvement for which his brother and Henry III had paid a heavy price. On 
balance, explanations for Henry Ill’s intercession on Otto’s behalf, other than sinister 
plottings at the English court, can easily be found.
Although Henry III did not achieve what he had hoped for - an alliance with 
Germany - the years from 1225 to 1231 were not wasted. The English court had won new 
and influential allies in Imperial politics: the King of Bohemia, the Rhenish Bishops, the 
Duke of Brabant and the (future) Duke of Brunswick. In Germany support for an English 
alliance grew. Already in 1224/5, Frederick had encountered opposition from the German 
regency concerning ratification of the treaty of Catania. Prospects for a time when 
Emperor and Pope would be reconciled again looked promising. The defining feature of 
English diplomacy during these years was its conservatism, both in the strategy pursued 
and in the choice of allies. Although an alliance with Germany would not necessarily lead 
to militaiy support, the active search for such an agreement very much resembled English 
policy from about 1209 onwards. This is not surprising, considering that both Henry’s 
regency council and the government of his early years were dominated by seasoned 
ministers and officials from his father’s d a y s .  178 Hubert de Burgh and, to a lesser extent, 
Peter des Roches, had dominated John’s relations with continental Europe, and they 
continued to do so under his son. At the same time, they did not simply re-enact what the 
had done in the past. The English court, too, had leained from past mistakes. After all, 
Henry’s regents were still trying to repair the damage done by the Plantagenets’ support 
for the Welfs. They knew that they had little enough to expect from Frederick II himself, 
and so they looked to his son, and to the government of Germany. The general direction 
of their actions remained the same, that is they tried to forge an alliance with.the Empire 
against France. The means, however, were maikedly different. Instead of supporting rival 
kings, the English regents tried to marry the King and his family into the royal and 
princely nobility of the Empire. In itself, this marked a remarkable shift if not in the 
direction, so in the instruments of English diplomacy on the continent. Equally worth 
noting is the continuing domination of relations between the two countries by the 
Archbishops of Cologne. Henry (VII), the Duke of Brabant and the King of Bohemia 
found it necessary to ensure the prelate’s support when dealing with England, with equal 
reliance being shown by Henry III. This, too, resembles the diplomacy of King John’s 
reign. It would be mistaken, though, to view this as blind conservatism, reluctant to face 
the realities posed by Frederick II’s success. Henry and his regents were well awaie that 
they could only hope to forge closer ties with the Empire by side-stepping the Emperor. 
They tried to do exactly that by exploiting the differences between Frederick and his son’s 
government. That this strategy failed repeatedly was due to the fact that they
178 Fred A Cazel, ‘Intertwined Careers: Hubert de Burgh and Peter des Roches’, Haskins Society Journal I 
(1989), 173-81.
39
underestimated the weight Frederick still carried in German affairs, but also, and more 
importantly, due to the pressures the Emperor found himself exposed tb. Foremost 
amongst these must be numbered his planned cmsade, and increasing tensions with the 
Holy See, It remained to be seen, whether this would change, once Frederick II had 
returned and once the straggle between Pope and Emperor had been decided.
Chapter II 
Marriage Politics and the Crusade 
(1231-5)
When Frederick II returned to Sicily in 1229, the papal campaign against him 
quickly collapsed. ^  By April 1230 negotiations had begun for a peace witli the Lombard 
communes.2 Simultaneously, Pope and Emperor treated about a revocation of Frederick’s 
excommunication, with a final agreement reached in the Treaty of San Germano by
1231.3 This initiated a period of concord between Gregory and Frederick. As far England 
was concerned, Henry (VII) diminished in significance. Frederick controlled his son’s 
affairs in Germany more tightly, and left him little room to pursue an independent policy. 
Moreover, beset by domestic problems and notoriously short of funds, Henry III was in 
no position to challenge his Capetian adversaries, and had to settle for a series of 
unsatisfactory truces instead. The close proximity between German and English politics 
prior to Frederick’s crusade ceased to exist, and Heniy n i’s efforts at drawing the Empire 
into a closer alliance against Louis IX seemed doomed. However, in 1234 English 
fortunes took a sudden turn for the better: Frederick announced that he wanted to many 
Isabella Plantagenet. This laid not only the foundations for relations between England and 
the Empire during the remainder of Frederick’s reign, it also revealed some of the 
underlying structures of the affairs and politics of Latin Christendom during these years.
II. 1 Emperor and Pope
A new spirit of concord prevailed in papal-imperial relations, most clearly visible 
in dealings with the commune at Rome, the Lombard towns and the affairs of the Latin 
Kingdom of Jerusalem. Viewed in the light of later events, notably Frederick’s second 
excommunication in 1239, these years lend themselves to an interpretation which sees 
them as a prelude at best, or at worst as indicative of papal d o u b l e - d e a l i n g . 4  Neither 
interpretation does justice to what happened. Gregory and Frederick had not suddenly 
become friends. They were tied together by common necessity. The Emperor needed 
papal support to subdue his many foes, foremost amongst them the Italian communes. 
Similarly, Gregory viewed Frederick’s success of 1229 as merely preliminary, a breathmg 
period, allowing for the spiritual, political and logistic preparation of a new campaign to 
the Holy Land. This, more than anything else, brought Pope and Emperor together. No 
campaign could be successful unless it was supported and assisted by the ruler of Latin
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Palestine. That this concord broke down eventually is sometliing which we, blessed with 
hindsight, can judge to have been inevitable. The situation may not have appeared the 
same to contemporaries, and the events of 1231-5 ought to be considered with this 
qualification in mind.^
The crusade remamed at tire centre of papal diplomacy. The precarious state of the 
Holy Land continued to be stressed. In April 1231, for instance, Henry III was 
admonished to make peace witii France, as the King of Persia was planning to destroy the 
Christian faith in Africa,^ with a similar request made to Louis IX in May 1233.^ The 
connection between peace in Europe and the success of a future crusade was stressed once 
more in spring 1234: a new crusade was soon to be launched. However, its success 
depended upon peace being established among the Christian rulers of Europe.^ This 
formed part of wider preparations for the new campaign. Amongst the measures taken 
were renewed efforts at pacifying Christendom, as well as attempts at restoring a state of 
orthodox spirituality. After all, it was during the early 1230s that Gregory commissioned 
his Decretales, a canon law collection which remained in use until the early twentieth 
century, and that he began to formalise the legal procedures for the interrogation and 
prosecution of suspected heretics, later to be known as inquisition. This was no mere 
coincidence.9 An armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem could be successful only if the 
combatants were true Christians, untainted by heterodoxy or idolatry. 10 Even a union of 
the Greek and Latin Churches was attempted. H hi many ways, this was little more than 
following, to the letter and step by step, the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council. Then, 
too, the institutional and spiritual renewal of Latin Christendom, the battling of heretics 
and schismatics, had been perceived as leading towards the ultimate goal of an armed 
pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Nor were Gregory’s references to the affairs of the Holy Land 
idle talk: in September 1234 the Pope called for a new crusade to start once Frederick’s 
truce had expired, and by November the preaching of the Cross had begun in Ireland,
40
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41France, Germany and Lombardy. Having a period of nearly five years elapsed between 
the calling of a crusade and its eventual departure was not at all unusual. Time was needed 
to muster the necessary financial and military resources, to allow for the recruitment of 
troops, the collection of funds, the settlement of legal and political disputes. Once again 
Gregory did little more than follow the precedent established by Innocent III.
Gregory’s and Frederick’s preparations also included efforts at fostering stronger 
links with the Muslim ailers of North Africa. On 2 0  April 1 2 3 1 ,  the Emperor concluded a 
truce with Yaliya Abu Zakaria o f  T u n i s i a .  13 They agreed to release prisoners, and to make 
amends for damages inflicted by pirates. The problem of Muslim corsairs also involved 
the Pope. In August 1 2 3 1  Gregory IX requested al-Kamil’s support in freeing merchants 
from A n c o n a .  14 in addition, efforts were undertaken to win or convert potential allies. In 
February 1 2 3 3 ,  for instance, the Sultan of Damascus was requested to allow various 
mendicants to preach the Gospel, and to accept Christianity. 1  ^In May, similar petitions 
were directed towards the Caliph of Baghdad and the Sultan of Morocco. 1^ For March 
1 2 3 5 ,  an embassy from the Sultan of Iconium is reported as visiting Rome, discussing the 
possibility of an alliance, and conveying the Sultan’s promise to assist the Christians in 
recovering all lands they had lost under Saladin. 1  ^These efforts also included attempts at 
converting the people east of the river Wolga, and initiated the earliest contacts with the 
Mongols. The success of Frederick’s stiategy in 1 2 2 9 ,  in itself by no means entirely 
unprecedented, set an example which was willingly taken up by the curia.
Emperor and Pope shared a mutual interest in the Holy Land. Ever since Urban 
IV, the curia had taken a lively interest in ensuring that the holy places of Christendom 
remained under the rule of tlie faithful. In Frederick's case, the liberation of Jerasalem had 
given him considerable weight and authority. It had helped to end his excommunication, 
as we will see it had strengthened his hands in dealing with the curia about other points of 
conflict, and it had added not inconsiderably to his prestige within Latin Christendom. 
After all, he was the man who had achieved what successive campaigns for the last fifty 
years had failed to obtain: a deal which returned Jerusalem to Christian control and which
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42allowed time to prepare for a campaign to cement and expand on his own achievements. 
This, in turn, gave the Emperor greater liberty in dealing with his remaining opponents. 
However, Frederick’s position was under threat from two sides: not only was the truce he 
had arranged in 1229 preliminary, but he also faced opposition from the nobles of 
Outremer. There, the underlying problem was Frederick’s inability to accept the 
limitations of royal authority in Palestine, and the limits of his own claims to the title of 
King of Jerusalem.^^ He had inherited the title via his wife, Yolanda/Isabella,^ ^  In 
theory, it was to be passed on to their son Conrad, but Frederick remained unwilling to 
comply. In fact, during the Emperor’s life-time, Conrad was never addressed as King, but 
only as heir to the kingdom of J e r u s a l e m . 2 2  This was combined with Frederick’s inability 
to acknowledge that in the Holy Land, unlike in Sicily or Germany, the monarch was ruler 
primus inter pares.^^ For instance, he refused to accept the role traditionally exercised by 
the nobility of Palestine in appointing a regent, and sent his Sicilian marshal, Richard 
Filangieii, instead. The Emperor showed scant regard for the sensitivities and expectations 
of his subjects in Palestine. In 1229, for example, the lands which had been won back by 
the truce with al-Kamil were not returned to their former owners, but to the Teutonic 
K n i g h t s ,^4 a relatively parvenu order with little standing in the society of Christian 
Syria.25 This was in spite of protestations made by the barons of Outremer. Frederick 
thus alienated some of the kingdom’s most important families. In particular the Ibelin 
lords of Beirut soon became a focal point for tliose opposing the Hohenstaufen r e g i m e .^ 6  
A crusade could be utilised to overcome such resistance. After all, when Gregory came to 
support Frederick against the rebels, he did so because they impeded the planned crusade. 
More importantly, a successful campaign would have given the Emperor the prestige, the 
lands and the manpower to isolate his opponents. In addition, the Emperor was no
26 For a contemporary, hostile account: Les Gestes de Chiprois, ed. Gaston Raynaud Publications de la 
société de VOrient Latin: Série historique, v, (Geneva, 1887), 76-83, 83-99,105,112-46; Continuation de 
Guillaume de Tyre dite du Manuscrit de Rothelin, in: Receuil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens 
Occidentaux, ii (Paris, 1859), 526. For a good secondaiy discussion of the sources: Geoffrey N. Bromiley, 
‘Philip of Novara’s account of tlie wars between Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and tlie Ibelins’, JMH iii 
(1977), 325-38.; see also: Peter W. Edbury, John o f Ibelin and the kingdom o f Jerusalem (Woodbridge, 
1997), 41-57.
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ordinaiy crusader. Unlike Richard the Lionheart he could not be content with a passing 
appearance in Syria. He was the kingdom’s ruler and as such bound to maintain and 
expand its lands and territories. An isolated success would not do. Frederick was 
probably aware that the Pope’s support depended not only on his successful recoveiy of 
Jerusalem, but also on his continuing defence and expansion of Christian lands in 
Syria.^"  ^As such, the new crusade was an obligation, a duty and a necessity
Gregory left no doubt as to who he s uppo r t ed . In  1231 Frederick sent troops 
under the command of his marshal, Richard Filangieri, against Jean de Ibelin and his 
allies. This was greeted with applause by Gregory. In August 1231, he wrote to Frederick 
who, for the first time, was addressed as King of Jerusalem (in itself a major concession 
on the Pope’s part), and promised his full s u p p o r t . 3 0  i n  June 1232, Gregory reprimanded 
the patriarch of Jerusalem for disregarding papal orders and for supporting the rebellion 
against Frederick.31 In July the military orders and the Church of Outi'emer were ordered 
to fight against those who disobeyed the E m p e r o r .  3 2 Once peace had been restored, the 
curia went to great lengths to lend Frederick its backing and even those who, only a few 
yeai's before, had been able to count at least on the Pope’s tacit consent in their rebellion 
against the excommunicate Hohenstaufen, now found themselves a most formidable 
alliance of regnum and sacerdotium. However, after initial successes, Richard was 
defeated, and the Ibelins gained control over most of the kingdom. Gregory, though, 
continued to support Frederick. In August 1234, for instance, he admonished Jean de 
Ibelin to make amends for the insults he had done to the Emperor, or to seek papal 
a r b i t r a t i o n . 3 3  Gregory made clear whose claims he considered to be the better. This could 
not have come as much of a surprise. After all, Frederick would have been unable to 
muster much authority, unless he had firmly subdued the kingdom which was to be 
defended by an imminent campaign. If civil strife continued to weaken the defences of 
Latin Christendom, the events of the Third Crusade had shown, even the biggest and best- 
equipped expedition could achieve little. As we wül see it was only when Frederick failed 
to win a decisive victoiy, and when liis continuing conflict with die Ibelins and there allies
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44began to threaten the planned crusade itself, that Gregory ceased lending his 
unquestioning support to Frederick. It was then, too, that he began to urge compromise 
and arbitration.
A similar spirit of co-operation prevailed in Frederick’s and Gregoiy’s dealings 
with the Lombard communes. However, the curia’s support was less unconditional than it 
had been in the Holy Land. Gregory urged peace and compromise, rather than 
condemning those who resisted Frederick. Nonetlieless, tliis marked a momentous shift in 
papal attitudes. In fact, when announcing his reconciliation with the Emperor, the Pope 
found it necessary to assure the communes that this was not a betrayal of his Lombard 
allies.34 Gregory was soon forced to arbitrate. During 1 2 3 1  Italian communes and their 
representatives had been summoned to a number of meetiiigs,35 which were to culminate 
in a diet at Ravenna. Although Frederick emphasised that this had been planned with the 
Pope’s advice, the list of paiticipants and the diet’s agenda caused unease.36 Frederick’s 
son was to attend with a contingent of Germany princes, and the meeting’s objective was 
the ‘establishment of peace and prosperity in Italy’. The presence of German troops and 
an agenda who’s phrasing echoed the justification of the very Imperial claims which the 
Lombard League had sought to refute did little to assure the communes of Frederick’s 
good intentions. Far from achieving its objective, the planned diet initiated a new period of 
war. The towns blocked the Alpine passes and prevented Henry (VII) from attending. 37 
111 the end, Frederick was forced to seek papal mediation. Negotiations began in March 
1 2 3 2 ,  but a final agreement was not reached until October 1 2 3 3 . 3 8  it is worth noting that, 
as in the truce of 1 2 2 7 ,  one of tlie clauses stipulated that the League provide 5 0  knights for 
tlie Emperor’s use in the Holy Land.39 The document did not solve the problems between 
Emperor and communes. At best, it provided a compromise, a temporary agreement 
which barely managed to patch over tlie fundamental disagreements between Emperor and 
Lombards. However tliis was not what mattered. Viewed in the context of papal crusading 
policy, the treaty of 1 2 3 3  was a small step towards the pacification of Christendom. None 
of the initiatives taken by the Pope during these years aimed at a permanent settlement of 
conflicts and rivalries. All the curia expected was that hostilities would cease long enough 
for die planned cmsade to get under way.
Nor should we be surprised at Gregory's rather different handling of the 
opposition to Frederick n  in Italy and Christian Syria. No Pope could have afforded to 
alienate the Lombards. Theii* political, economic and militaiy weight was too important an 
asset to be dispensed with easily. The communes had provided the Pope with the 
necessary financial and military backing to lead his wars against Frederick during the 
Emperor's absence and their traditional wariness of any attempt at establishing firm
34 Constitutiones, nr. 149.
35 Ibid, nrs. 151-2.
36 Ibid., nr. 155.
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45Imperial control was one of the fundamental safeguards for the continuing political 
independence of the Holy See. No Emperor would be able to treat a Roman pontiff as 
Henry IV and his predecessors had done, while the Pope would be able to count on easy 
support from the towns and communes of northern Italy. Naturally, this caused problems 
for Gregory IX, too. He could not and probably did not want to support open rebellion 
against the Emperor, as this would have tied up resources and funds needed for a much 
greater undertaking. However, neither could he abandon his old allies and support the 
Emperor in all his demands against the Lombaids. Consequently, the curia was forced to 
perform a precarious balancing act, alienating neither its traditional friends and allies, 
while remaining on good terms with the Emperor whose backing was needed not only for 
far-flung expeditions to North Africa, but also for equally pressing problems closer at 
home.
It would be wrong to perceive the Pope as a friend of communal government per 
se. Gregory was equally stern in his condemnation of communes once they interfered with 
his own authority. A good example is provided by the government of Rome.40 After 
various efforts at finding a compromise balancing the Pope’s claims to sovereignty within 
Rome and the citizens’ demands for self-government, a final break occurred in 1234. The 
citizens maintained that all the papacy’s possessions were part of the dominions of the city 
of Rome, and as such had to be under communal control. This was unacceptable to 
Gregory, and preparations began to solve the problem by force. In October and November 
the curia started to muster troops in Germany for a campaign against the Romans, to be 
led by the Emperor.41 In December, the Churches of France, Castile and Aragon were 
asked for support,42 as was the clergy of England.43 English chroniclers emphasise the 
prominent role of Peter des Roches, Bishop of Winchester, during the campaign.44 The 
reasons for Peter’s involvement will be dealt with in greater detail at a later stage.45 
Suffice it to say here that his involvement was not a sign of warming relations between tlie 
English court and the Emperor, but the result of Peter’s fluctuating political fortunes 
which by then, and not for the first time, had driven him into exile.46 However, what this 
episode does illustrate is the degree to which Pope and Emperor collaborated, and the 
extent to which they depended on each other’s support. Frederick needed Gregory in 
order to overcome the opposition he faced in Palestine, and in order to settle his affairs in
46 Ferdinand Gregorovius, Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter: vom V. bis XVI. Jahrhundert, New 
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AM, III, 142. However, Mattliew Paris names the count of Toulouse as leader of tlie papal aimies: CM 
III, 304.
45 II. 3.
46 Vincent, Peter des Roches, 470-2.
Lombardy. The Pope, on the other hand, was unable to overcome the political challenges 
he faced in his own domains without external help, primarily that of Hie Emperor. It was 
upon this interdependence that tlieir concord was based.
This point will be illustrated with two more examples, that is the Emperor’s 
relations with his son, and the affairs of Languedoc. Frederick’s involvement in 
Gregory’s war against the Romans was cut short by his son’s r e b e l l i o n . 4 7  Since Henry’s 
failure to attend the diet at Ravenna, relations between father and son had cooled. In April 
1232, during a meeting at Aquileia, the King was forced to perform an oath of loyalty to 
the Emperor. To make his humiliation complete, the German princes were authorised to 
rebel against him, should he show any sign of disobedience in future. Furthermore, 
Henry (VII) had to petition Gregory to be excommunicated should he ever again oppose 
his father’s d e c i s i o n s . 4 8  This left Henry no room for manoeuvre. Many of the Imperial 
princes began to utilise this rift between father and son, and appealed to the Imperial court 
as a sure means of overturning the young King’s decisions. By 1234 Henry was driven 
into rebellion. Frederick showed no hesitation, and in July 1234 he asked Gregory DC to 
excommunicate his son. In response, Henry (VII) started negotiations with the Lombard 
League and concluded a treaty of mutual friendship and s u p p o r t . 4 9  The young King had 
reached the point of no return. In spring 1235 the Emperor entered Germany, while 
Gregory IX threatened excommunication to those still assisting the rebels.^O Henry’s 
support crumbled, and in July 1235, at Wimpfen, he was forced to surrender, was 
imprisoned and exiled to Apulia.^ 1 The compromise agreed in 1220, awai'ding Frederick 
control over the Empire, on condition that his son ruled Germany, had failed, not tlie least 
because Frederick was unwilling to cede authority in deed as well as name.
Finally, the Emperor’s involvement in Languedoc ought to be considered. Like 
Lombardy and the Holy Land, Imperial Burgundy found itself at the centre of Frederick’s 
attention. As soon as peace had been aiTanged with Gregory IX, the Emperor stated his 
claims: in March 1 2 3 2  feuds were banned across Provence, and efforts were undertaken 
to recover Imperial lands.^^ Similarly, in November 1 2 3 2 ,  Frederick sent orders that 
those who held Imperial fiefs meet him with tioops the following s p r i n g . 5 3  The full 
weight of Imperial authority was to be felt. In September 1 2 3 4 ,  the Count of Toulouse 
received a confirmation of his fiefs and was granted the margraviate of P r o v e n c e 4 
this, Frederick followed a petition made by the King of France to the Pope.^^ Frederick’s 
influence in the region is also evident in the presence of both tlie Counts of Toulouse and
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Provence at a diet at Hagenau in late 1235.^^ They led the largest contingent of 
Burgundian nobles attending a meeting outside Arles since the days of Frederick 
Barbarossa. Their attendance was a major achievement in itself, as in the past the ongoing 
feud between the Counts had thwarted all efforts at p e a c e m a k i n g . 5 7  The Emperor used 
his new found influence and status to manifest his claims even in regions which for tlie 
pervious generation or two had only seen little, and mostly nominal, exercise of Imperial 
rule and lordship.
A pattern should become in all this, in Frederick's dealings with the barons of the 
Holy Land, as much as in his relations with the communes of Northern Italy or tlie lords 
and nobles of Burgundy. Nor were these efforts confined to the lands listed above alone. 
In Germany the Emperor, too, aimed at establishing a basis for firmer royal control than it 
had existed before. In 1235 a diet issued what was to become known as the Mainzer 
Reichslandjfieden. The document aimed at listing and manifesting the responsibilities and 
rights of the Emperor in his Geiman homelands. Although this entailed a final surrender 
of those privileges which in the past had been either given to or taken over by towns, 
princes and prelates, it also aimed at strengthening the monarch’s position by underlining 
his role as the final arbitrator of legal disputes and conflicts. In fact, this aspect of the 
1235 Reichslandfiieden was to become one of the basic constitutional documents of the 
Holy roman Empire, used and refeiTed to until the Empire’s demise in 1806.
Although Frederick’s actions do form part of what could be described as preparing 
Christendom for a new campaign to Palestine, they also aimed at extending, manifesting 
and strengthening his authority in all those lands which nominally fell under the Empire’s 
control. However, the question remains whether the two were as mutually exclusive to 
him as they might seem to us. Unless proper control had been established over his various 
domains, Frederick would be unable to lend the planned expedition his full support. In 
many ways, his actions are reminiscent of Frederick Barbarossa’s preparations for the 
Third Crusade. At the time, these entailed a temporary pacification of Italy, the 
establishment of a general peace in Germany, and further expansion into B u r g u n d y . 58 
Similarly, the ruthlessness with which Henry VI had established his claims over Sicily 
was part of his crasading preparations, as weU as stating his claims to be William II’s trae 
s u c c e s s o r . 5 9  That Frederick II, unlike his predecessor, continues to be viewed as a 
Macchiavellian plotter, exploiting the religious credulity of his contemporaries, owes 
much to later papal p r o p a g a n d a . ^ 0  However, if compared to his father’s and grandfather’s 
undertakings, the main difference appears to be that Frederick II did not die before the
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48crusade got under way or before it reached its goal. If this hypothesis is accepted, we also 
see Frederick II emerge no longer exclusively as the sage law-giver and proto-renaissance 
prince, the enlightened absolutist, finally brought down by his own anachronism, but well 
and truly as a medieval monarch who lived, thought and acted within the same parameters 
as his contemporaries, who shaied and followed a common set of beliefs and precepts for 
action and royal government. Part of this Weltbild was, and was to remain for a long time, 
the defence of Christian lands in Syria. This certainly was not the Emperor’s sole 
motivation, but it was an aspect of his acts which, so far, has all too frequently been 
overlooked and which gives a more plausible explanation of his undertakings than many 
previous approaches have done.
Where did tliis leave Henry IH ? Where did he fit into the greater scheme of things 
? Was there any hope that he might succeed in achieving what he had failed so notably to 
obtain before, that is an alliance with the Empire and, ultimately, the recovery of his 
paternal inheritance in France ? Heniy (VII), had been politically isolated. At best the King 
of England may have hoped that Frederick’s interest in the affairs of Imperial Burgundy 
might lead to a rapprochement. After all, Languedoc had been an area which had come 
under increasing domination by the Capetians, often, and especially during Louis VIH’s 
reign, at the Emperor’s expense. Moreover, by granting Raymond of Toulouse the 
margraviate of Provence, Frederick was rewarding one of the English King’s most loyal 
allies. However, should Henry have entertained such hopes, he was to be disappointed. 
Louis IX and Frederick II acted in unison. The grant awarded to Raymond of Toulouse 
co-incided with similar petitions made by the King of France whose brother, one day, was 
to inherit the county.^ 1 The Emperor’s primary objective was to establish a firmer grip on 
the affairs of Imperial Burgundy, and he had little reason to fear Capetian influence in the 
region. Frederick also made sure that his renewed interest in the kingdom of Arles was 
accompanied by efforts to strengthen his ties with Louis, and in May 1232 the treaty of 
Catania was confirmed once more.^^ Louis IX continued to be one of the pillars of 
Frederick’s diplomacy in Europe.
II.2 Henry III and Louis IX
The recovery of Poitou, Anjou and Normandy remained an ambition of Henry 
n r  s. However, he was unable to embark on a major campaign in France, and had to settle 
for a series of truces instead. This was as much the result of political unrest he faced in 
England, as of persistent papal pressure. In April 1231, shortly after an understanding had 
been reached with Frederick II, Gregory IX wrote to Henry III and urged him either to 
make peace with Louis IX or to prolong the existing t r u c e .^ 3  Similar exhortations were
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sent to the King of France in May 1233V^ The Pope even involved himself directly in 
negotiations; in 1233 the Archbishops of Paris and Sens, as well as the Bishops of 
Salisbury and Winchester, received papal letters to facilitate an agreement. They were to 
urge if not a lasting peace, so at least a temporary agreement which eased continuing 
tensions between the royal houses of England and France. This was probably par t of the 
papacy’s peacemaking efforts in preparation for the 1239 cmsade, a connection underlined 
by another papal missive from February 1234: the Holy Land depended on peace among 
lire Christian princes. Therefore Louis and Henry should come to t e r m s . ^5 This initiated a 
period of protracted negotiations, plagued by the continuing distrust with which the two 
mlers eyed each other. Henry III found liimself facing a papal attitude not dissimilar to 
the one Frederick II encountered in Lombardy. A conflict which, judging by past 
precedent, was not amenable to a quick and peaceful solution, or where such a settlement 
could be achieved only through a prolonged and costly military campaign, was to be 
considered as keeping occupied financial and military resources which were much more 
urgently needed in settling the affairs of the Holy Land. For the past generation henry IB, 
his father and his regents had aimed to undo the losses incurred in 1204, but they had 
failed repeatedly. Moreover, a military manifestation of his claims would have entailed 
attacking the realm of a minor whose family had shown itself to be one of the great pillars 
of papal policy in the past. A truce, however much it was a preliminary measure, a 
settlement which hid rather than solved the underlying conflict, was preferable to yet 
another prolonged and with aU likeliliood inconclusive war.
Henry IB, however, left no doubt that any agreement was to be only temporary in 
n a t u r e . 6 7  wiiile negotiations for a peace continued, preparations began for military action. 
In April 1234, troops had been mustered to assist the Count of Brittany in a rebellion 
against the King of F r a n c e .  ^  8 However, Hemy IB was deserted by his allies as quickly as 
he had won them: in September the Count submitted to Louis IX.69 Similarly, in August 
1234, Henry’s stepfather, Hugh de Lusignan, Count de la Marche, once among the pillars 
of English diplomacy, agreed on a settlement with Louis I X . 7 0  The King of France 
promised not to enter a truce unless the Count’s claims against the King of England 
concerning the island of St Oleron had been settled. This was to prove a major stumbling 
block,71 and a final agreement was not reached until late July 1235.72 The truce was to 
be valid for five years from mid-August, and was to include the Count of Toulouse as 
well as the Kings of England and France. A complicated system was set up to arbitrate
Royal Letters, I, Appendix V, nr. 31.
65 Registres Grégoire IX, ms. 1801-2.
66 Henry III, for instance, repeatedly stressed that he complied reluctantly, and only because of the pressure 
exercised by tlie curia: CR 1231-4, 559.
62 Ibid., 559-60.
68 Ibid., 558.
69 Powicke, King Henry III, 184.
26 Layettes, II, nr. 2307.
21 CR 1234-7, 160-1; TR, nr. 65; CPR 1232-47, 110.
22 d D, m-. 239; CR 1234-7, 192.
violations of the peace, foreshadowing the anangements of the treaty of Paris (1259). 
Even then, the truce was not fully ratified until early 1236.73 The truce of 1235 was to 
form tlie basis for future agreements between the two mlers for almost a generation. At the 
time, however, it was considered not a blue-print for peace, but merely as a means of 
postponing tlie final showdown over Heniy’s inheritance.
The English court continued to look for allies in France. Most importantly, plans 
were made for a mairiage between Henry III and the Count of Ponthieu’s heiress and 
daughter. 74 After consultations with tlie ciiriaj^  as well as the regents of Louis IX and 
Queen Blanche,76 the King’s intentions were made public in April 1235.77  Soon after, 
Henry’s almoner was sent to Poiithieu, probably in order to finalise arrangements.78 By 
early summer, however, problems occurred. According to Matthew Paris, the marriage 
failed, amongst other reasons, because of the opposition it encountered from Louis IX’s 
court.79 The prospect of an English King acquiring the strategically important county of 
Ponthieu must have caused some unease.80 At the same time, it seems that Henry HI was 
playing a double game. Although he and Count Simon of Ponthieu had entered into a 
legally binding agreement, the King also contacted Count Amadeus of Savoy.81 Henry 
explained that he had been prevented from marrying the Count’s niece, daughter of the 
Count of Provence, because he had akeady exchanged vows concerning another bride. In 
the meantime, however, Henry had heard of an impediment to their proposed mairiage. 
Amadeus was therefore asked to ensure tliat his niece would not marry someone else. The 
recently discovered impediment probably refened to the King and Simon’s daughter being 
related witliin the canonically prohibited degrees of consanguinity. However, negotiations 
to secure a papal dispensation had begun well before Henry announced his intentions, and 
strenuous efforts had to be made by the English court to counteract the ongoing process at 
the curia. On the very day the above letter was sent to Amadeus of Savoy, Henry III 
contacted his proctors in Rome and ordered them not to pursue the matter any f u r t h e r .^7 
In July the King’s agents were informed that the council had decided to postpone the 
planned marriage. Therefore, they were ordered not to breathe a word about it to any 
living soul.83 However, by August the curia’s support had been enlisted,84 and in eaiiy
50
23 Foedera, 1 ,221; CR 1234-7,158.
24 Mai'garet Howell, Eleanor o f Provence: queenship in thirteenth-century England (Oxford, 1998), 10-11 
for much of tlie following.
25 tR, nr. 5. Henry announced a mission headed by William of Kilkenny and Robert Surecote, 
mysteriously defined as dealing with urgent matters on which the Pope’s counsel was needed. Presumably, 
this included the planned marriage.
26 CPR 1232-7, 94.
22 TR, nr. 61.
28 Ibid., nr. 64.
29 CM, III, 327-8.
86 Stacey, Politics, 180.
81 TR, nr. 70.
82 Ibid., nr. 72.
83 Ibid., nr. 75.
84 Ibid., nrs. 76-8. However, it is wortli noting tliat Henry’s betiotlial to the daughter of Simon of 
Pontliieu was not finally nullified by tlie curia until August 1252: Foedera, I, 284.
51October Henry wrote to the Count of Provence, announcing envoys to draft a proper 
maiTiage treaty.85 gy Christmas, he was mamed.8 6
We will probably never know for certain why Henry III changed his mind. 
However, there is little doubt that it was he who decided to abandon the heiress of 
Ponthieu. Matthew Paris may have reflected anxieties at die French court as to tlie possible 
consequences of English control over Ponthieu. However, proceedings at the curia seem 
to have progressed well, and should Louis IX have made serious objections, there would 
have been no need to order Henry’s proctors to act in such a secretive manner. Louis’ veto 
would have been reason enough in itself. It is equally difficult to see the advantages of a 
Provençal mairiage. Not only did Henry risk alienating his traditional ally in Languedoc, 
die Count of Toulouse, he also got veiy littie in exchange. His marriage portion was never 
formally settled,87 and his wife would have been only one claimant amongst several to 
her father’s inheritance. At best, Henry may have hoped to offset Capetian influence at the 
eastern flanks of Gascony, or maybe, as has been suggested, exchange any lands he 
might receive for territories in Normandy or Poitou.8 8  He may have reacted to Louis IX’s 
mairiage with another of the Count’s daughters in 1234. Be this as it may, these dealings 
underline the extent to which Henry refused to give up hope for a future role in France.
He may have been forced into a truce, but this did not mean the end of his claims or 
ambitions.
Prospective marriages were not the only means by which Henry III tried to 
strengthen his influence along the borders of France. He continued to maintain friendly 
relations with the Count of Toulouse. Parallel to negotiations with the Count of Provence, 
an envoy from Raymond VII of Toulouse arrived in England in October 1235. Henry’s 
response to the Count seems sufficiently conspiratorial to assume that possible moves 
against Louis IX had been amongst the issues discussed: Henry’s envoy would convey 
the King’s answer verbally, as the roads were too dangerous to commit anything to 
w r i t i n g . 89 How effective such an alliance would have been remains open to doubts. 
Raymond’s heiress had married Alphonse of Poitiers in 1234, making Louis’ brother the 
prospective heir of Toulouse. At the same time, as later events would show, Raymond 
was far from willing to accept this as inevitable. He made repeated efforts to extricate 
himself from Capetian control, and continued to pose problems to Louis’ authority in the 
region until his death in 1245, Little evidence survives for other contacts. The Count of 
Guines came to England,90 and the Countess of Flanders was requested to repay a loan of 
£50 made by King John to the citizens of Ghent.91 Neither case constitutes a major
85 Ibid., nr. 84.
86 CR 1234-7, 339; Howell, Eleanor, 12-21 for a more detailed account.
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88 Stacey, Politics, 180-1.
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52diplomatie initiative, but they illustrate the difficulties facing Henry III in his quest for 
allies. Not only did Louis IX expand his influence into areas traditionally among the 
pillars of English anti-Capetian diplomacy, he also strengthened his hold on dependent 
rulers, such as the Countess of Flanders. Under these circumstances the King of England 
had little option but to sue for peace.
However, diplomatic setbacks were not the only reason for a lack of military 
initiative on Heniy Ill’s part. England was beset by political difficulties, and during 1233- 
4 the King faced the most serious rebellion of magnates since Magna C a r t a . 9 2  These 
troubles originated in the King’s refusal to grant Richard Marshall access to all of his 
inheritance. After repeated attempts at mediation had failed, war broke out. The Marshal 
soon formed an alliance with Llewelyn of Wales and the King of Scotland, thus 
threatening Henry both along England’s western and northern borders, and in the south­
east. Peter des Roches, Bishop of Winchester, at the time in charge of the King’s 
government, had lost support by his treatment of Hubert de Burgh. His defeated rival had 
been deprived of his fiefs and grants and had been put on trial on trumped up charges of 
conspiracy and tieason.93 Even the Pope complained about his treatment by the Bishop of 
Winchester. By spring 1234 Henry III also encountered strenuous opposition from the 
English Church, with plans to excommunicate liim should he not make peace with the Earl 
Marshal. Aggravated by his continuing financial malaise, Henry remained unable to 
respond to the raids of the Marshal and his allies. Not until the King led attacks on 
Richard’s Irish estates did a change for the better occur. Even then, however, Henry’s 
finances did not allow for sustained military action. In 1234, a compromise peace was 
reluctantly agreed upon, Peter des Roches was sent into exile, and only the Marshal’s 
sudden death spared Henry IE further humiliation. Under these circumstances, the King 
was in no position to embark upon adventures abroad. We should, tehrefore, not be 
surprised, if Engliosh relations with Germany during tehse years do not rival those 
between 1225 and 1229 either in frequency or in intensity. The king of England was 
unable to do what in the past had all too often instigated his interest in the. medieval 
Emphe, its princes and mlers: a military campaign to reclaim his inheritance. Moreover, as 
we have seen, the political situation in Germany gave the English court little hope of 
achieving its goals. It had failed to do so under far more auspicious circumstances than it 
would encounter now.
92 Vincent, Peter des Roches, 375-9, 399, 417-434 for the following. Some of tlie issues involved have 
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93 David Carpenter, ‘The FaD of Hubert de Bmgh’, in: his The Reign o f Heniy III (London, 1996), 45-60.
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II.3 Frederick II and Henry HI
After Frederick’s return from crusade all hopes that his predicaments might be 
used to Henry Ill’s advantage had been dashed. Hemy (VII) was in no position to 
counteract his father, and the Pope had little interest in alienating his new and potent 
friend. It would be mistaken, though, to assume that contacts had come to a complete 
stand-still. In January 1231 , for instance, the Bishop of Cambrai received guaiantees for 
his safety on coming to England,94  and in 1232 the Duke of Limburg visited the shrine of 
St Thomas at Canterbury.95 The latter’s visit also indicates continuing relations with 
Cologne, as the Duke remained amongst the Archbishop’s most trusted allies. A similar 
impression is given by a grant of trading privileges to the merchants of Cologne from 
April 1231.96  Unlike earlier grants of a similar kind, tliis time the rights were awarded for 
an unspecified lengtli of time. This may have been a reflection of the Archbishop’s former 
good services. Amongst the other agents of English relations with the Empire, the Duke of 
Brunswick played only a subordinate role. Envoys from the ducal court are recorded as 
being in England in August 1231 and July 1233.97  However, no evidence survives to 
illuminate the purpose of their mission. Apart from these, some familiar names appear, 
like that of the Count of Hückeswagen, whose wife had sent envoys to the English court 
in 1233.98  This may have been related to earlier proceedings concerning a Bohemian 
marriage. These, however, had long been abandoned, and the most likely explanation is 
that the Count’s messengers may have conveyed news of Henry (VII)’s alleged plans to 
divorce his wife, and to marry Agnes of Bohemia instead.99 The Duke of Brabant, on the 
other hand, played no part at all, and in February 1231 Henry’s brother Richard was 
granted the Duke’s English l a n d s .  100 Although contacts continued, their scale and 
frequency bear little resemblance to the years before 1231 .
Henry (VII)’s loss in significance coincided with a surge of English interest in 
Frederick II. Previously, the King’s court had largely ignored the Emperor and had 
concentrated on the German regents instead. However, the political changes occurring in 
Germany required a new approach. In November 1232  a messenger from Thomas of 
Acena, Count of Apulia, anived in E n g l a n d .  101 This may indicate high-ranking contacts, 
as Thomas was among the Emperor’s most trusted advisors. He had been involved in the 
diplomatic preparations for Frederick’s crusade, when he negotiated with al-Kamil in
94 CR 1227-31, 466. A Simon de Cambrai is referred to in October 1231 as customary recipient of the 
King's alms: R. Allen Brown (ed. ), Memoranda Rolls 16-17 Hemy III preserved in the Public Record 
Office (London, 1991), nr. 206. However, I have not been able to establish any further connection.
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54prepai'ation for the Emperor’s expedition, and was later to play a significant role in the 
administration of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. 102 However, no evidence survives to 
illuminate the background of this mission. Nor was tliis the only contact. In March 1233, 
Henry III complied with a petition from the Emperor and promised £30 to assist Lando, 
nephew of the Archbishop of Messina, in his studies at Paris. 1^3 it would be reading too 
much into the sources, though, to view this as indicating ‘that the Emperor was now 
considered a diplomatic channel for English interests.’104 What these visits certainly did 
indicate, however, was the eminent role played by Peter des Roches, Bishop of 
Winchester, in English politics.
After losing out against his rival Hubert de Burgh in 1225, the Bishop had left for 
the Holy Land, where he had come to prominence in the Emperor’s crusade. He 
accompanied Frederick on entering Jerusalem, and some, mostly English chroniclers, list 
him among the leaders of the e x p e d i t i o n .  105 Returning to Europe with the Emperor, Peter 
was involved in negotiations with Gregoiy IX during 1230-1. The Annals o f Tewkesbury 
probably exaggerate when they state that the Bishop pacified Frederick and G r e g o r y ,  106 
but independent evidence survives to link Peter with the proceedings. In August 1230, he 
was one of the envoys confirming the demands made by the cardinal of Santa Sabina, the 
Pope’s negotiator, to the E m p e r o r .  107 This earlier involvement in Imperial politics may 
explain the contacts established with tlie Imperial court during the early 1230s. The Count 
of Apulia probably met Peter during Frederick’s crusade, while the Archbishop of 
Messina most likely dealt with Peter in the course of the negotiations of 1229-31.108 This 
impression is also strengthened by the kind of petitions Henry’s government received, 
such as that on Lando’s behalf. The embassies reaching England certainly point to 
personal t i e s .  109 No treaties were discussed or alliances planned. Nonetheless, the 
possibility that Peter’s good standing with the Emperor might be used to Henry Ill’s 
advantage should not be ruled out. The fact that Henry (VII) solicited French rather than 
English support during his rebellion may be a case in point. HO Peter was certainly adapt 
at calling in favours from old friends. Matthew Paris, for instance, reports that in 1233 he 
had asked the Emperor’s support in the planned election of John Blund as Archbishop of
102 Powell, Anatomy, 199; E. Blochet, ‘Relations diplomatiques des Hohenstaufen avec Les Sultans 
d’Ègypte’, Revue Historique, Ixxx (1902), pp. 51-64.
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C a n t e r b u r y . H I  Similarly, Gregory IX helped, assisted and defended the Bishop of 
Winchester when his position became increasingly untenable, due to the vigorous 
opposition he began to encounter from the kingdom’s magnates and prelates. Closer ties 
were certainly forged, but the question remains whether this would have been the case 
without Peter’s involvement.
However, even the Bishop of Winchester’s prominent role did not prepare Henry 
ni for what was yet to come. In November 1234, after negotiations which may have been 
under way since September, 1H  Frederick II officially announced his intention to many 
Isabella Plantagenet, the King’s s i s t e r .  H 3 An embassy led by Peter de Vinea, Frederick’s 
trusted councillor, was sent to anange the details. If possible, he was to be joined by the 
Archbishop of Cologne. The Emperor was very specific in what he had to offer: he would 
take Isabella as Ms lawful wife, and would keep her with aU the honour appertaining to an 
Empress. She would be given the Mazara valley and the honour of Mount San Angelo, as 
other Queens of Sicily had had it.H 4 exchange, Frederick was to receive a dowry of
30,000 marks. By mid-December, Peter had reached E n g l a n d .  H  5 However, he was 
travelling alone. Henry of Mühlenark, the new Archbishop of Cologne, played no part in 
the negotiations. At best the fact that he had been intended to accompany the Emperor’s 
emissary may have been an acknowledgement of the weight he once carried in dealings 
with E n g l a n d .  H  6  Negotiations proceeded quickly, and in late February 1235 Henry ITT 
announced his sister’s imminent m a i r i a g e .  H7 At last, and wholly unexpectedly, the King 
of England received what he had been working for with so much effort and so little 
success since 1225: an alliance with the Empire.
In late spring 1235 an embassy led by Duke Henry of Brabant, acting as 
Frederick’s proxy, arrived in England to escort the King’s sister to G e r m a n y .H 8  The 
Duke was accompanied by the Archbishop of C o l o g n e ,  H  9 and two high-ranking 
Teutonic K n i g h t s .HO Isabella’s imminent departure provided an opportunity to reward
C M , III, 243; Vincent, Peter des Roches, 365-71 concerning tlie election and Peter’s role.
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56old friends and to seek new allies. On 24 April the Teutonic Knights were promised an 
annual rent of 40 m a r k s .H I  Most importantly, on 7 May the Duke of Brabant was 
promised that, should he or his son return within a month from Michaelmas 1235, or by 
Easter 1236, they would receive the honour of E ye.H 2 The Duke was promised the 
settlement of an old grievance, tlius providing an opportunity to forge closer links with a 
ruler strategically positioned to the eastern borders of France. Henry seems to have had 
great hopes for this alliance. In October, after news of the Duke’s death had reached 
England, Henry assured the Duke’s son that Eye could still be his.H 3 To underline the 
sincerity of his intentions, Richard de Zudendorp received confirmation of a grant which 
Duke Henry I once had made concerning the town of Laxfeld.H4 To emphasise that this 
might be the dawn of a new era in relations between England and Brabant, various trading 
privileges were issued to the Duke’s merchants,H5 while one of his clerks was promised 
an annual payment of ten marks from the Exchequer. H 6 The Duke of Brabant was thus 
considered to be about to re-enter the fold of loyal allies and potential ' supporters. 
However, old friends, too were rewarded for their services. A number of trading 
privileges were issued for tlie citizens of Cologne, but few grants were made comparable 
to the privileges received in 1231.H 7 Although old friends were not forgotten, new 
opportunities were eagerly seized.
Frederick’s choice of emissaries reflected the tradition of English contacts with 
Germany. Although Peter de Vinea led the negotiations, Isabella’s escort consisted of the 
Archbishop of Cologne and tlie Duke of Brabant. Only the Duke of Brunswick was 
conspicuous by his absence. However, this was not a sign of cooling relations or of the 
Duke’s lessening significance. Rather, Otto of Liineburg was about to be granted what he 
and his family had been fighting for ever since the fall of Henry the Lion in 1*184: to be 
taken back into the ranks of the Imperial nobility. H 8 Not only had Henry lost liis duchies 
of Bavaria and Saxony, he had also been deprived of his ducal titles. H 9 To undo lliis loss 
in rank had remained among tlie major concern of Hemy the Lion’s descendants. HO After 
his wedding at Worms in June/July 1 2 3 5 ,H I Frederick proceeded towards Mainz, where 
he presided over the diet which witnessed the final reconciliation between Hohenstaufen 
and Welfs. Since September 1234, a commission had been investigating Otto’s claims to
2^1 CChR, 200; full text in Koeppen, ‘Die englische Rente’, at 413-4.
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57the Welf i n h e r i t a n c e .  H2 August 1235, he was granted tlie lands of his uncle, and was 
made Duke of B r u n s w i c k .H3 This was as much a reward for Otto’s loyalty during the 
Emperor’s excommunication and Henry (VII)’s rebellion, as yet another step towards 
pacifying the Emperor’s homelands as well as his domains in Burgundy and Italy.
The way the union of 1235 had been brought about did not lack a certain revealing 
irony. For years henry had been tiying to forge closer ties with the Empire Throughout, 
the best means of reaching his goal had been by side-stepping Frederick II himself, and by 
turning to his son and the German princes instead. Nonetheless, over and over again it 
was the Emperor’s unwillingness to involve himself in the rivalry between Plantagenets 
and Capetians which had Heniy’s schemes caused to falter. Then, just as Henry (VII), the 
main hope the English court still had of acliieving closer links witli the Hohenstaufen, was 
about to be deprived of his royal title, Frederick perfonned a volte face and announced his 
intention of marrying a Plantagenet princess. In many ways this is illustrative of the tight 
reins with which he governed Germany, and of the new strength of position he had 
obtained since his return from the Holy Land and since his excommunication had been 
revoked. Henry (VII)’s inability to gain control of his own affairs certainly had 
contributed to his rebellion against his father, and it was the success of his crusade which 
allowed Frederick II to disregard at least some of tlie worries his marriage was to cause to 
his old Capetian friends. Nonetheless, the abruptness with which he changed direction 
requires some further analysis. What exactly had been his reason to marry Isabella 
Plantagenet ?
It seems tliat the English court had been surprised by Frederick’s abandonment of 
his traditional, waiy stance towards closer links with England. There was no bargaining 
over the conditions he had made concerning Isabella's marriage portion, and no attempt at 
receiving further guarantees of political collaboration. The prize on offer was probably too 
valuable to risk it by putting forth demands. Nonetheless, Henry and his court new 
exactly what they expected to gain from this alliance. Ever since Peter de Vinea had 
arrived in England, hopes abounded that the proposed marriage might be used against 
Louis IX. In December 1234 Henry wrote to Frederick II, expressing his hope that tlie 
Emperor would assist him in obtaining his honour and a d v a n t a g e .  H 4 t h e  past this had 
been the phrase commonly used to denote the King’s claims to his inheritance in France. 
Probably in Februaiy 1235, a similar letter was sent to the Cardinal of St Praxedis: with 
the Emperor’s help it would now be possible to recover Henry’s rights. 135 This 
expectation is also contained in the account of the Annals o f Dunstable: the Emperor had 
promised to assist Hemy in the acquisition and defence of his r ig h t s .  H 6  This certainly
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135 TR, nr. 14.
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expressed the prevalent attitude amongst those close to the King. The marriage was 
viewed as a stepping stone towards a military recoveiy of Anjou, Poitou and Normandy.
The Emperor’s motivation is more difficult to ascertain. After all, he must have 
been aware of English expectations that his marriage could be utilised against Louis IX. At 
the same time, no evidence sui-vives to suggest that he was about to abandon his Capetian 
a l l i e s .  H7 jn  fact, the Emperor took great care to assure Louis that his marriage would not 
mean an end to their friendship. In April 1235, informing the King of France of the 
planned wedding, Frederick declared that he was to continue his alliance with the 
Capetians, and suggested that he and Louis IX meet in the near f u t u r e .  H 8 Gregory IX, 
too, assured the King of France that no harm was to come from this u n i o n .  H  9 
Furthermore, attempts were made to settle the Anglo-French conflict, hi a letter, probably 
written in June 1235, Henry III referred to a suggested meeting between the rulers of 
England, Germany and F r a n c e .  HO xhis can be linked to the planned conference at 
Vaucouleurs which was to settle the conflict between England and F r a n c e . H I Although 
the three rulers never met, the fact remains that Frederick was aware of the implications 
his marriage might have for relations with France, and that a settlement of the differences 
between Henry HE and Louis IX formed part of its diplomatic background.
However, this still does not explain why Frederick was willing to enter into a 
union which, despite his best efforts, was viewed as a potential thieat by the Capetians, A 
number of explanations have been put forth, none of them entirely convincing. To give a 
few examples: the marriage was interpreted as aiming at putting an end to the old conflict 
between Welfs and Hohenstaufen. H 2  However, by 1235 tlie Welfs’ loyalty was beyond 
doubt, and Frederick n  had initiated moves for a final settlement well be fore negotiations 
with England began. H 3 it bas even been suggested that the union was to prevent Henry 
(VII) from receiving English subsidies, H 4  but: Henry had approached the Capetians, not 
England for support. Fritz Trautz suggests that it may have been an attempt at linking 
Frederick to a ruler of proven loyalty to the Holy See.H 5 However, in 1234, Hemy III 
had faced excommunication, not the Emperor. Although this does not mean that none of 
these reasons may have played their part in Frederick’s or the curia’s deliberations, it 
seems that other, equally important reasons have so far been overlooked. H 6  Tq reach a
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59better understanding of events, tlie wider European political and diplomatic context ought 
to be considered. Most importantly, Gregory IX’s role in the proceedings should be taken 
into account.
Neither the Emperor nor Henry III left any doubt about the Pope’s involvement. 
When Frederick II first announced his intentions, he described himself as acting ‘ad 
tractatum et ordinationem karissimi patris nostri domini G r e g o r i i ’ .H V  This was repeated 
in the Emperor’s letter to Louis IX from April 1235: during a meeting the previous 
summer, the Pope had suggested Isabella as Frederick’s w i f e . H 8 He was not 
exaggerating. Gregory took an active role during the negotiations. In December 1234, for 
instance, he wrote to Hemy HI and announced that Frederick was to ask for Isabella as his 
w i f e .  149 A similar point was made in the marriage contract publicised on 27 February: 
upon the Pope’s advice, Isabella had been given in marriage to Frederick 11.150 When the 
King of England wrote to the cardinal of St Praxedis the same month, this was repeated: 
as suggested by the Pope, the King’s sister had been given in marriage to the 
E m p e r o r .  151 Gregory IX was the driving force behind the agreement. Taking into 
account his repeated exhortations to Louis IX and Hemy III to arrange peace, it seems 
unlikely that he had intended the mairiage to be the opening shot in a war against Louis 
IX. This is underlined by a letter from Pope Gregory to Louis IX from September 1234, 
after the marriage between Frederick and Isabella had first been mooted: not to impede Üie 
business of the Holy Land, peace ought to be made with Henry HI. 152 Why then did he, 
and why did Frederick favour an English mairiage?
It may be worth considering overall papal policy during these years. As pointed 
out earlier, a crusade to the Holy Land remained at the centre of papal concerns, and the 
pacification of Christendom was an integral part of its preparations. England and France 
were not the only subjects of papal arbitration. In January 1235, for instance, Gregory IX 
had urged the Aichbishop of York and the Bishop of CaiJisle to arrange a peace with 
S c o t l a n d .  153 Peace was to be established across Christendom, in Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy and Palestine. As we have seen, not all of the Pope’s efforts aimed at a 
permanent settlement of conflicts. In fact, it appears that the curia would have seen its 
aims fulfilled, if peace lasted long enough for the campaign to get under way. Nor were 
papal actions always guided by realism or political pragmatism. With this proviso in mind, 
Gregory’s support for the Anglo-German marriage seems less surprising. If nothing else.
his children from Bianca Lancia whom he appeals to have married after tlie deatli of Yolanda/Isabella, but 
who must have died 1233/4. ibid., 359.
147 HB, IV, 503.
148 Ibid., IV, 539-40.
149 Foedera, 1 ,220.
150 TR, nr. 1.
151 Ibid., nr. 14. The point was repeated in a letter from Henry III to Gregory IX from April 1235: 
Foedera, 1,225-6.
152 Registres Grégoire IX, nr. 2180.
153 poedera, 1,214-5.
60the Hohenstaufen were linked to the Plantagenets, while still being firmly tied to the 
Capetians. Potentially, this could mean forging a formidable alliance which could be 
utilised for the purposes of the Holy Land. Even if tliis might have been overly optimistic, 
the Emperor’s influence with Henry HI and Louis EK could nonetheless be sued to broker 
if not a permanent, so at least a temporaiy settlement of the rivalry between Capetians and 
Plantagenets which had beset so many past expeditions to the Holy Land. As we will see, 
this was not entirely unrealistic. More importantly, it makes Gregory’s involvement 
appear little different from earlier initiatives by the curia which, too, had aimed at using the 
politics of mairiage to settle conflicts, to cement or form alliances. H4
However, where does this leave the Emperor ? The affairs of the Holy Land 
certainly played their part in Frederick’s deliberations. Even if he himself did not intend to 
participate in the planned campaign, he had considerable interest in the Holy Land. In 
addition, the English alliance also brought other much needed gains. H5 The financial 
advantages to be had out of the mairiage were considerable, and Frederick left little doubt 
that he needed the money. The payment of Isabella’s dowry was to dominate exchanges 
between England and Germany over the following years. He needed funds to finance his 
campaigns in Italy and Palestine, to reward his followers and allies. Similarly, the 
marriage gave Frederick additional standing within Latin Christendom, with some 
important consequences. In 1238, for instance, English troops fought alongside the 
Emperor’s against the Lombard League, and when Henry Ill’s younger brother went on 
crusade in 1239, he acted in close co-operation with Frederick, performing a semi-official 
role on the Emperor’s behalf in Palestine. However, should the Emperor have hoped that 
this would put English requests for further assistance against France at rest, he was to be 
disappointed. This dichotomy of expectations continued to define and form relations 
between the two mlers. The mairiage between Frederick II and Isabella Plantagenet gave 
Gregory IX the hope that peace could be arranged in time for his planned cmsade, Henry 
n i  the expectation that Frederick’s support could be won against the Capetians, while the 
Emperor gained much needed funds, troops and prestige.
5^4 For the interplay of peace and marriage diplomacy: Constance M. Rousseau , ‘A papal matchmaker: 
principle and pragmatism during Innocent Ill’s pontificate’, JMHxxiw (1998), 259-71.
5^5 Trautz, Die KOnige, 105.
Chapter III
^confederati sumus (...) contra otnnes homines
( 1236-9 )
Isabella’s marriage initiated a new period of concord in Anglo-Imperial 
relations. In fact, the years between her mairiage and Frederick’s excommunication in 
1239 stand out for the frequency and intimacy of relations between the two rulers. The 
English court took great pride in its close relationship with the Empire, and stressed 
the newly established family connection between Emperor and King.^ Peter de 
Vinea’s continuing presence in England showed its influence in the increasingly 
flowery style of Henry Ill’s foreign correspondence.^ In 1236, Henry de Aeys, the 
Imperial chamberlain,4 was in England, probably in connection with the trial against 
the Jews of Fulda for accusations of ritual murder. At the time, Frederick had been 
recruiting Jewish converts from across Christendom as expert witnesses, and in his 
response Henry III referred to neophytes he was sending to Gennany.5 In addition, 
Henry III and Frederick seem to have embarked on an animated exchange concerning 
falconiy.6  Furthermore, although with a certain degree of apprehension,^ Walter of 
Ocra was granted permission to journey to Ireland for the collection of Isabella’s 
dowry . 8  In 1238, at Frederick’s instigation, a clerk of Reggio was promised a
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1 Henry III in a letter to Gregory IX probably dating from January 1237, outlining his relationship 
with Frederick: TR, nr. 48.
2 In 1236, for example, Walter of Ocra was referred to as ‘clerk and envoy of tlie King's brother 
Frederick’: CPR 1232-47,146.
3 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, ‘Petrus de Vinea in England’, MIÔG li (1937), 43-88, at 58-9. However, tlie 
influence exercised by the papal chancery should also be noted: Geoffrey Banaclough, ‘The English 
royal chancery and the papal chancery in the reign of Hemy HI’, MIÔG Ixxii (1954), 365-78.
 ^Royal Letters, II, nr. 418. Henry is referred to as imperialis aulae marescallus. However, tliis poses 
problems of identification. Julius Ficker, in his ‘Die Reichshofbeamten der staufischen Période’, 
Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-Historischen Klasse der (k. k. ) Osterreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften zu Wien xl (1862), 447-549, at 466, suggested as the ‘de Aquis’ were usually 
chamberlains, not marshals, tliis must refer to Henry of Pappenheim. However, it is equally likely 
that an English scribe had been making a mistake. Henry of Aachen (Aeys being tlie Anglo-Norman 
word for Aachen) was a prominent figure at Frederick II’s court, involved in negotiations with France, 
RÎ, nr. 1986, and later prothonotary: Ennen/Eckertz, Quellen, II, nr. 222. Even more importantly, he 
was related to tlie advocate and tlie provost of Aachen who, earlier on in Henry Ill’s reign, had been on 
diplomatic missions to England: Erich Meuthen (ed.), Aachener Urkunden 1101-1250, (Bonn, 1972), 
nrs. 8, 254. This also made him a close relative of Hemy (VII) and a half-cousin of Frederick IPs first 
wife, Constance of Aragon: Erich Meutlien, ‘Die Aachener Prdpste bis zum Ende der Stauferzeit’, 
Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins Ixxviii (1966-7), 5-95, at 60-84. He, thus, seems a more 
likely candidate for such a high-profile mission. However, just to make tilings really confusing, in 
December 1237, a ‘Gerardus de Aquis tricameraiius noster’ was announced as tlie Emperor’s envoy to 
crusaders from France: HB, V, 141.
5 An account of tlie affair is given by Annales Erphordenses, MGH SS xvi, 31. Friedrich Battenberg, 
Herrschaft und Verfahren: politische Prozesse im mittelalterlichen rOmisch-deutschen Reich 
(Daimstadt, 1996), 30-33.
6 English records point to an unusually large number of visits by Imperial falconers to England and 
vice versa. CPR 1232-47, 139; CR 1234-7, 296; this exchange continued until the late 1240s, CR 
1247-51, 88 [20. 9.1248].
7 CR 1234-7, 368.
8 CPR 1232-47,146. The need to pay Isabella’s dowry led to attempts to win additional finances from 
the King’s Irish subjects, CR 1234-7, 509-10, 571-4. Walter of Ocra and Giles Bertaud of the 
Teutonic Knights had been sent specifically to collect outstanding debts: TR nr. 55; Felix
benefice.9 This was more than what was common in exchanges between medieval 
mlers. Even the animated contacts during Henry (VII)’s regency bear little compaiison 
with these years. It must have seemed as if the fulfilment of Henry’s wishes was 
imminent.
However, it was the Emperor who now stood at the centre of exchanges. The 
German regents, acting on behalf of his second son, Conrad IV, who was formally 
elected king in 1237, played only a subordinate role. This is illustrated by the envoys 
sent to England. Many of those who had played such an important role in Anglo- 
Imperial relations in the 1220s, such as the Archbishops of Cologne, disappear from 
the records. Most embassies were led by Frederick’s officials, in marked contrast to 
the period before 1 2 2 9 . Frederick’s proctors were drawn from among the inner 
circle of his administration. Walter of Ocra may serve as an example. H  In May 1236 
he travelled to I r e l a n d ,  H  in 1237 he returned to collect the final instalment of 
Isabella’s d o w r y .  13 Since 1236 Walter had been Frederick’s chaplain. He was one of 
the Emperor’s foremost diplomats and, next to Peter de Vinea and Thaddaus de 
Suessa, chief advisors. His presence therefore testifies to the significance now 
attached to relations with England by the Emperor himself. Naturally, the collection of 
Isabella’s dowry was a task best entrusted to reliable aids and confidantes, but it also 
pomts to the fact tliat Frederick may have been expecting more than merely an increase 
in funds to spring from his improved standing with the court of Henry III. A similar 
picture as to the rank and significance of Imperial envoys is borne out by the other 
emissaiies sent. These included tlie chamberlain Henry of Aachen who visited England 
in 1236, H  and in January 1239. H  Another member of his family, the advocate of 
Aachen, is recorded in June 1236.16 Later that year a Hugh de Gastello Novo, 
probably a medium-ranking in Frederick's Sicilian administration, is mentioned as the 
Frederick’s m e s s e n g e r .  17 The Geimans who used to dominate contacts between the
Liebermaiin, ‘Zur Geschichte Friedrichs II, und Richards von Coniwall’, NA xiii (1888), 217-222, at 
217-8 for tlie Msh connection.
9 CPR 1232-47, 219.
With the exception of 1237, ivhen Geraid de Zuydendorp was in England: CLR 1225-40, 263. It is 
uncleai" though whetlier he attended on a diplomatic mission, or to trade.
Kemp, Kirche und Monarchie, I, 128-132; Heinz Hartmann, ‘Die Urkunden Konrads IV. ’, AfD 
xviii (1944), 38-163, at 134-47; Gunther Wolf, ‘Anfange standigen Gesandtschaftswesens schon zur 
Zeit Kaiser Friedrichs II. T , AfD xli (1991), 147-53 for his diplomatic career.
12 CPR 1232-47, 145, 146.
13 TR, nrs. 53-5; CLR 1225-40, 265, 268, 269, 275, 276, 278; CPR 1232-47, 188; CR 1234-7, 
466.
14 Foedera, 1,224.
15 CLR 1226-40, 359.
16 HB, rv, 884-5. William, tlie advocate of Aachen, Henry’s brotlier: Meutlien, Aachener Urkunden, 
nr. 122, where, 15. 6. 1237, Henry of Aachen, Imperial camerarius and brotlier of the advocate, buys 
lands.
17 CR 1234-7, 301. Who exactly he was remains obscme. In 1255, however. Innocent IV mentioned 
Hugh de Castroiiovo in a letter outlining tlie actions to be taken against Manfred and Frederick Lancea 
in Sicily: AI, II, nr. 1044. The envoy ‘Hugh’ mentioned in 1237 may have been tlie same person: 
CLR 1226-40, 250.
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two countries were increasingly replaced by men drawn from among the Emperor’s 
Sicilian subjects.
III.l Imperial diplomacy
Nonetheless, his marriage had begotten Frederick problems as well as 
opportunities. Foremost amongst the former ranged the impact tins would have on his 
relations with Louis IX, and it is therefore not surprising to see that he stepped up his 
efforts to broker a more permanent settlement between Louis IX and Hemy m. To this 
purpose, he called for a meeting between himself, Henry III and Louis IX at 
Vaucouleurs, on the borders between France and the Empire, in 1236. Matthew Paris 
vaguely describes the meeting as designed to deal ‘de negotiis arduis, tam imperium 
quam aha regna contigentibus’.l^ What this meant is elaborated in a letter by Henry III 
to Frederick, in which he thanks the Emperor for his efforts to ensure peace between 
Capetians and Plantagenets.^^ However, in early January 1236, Henry III declared 
that he would not pai’ticipate in the meetmg, and gave his r e a s o n s .H e  himself was 
too busy, while the barons were reluctant to let his brother Richard go, unless 
sufficient guarantees could be given for his safety. In February, the Emperor’s 
invitation was finally rejected.^ 1 The barons, Henry explained, had refused to give 
Richard peimission to leave. Also, as campaigns in Scotland, Wales and Ireland were 
imminent, his presence could not be spared. Matthew Paris elaborates on this: as 
Richard was the King’s heir, and as nobody knew whether the King’s wife would 
bear children, he should not be exposed to the vagaries and dangers of a meeting witli 
Louis IX.22 The King of England was seeking, and was given, an excuse from 
having to embark on a meeting which, with all likelihood, was going to end in the 
surrender of part or all of his inheritance. Using the truce forced upon him in 1234 to 
muster the troops and allies, the means and men necessary to obtain what he believed 
to be his by force may have seemed a more appropriate option. At the same time, we 
should not dismiss the reasoning employed by tiie King too easily, for, as will become 
clear, the crisis of the early 1230s continued to plague his reign in England, and began 
to have repercussions beyond the borders of his own kingdom as well.
Another attempt was made in 1237. In April, Hemy announced to the Emperor 
that Richard and other English nobles would attend the meeting at Vaucouleurs.^3 
However, the second conference, too, failed to materialise. The fullest account is 
given by Matthew P a i i s . ^ 4  Richard was to be accompanied by the Archbishop of York
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64and other prelates and nobles. Some unease had been caused by the fact that the King 
of France had been amassing large forces near Vaucouleurs, but the party decided to 
set out nonetheless. However when they reached Dover they were met by Imperial 
envoys who brought news that the meeting had been postponed by another y e a r . ^ 5  i n  
this instance, Matthew’s report is confirmed by another source. In the late thirteenth 
century, William de Nangis described the planned meeting and its subsequent 
f a i l u r e . 2 6  Just before the meeting, Louis’ younger brother Robert had married a 
daughter of the Duke of Brabant. As this was to be followed by Robert’s enfeoffment 
with the county of Artois, many nobles had decided to attend such a festive 
o c c a s i o n . 2 7  The Emperor, however, seeing that Louis was accompanied by so many 
aimed men, cancelled the meeting. According to William, this was a sign of God’s 
good will towards the King, as it was suspected that the Emperor had evil designs on 
the kingdom of France. This statement may have been influenced by Frederick’s later 
reputation and the author’s declared desire to promote his hero’s sanctity. Put into a 
wider context, a slightly different interpretation emerges. It seems unlikely that 
Frederick entertained designs against the French crown, and to what extent the troops 
accompanying Louis played any part in the failure of the meeting remains unclear. In 
fact, in a letter dated to 1 2 3 7 ,  the Emperor expresses his delight that he and Louis were 
now relatives,^^ probably referring to Robert of Artois’ maniage (his wife was the 
grand-daughter of Frederick’s uncle, Philip of Swabia).However,  Frederick faced 
political difficulties in Germany and Italy which may have required a postponement, 
and which were probably amongst the affairs of the Empire referred to by Matthew 
Paris in his account of the failed meeting in 1 2 3 6 .  Most important amongst these 
troubles were the affairs of Lombardy, and Frederick’s worsening relations with the 
papacy.
Since 1235, Gregory IX had been trying to arrange a truce between the 
Emperor and the Lombard L e a g u e .^ O  This put him in an increasingly difficult 
position, as Frederick II’s demands for a heavy fine and the excommunication of all 
those who refused to make peace met with equally stubborn resistance by the 
Lombards. At this point the Pope could ill afford to alienate either party. The 
communes had proved themselves to be reliable allies and even the affairs of the Holy 
Land would not have justified their full abandonment. Furthermore, we should not 
ignore the fact that even the Pope’s earlier efforts at mediating between communes and
25 Impérial envoys, Walter of Ocra and Giles Bertaud, are known to have been at the royal court 
between 17 June and 6 July 1237. However, tliey were mostly concerned with collecting outstanding 
debts for Isabella’s dowry. CLR 1226-40, 275, 276, 278; CPR 1232-47, 188; CR 1234-7, 466; TR, 
ms. 54-5.
25 William de Nangis, Gesta Sanctae Memoriae Ludovici Regis Franciae, RHGF xx (Paris, 1840), 
309-465, at 424-6.
22 William’s version of events is confirmed by the Chronicon Alberici Monachi Trium Fontium, 
RHGF xxi, (Palis, 1855), 494-630, at 591.
28 A/, II, nr. 26.
29 R l  nr. 2267.
30 Abulafia, Frederick II, 291-305.
65Emperor had aroused suspicions in Lombardy. Equally, Frederick’s help was essential 
in order to provide permanent Christian control over Palestine. In the end, Gregory 
had little option but to continue pressing the case for a peaceful settlement, and to 
repeat the setbacks he had suffered so far.^1 Consequently, he tried to arrange for a 
series of meetings between Frederick II’s proctors and tliose of the rebelling towns.^^
In many ways, this was a race against time, and increasingly placed Gregory in a 
situation in which a stance of disinterested neutrality became more and more difficult to 
maintain. The Emperor had intended to lead a campaign to northern Italy in 1 2 3 6 ,  but 
postponed it at tlie Pope’s i n s t i g a t i o n . 33  a  planned meeting at Viterbo failed when 
Frederick’s representatives left before the proctors of Milan and its allies anived. In 
June, anodier effort was made, but when Frederick was forced to inteiwene in the wars 
against the deposed Duke of Austria, tliis caused another d e l a y .  3 4  Once he returned to 
Italy, new efforts were undertaken to find a peaceful settlement, and in April and May 
1 2 3 7  a number of high-ranking Imperial officials were sent to the Pope, pro facto 
Lombardie.^^ However, Frederick’s patience began to wear thin. While proceedings 
continued at the curia efforts were made to find a military solution to the Lombard 
problem. The Emperor’s cards looked good. During 1 2 3 5 / 6  he had taken control of 
several towns - Bergamo, V e r o n a , 3 6  V i c e n z a 3 7  and Padua all accepted his rule in 
1 2 3 6 . 3 8  Milan and its allies thus looked increasingly isolated, and their position 
against Frederick harder to maintain. If peace could not be arranged by diplomatic 
means, it certamly could be achieved by victory in b a t t l e . 3 9  Milan’s hope thus centred 
increasingly on the prospect of a break between Pope and Emperor. This certainly 
was what was to happen in the long-term. In the meantime, though, Frederick 
achieved a sudden, unexpected but decisive victory against his Lombard foes. 
Accompanied by troops from Cremona and other allies, Frederick intercepted a party 
led by the Milanese at Cortenuova in 1 2 3 7 . 4 0  This resulted in one of the worst defeats 
in Milan’s history. Its podesta was captured and executed, and the carraccio, the 
symbol of communal identity, first dragged through the streets of Cremona, and then 
sent to Rome as a trophy. Frederick saw the opportunity to establish his authority in 
Lombardy, fiimly and without protiacted negotiations. In July 1 2 3 8  he rejected a papal 
offer to mediate, as he could not accept anything but the Lombards’ unconditional
31 Epistolae, I, nrs. 691-2.
32 BQuger, Hochmeister, 172-7 for a good secondary account.
33 HB, IV, 876.
34 For a background account of the campaign: Friedrich Hausmann, ‘Kaiser Friedrich II. und 
Osterreich’, in: Fleckenstein, Probletne um Friedrich IL, 225-308, at 245-64; Kail Brunner, ‘Zum 
ProzeB gegen Hei-zog Friediich II. von 1236% MIÔG Ixxviii (1970), 260-73.
35 Ryccardus de S Gennano, Chronica, MGH SS xix, 374; Epistolae, 1 ,707.
Annales Bergomates, MGH SS xviii, 810.
32 Annales MantaunL MGH SS xviii, 21; Annales Parisii, MGH SS xix, 10.
38 Annales Scheftlarienses Maiores, MGH SS xvii, 340. Also, witli regard to the specific case of 
Perugia: John P. Grundman, The Popolo at Perugia, 1139-1309 (Perugia, 1992), 81-3.
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s u r r e n d e r .41 The League had lost its gamble. Taking these events into account, 
Matthew’s statement that the second meeting at Vaucouleurs had been postponed at the 
Emperor’s instigation seems credible. Events in Lombardy demanded his immediate 
attention. At stake was not only his control over the Imperial towns in northern Italy, 
but also his relationship with the curia.
The fact that Frederick’s toughened stance after Cortenuova had little 
immediate impact on his standing with the curia does not mean that we should ignore, 
or tliat the Emperor had been unaware of the strain his attitude put on papal-hnperial 
relations. In fact, events in Lombardy point to the fragility of the papal-imperial 
concord. In September 1 2 3 6  the Emperor criticised Gregory: while he was asking for 
ecclesiastical censures against the Lombard rebels, all he got in response were 
complaints about his alleged maltreatment of the Sicilian C h u r c h . 42 Earlier on the 
same year, Gregory had accused Frederick of various transgressions against the 
Church, to which the Emperor responded by listing what he considered the injustices 
committed by the Holy S e e . 4 3  Frederick’s confidence in the Pope’s neutrality was 
certainly not increased when Bishop James of Praeneste, a staunch supporter of the 
League, was appointed papal legate in Italy. In a letter probably dating from February 
1 2 3 7 ,  the Emperor announced that he was sending Herman of Salza as his envoy, 
despite the doings of Bishop James. However, Herman was to deal only with Gregory 
h i m s e l f . 4 4  The spirit of co-operation which had guided the actions of Emperor and 
Pope since 1 2 3 1  began to wear thm.
Simultaneously, papal and Imperial interests began to conflict in Provence. In 
April 1236, Gregory IX ordered the Count of Toulouse to go to the Holy Land for five 
years if he wanted to avert his excommunication.45 in May, he requested Louis IX’s 
help against the Count.46 Gregory did so at a time when Frederick II was aiming to 
expand and stiengthen his authority over Languedoc. From 1238 the conflict began to 
escalate. In August Gregory IX ordered the citizens of Avignon not to ally themselves 
with the Count of Toulouse against the Count of Provence, or to support the Imperial 
seneschal who was suspected of harbouring heretics.47 Furthermore, the communes 
of Allés and Marseilles were ordered to fight Frederick’s seneschal,48 as was the 
Count of Provence. 49 Gregoiy considered the fight against Catharism more important 
than Frederick’s claims to Imperial overlordship in Languedoc. His actions were not 
unlike those of Innocent III or Honorius III in the same region. Both had begun to 
exercise quasi-Imperial authority in the area. At that time, however, Frederick had
41AI, I, nr. 351.
42 Registres Grégoire IX, nr. 3361.
43 Epistolae, I, nrs. 695-701.
44 A/, II, nr. 25.
45 Epistolae, I, m. 688.
45 Registres Grégoire IX, nr. 3138; this request was repeated the following year: Epistolae, II, nr. 706. 
42 Registres Grégoire IX, nr. 3802-3.
48 Ibid., nr. 3804-5.
49 Ibid., nr. 3806.
neither shown interest in nor had he been able to manifest his claims over Toulouse 
and Provence. In the meantime circumstances had changed and what once had been 
permissible was now likely to cause offence. Gregory’s actions were the more 
dangerous, as the Count of Toulouse was Frederick’s most reliable ally in the area.^^ 
Frederick, however, decided to disregard papal interference, and continued to state his 
claims. In Januaiy 1 2 3 8 ,  he granted a series of privileges to the citizens of Avignon.^ 1 
In June he complained to Gregory about the appointment of James de Praeneste as 
legate in Provence, declaring that the legate would not work for the unity of the faith, 
but was rather suited to sow dissent and umest.^^ However, the affair also shows that 
Pope and Emperor were still capable of settling their conflicts peacefully. The legate 
was ordered to absolve the Count of Toulouse from all ecclesiastical c e n s u r e s , ^ 3  and 
Frederick decreed that his edicts against heresy be promulgated in the kingdom of 
A i i e s . ^ 4  Then relationship was not yet doomed to fail.
A similar example is provided by Frederick’s difficulties in the Holy Land. 
One of the Emperor’s major conflicts had been with the commune of Acre, which 
refused to accept Frederick’s baillie, Richard Filangieri. In 1 2 3 6 ,  with Gregory’s 
help, a compromise had been a r r a n g e d . ^ 5  As long as the planned project of a crusade 
remained likely, co-operation continued. However, that very project soon began to 
divide Gregory and Frederick. The Pope had been planning another expedition to 
Palestine to begin in 1 2 3 8 .^ 6  The Emperor, though, insisted that his truce should be 
observed, and the campaign should not start until 1 2 3 9 ,  In November 1 2 3 7  Gregory 
announced to Frederick that the crusaders were to set sail by June 1238.^2 
Simultaneously, he addressed prominent ecclesiastical circles in Sicily and asked them 
to persuade the Emperor to support his crusading p l a n s .  ^ 8  Frederick, however, 
refused to comply, and announced that he was sending one of his officials to the 
crusaders assembling in France, explaining his reasons why he would ask them to 
postpone their e x p e d i t i o n . ^ 9  g y  7 December, he could announce to the Pope that the 
crusaders had agreed not to begin their campaign until the truce had expired.60 In the 
end, Gregory complied. However, Frederick was never to participate in the 
expedition. In March 1 2 3 9  he was excommunicated for a second time. The ensuing
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wars left little room for an adventure like the one he had undertaken in 1228. It was 
left to a number of French and English nobles to sustain Christian crusading efforts.
These differences over the affairs of Burgundy, Italy and the Holy Land 
illustrate the underlying difficulties in the relations between Pope and Emperor. 
Gregory had been willing to help and assist Frederick.61 However, there were limits 
to the Pope’s co-operation. If Frederick haitoured heretics or if he flatly rejected papal 
efforts at pacifying Lombardy, this could not be accepted. Equally, Frederick claimed, 
and probably meant, that his actions were little more than finally putting an end to die 
veiy problems which in the had hampered his freedom of action in the past. The battle 
of Cortenuova had presented the opportunity to solve the Lombard problem once and 
for all, while he was also on his way to establish effective Imperial authority in 
Burgundy. To him, Gregory’s complaints may indeed have been difficult to 
understand. At the same time, to see relations between Frederick and Gregory as 
diifting unavoidably towards the excommunication of 1 2 3 9  would be a mistake. There 
was still room for compromise. Gregory was willing to give in when his actions in 
Provence aroused Frederick’s suspicions, and he eventually complied with the 
Emperor’s wishes concerning the stai ting date of the new crasade.
Frederick seems to have been aware that he was risking collision with the 
curia, and therefore mustered support from across Christendom. It is safe to assume 
that tlie intended meetings at Vaucouleurs had originally intended to form pait of these 
wider diplomatic efforts. In July 1 2 3 6 ,  for instance. King Bela of Hungary wrote to 
Gregoiy IX and asked him not to support the Lombards, as this would damage both 
the Church and the Christian p r i n c e s . 6 2  He probably acted at Frederick’s instigation. 
This certainly was the case with Henry III. In June 1 2 3 6 ,  emphasising his friendship 
with Frederick, he asked the Pope not to support the Lombard rebels against their lord, 
the E m p e r o r . 6 3  According to Matthew Paris, similar requests were made in 1 2 3 8 . 6 4  
Furthermore, Henry announced to Frederick that he had sent Baldwin de Vere and 
Bartholomew Pecche to further the Emperor’s cause at the curia,^^ It thus seems that 
the planned conference had been part of a more wide-ranging drive at enlisting the 
support of the Emperor’s fellow-monarchs. In the case of Henry HI, this went beyond 
moral and diplomatic support. Matthew Paris reports how, in 1 2 3 8 ,  a contingent of 
English troops under the leadership of Henry de Trubleville, seneschal of Gascony, 
was sent to Italy. Henry brought not only knights, but also f u n d s . 6 6  Im February
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1238, he received £73 from the Exchequer ‘pro auxilio soroiii regis imperatoris 
Alemannorum’,62 and in February 1239 Florentine merchants received 1000 marks 
that they had lent to the elect of Valence ‘for the expedition of the King’s affairs in 
Italy when he was there in the Emperor’s a i m y ’ . 6 8  in many ways the campaign of 
1238 marked the apex of Frederick’s standing within Latin Christendom. Also 
participating was Baldwin de Guines, one of the great mercenary leaders of his 
time.69 The King of Hungaiy had been ordered to provide troops.^0 Moreover, some 
later sources report tliat the Sultan of Egypt and Vatatzes, Emperor of Nicaea, had sent 
contingents,21 and Flemish and Spanish knights fought on Frederick’s side.72 in 
many ways this testifies to the success of Frederick’s diplomacy. The Emperor could 
justly claim to act in unison with tlie secular leaders of Latin Christendom.
Frederick’s campaigns in Lombardy also explain another dominant feature in 
his relations with England: tlie collection of Isabella’s marriage portion. By the 
thii’teenth century Imperial campaigns in Italy were less based on feudal levies, than on 
the hiring of mercenaries, greatly increasing the costs of warfare.23 Moreover, 
military action alone was not enough. Allies had to be won and rewarded. The 
payment of specified sums of money became a feature of increasing regularity in the 
treaties between medieval rulers, and they also featured in the alliances between 
Frederick and several German princes and Italian towns. Under these circumstances,
30,000 marks were a prize which could not be set aside easily, and we should not be 
surprised to see that most of the surviving evidence for contacts between tlie Imperial 
and the English court is concerned with Isabella’s dowry. This appears to have caused 
some embarrassment to the King of England. In June 1236 Henry III asked for a 
postponement.24 However, he seems to have had little success as, in August, he 
requested Gregory IX’s help in extracting sufficient funds from his Irish subjects.^6 
In late April 1237 Henry put all financial transactions on hold, until 10,000 marks 
owed to Frederick for die previous Easter term had been paid.^ 6  He even had to allow 
Frederick’s proctors to oversee the collection of funds in Ireland. In fact, the financial 
difficulties the King of England faced during these years led to an important 
concession. In January 1237 Henry III at last confimied Magna Carta.27 In exchange.
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__ 70he managed to extricate the funds to pay his outstanding debts to Frederick J o  The 
King of England assisted and supported his brother-in-law. He sent troops and 
money, and he pleaded on his behalf at the curia. By doing so, he acted in unison with 
most of the secular leaders of Western Christendom. Although this also marked a 
considerable improvement in relations with Frederick, we should not deduce from this 
that Henry assumed a special position in Frederick's estimation. He was certainly 
courted, and contacts between the two monaichs became more frequent and intimate, 
but there is little to distinguish between the way Henry HI was treated and how other 
potential allies fared at Frederick's hand. The Emperor certainly saw his mairiage pay 
tlie dividends he may have expected, but the question remains to what extent Henry III 
had come any closer to achieving his aim of a close alliance with the Emperor and 
agahist the King of France.
IIL2 English ambitions
Although a truce had been agreed in 1 2 3 5 ,  the English court seems to have 
hoped that Frederick would join a campaign against the Capetians. In 1 2 3 6 ,  for 
instance, Matthew Paris reports that Frederick had requested Richard of Cornwall to 
come to Vaucouleurs to fight the F r e n c h . 2 9  Considering Matthew’s close links with 
the royal court this may well have been a reflection of the hopes entertained by the 
King and his government. Henry III ceitainly continued liis efforts to forge closer ties 
with potential allies against Louis IX. However, he met with various setbacks. In 
1 2 3 7  Robert of Artois mairied a daughter of the Duke o f  B r a b a n t , 8 0  and another of 
Louis IX’s brothers the heiress of Toulouse.81 The Duke and Raymond of St Gilles 
had been at the centre of English diplomacy since Henry’s minority. The Duke’s 
French marriage also sealed English efforts at drawing him into a web of English allies 
on the eastern borders of the Capetian kingdom. Altliough Raymond had probably had 
little choice of escaping his daughter’s marriage with Alfons of Poitiers, this also 
indicated that, in the foreseeable future, Toulouse was to pass into Capetian hands, 
weakening Heniy’s position even further.
Nonetheless, it was not all gloom for the King of England. To some extent he 
was able to compensate for his losses by making new friends. In January 1 2 3 6  the 
marriage between Eleanor of Provence, daughter of Count Raymond Berengar, and 
Henry III was celebrated at Westminster.82 This brought Henry HI into close contact 
with the Counts of Savoy, an important family in Northern Italy and Imperial 
Burgundy, with widespread interests across Europe. To some extent this may have
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71been an attempt to counter recent French successes. 8 3 After all, Louis DC had mairied 
Margarete of Provence, Henry EFs sister-in-law, in 1234. More importantly, through 
this union Henry III gained the advice of a family which was more aware of the 
structures and under-cuixents of European politics than anyone at the English court. 84 
At the same time, we should beware of exaggerating the significance these new links 
might have. This is illustrated by the mairiage between the Countess of Flanders and 
Thomas of Savoy in 1237.85 According to a late-thirteenth-century French source, 
this had been brought about through pressure from Louis IX. The Countess’ chosen 
spouse had originally been Simon de Montfort. However, the fealty he owed to the 
King of England made him an unsuitable candidate, and so the Countess had to settle 
for Thomas of Savoy instead. 8 6  Whether the original marriage project had been 
brokered by Henry III remains unclear, despite the obvious political advantages it 
might have entailed. At the same time, it seems unlikely that Louis would have 
favoured Thomas over Simon had he been perceived as a stalwart of English interests.
He was Louis’ uncle by mairiage as much as Henry’s. At best, the King of England 
may have hoped that Thomas would show a greater degree of independence from the 
French crown than Ms wife had previously done.
Some of the King’s new relatives assumed high positions within the royal 
administration. Prominent amongst these was William of Savoy, the elect of 
Valence.87 During the 1238 campaign against the Lombards he had been one of the 
leaders of the English contingent.8 8 However, his untimely death in 1239 meant that 
his military leadership and political skills had little influence on the further 
development of relations between England and the Empire.89 Nonetheless, his career 
can help to illustrate both the opportunities and the dangers Henry’s Savoyard 
connection carried with it. This is best exemplified by the events surrounding the 
schism of Liège.90 In 1238 the chapter split over the election of a new Bishop, with 
factions centring around Otto, the provost of Aachen, and William of Savoy. The 
political situation in the area at the time is important. It has been suggested that 
Thomas, the new Count of Flanders, could have had a hand in this election, as he and
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the late Bishop had been close alliesJl More interestingly, the nearby Bishop of 
Cambrai, Wido of Laon, had once been chancellor of the university of Paris, and 
could thus be viewed as a pillar of French influence in the region.92 powicke suggests 
that William’s election had been a compensation for Henry’s failure to install his uncle 
in the see of Winchester.93 Having a faithful relative controlling an area of key 
strategic importance just across the Channel, and bordering France, had obvious 
advantages. This assumption is however, open to two major criticisms. First, there is 
little evidence to suggest Hem y BI’s involvement. The closest we have is a letter from 
Otto, provost of Aachen, written on behalf of a clerk of the Duke of Brabant, Henry de 
Rumenham. Henry was urged to grant the clerk what he had long been promised. At 
best, this implies that the King of England was not viewed as someone hostile to 
Otto’s candidacy. Otherwise the provost would have been a most unsuitable choice for 
intercessor. In addition we should not forget that he had been one of Frederick's 
envoys to England, as had other members of his family. Even Matthew Paris, 
someone who would not normally let pass an opportunity to comment on the King’s 
patronage of his foreign favourites, records no involvement.94 More importantly, as 
Otto was the candidate supported by Frederick II, it seems unlikely that Henry III 
would have willingly opposed the Emperor. After all, tliis would have meant throwing 
away any benefits he may have gained from sending troops and money assist 
Frederick in his Italian campaigns. Nonetheless, this underlines the ambiguous role 
played by the King’s Savoyai*d relatives. Henry’s Provençal marriage certainly opened 
up new channels of influence, he gained the expertise and advice of a family with 
unrivalled connections across Europe. At the same time, this also meant that he was 
drawn into conflicts and rivalries which stood in direct opposition to what he was 
hoping to achieve. More than before, he was forced to perform a precarious balancmg 
act between the various factions, ambitions and goals of those close to him and his 
undertakings.
Hemy Ill’s unwillingness to challenge the Emperor is further illustrated by the 
affair of Peter Saracenus. In June 1238 Gregory IX had written to Frederick, and 
demanded the immediate release of Peter Saracenus, whom he described as an envoy 
from the King of England, unlawfully imprisoned by the E m p e r o r . 9 5  i n  July, 
Frederick responded and declared that Peter would not be freed, as he had been trying 
to sow discord between the Emperor, the Pope and the King of E n g l a n d . 9 6  No 
evidence survives which could illuminate the nature of Peter’ alleged crimes. 
However, there is little doubt as to his close relations with England. Peter, descendant
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73of a noble Roman family which had numbered Innocent Ill’s seneschal amongst its 
members,97 had been employed as Henry Ill’s proctor at the curia since the days of 
Honorius 111.98 Only in March 1238 the King had written to Gregory IX about 
business which Peter was to conduct on his behalf.99 Peter and his family also 
received lavish rewards from tlie royal court. Peter himself was awarded an annual fee 
of £40,1^^ his son John held a benefice in Norfolk,!^! and his son Peter another in 
the diocese of B a t h .  102 Henry III, however, does not appear to have been overly 
concerned about his proctor’s imprisonment. To my knowledge no evidence survives 
to suggest any efforts at helping Peter. The only reference to the affair is made by 
Matthew Paris, who takes a dim view of Peter’s character, accusing him of trying to 
dupe the King of England into paying his ransom. 103 The Annals o f Dunstable only 
mention the capture of Peter and his son John, and their release within a year. 104 No 
letters to the Emperor survive, no envoys were sent. This seems unusual, but it may 
serve to illustrate Henry’s unwillingness to alienate Frederick. As little as William of 
Valence had been able to count on the King’s support in pursuing his ambitions in 
Liège, so Peter was not able to expect much help from his English employer. In the 
end this did little to help Frederick’s affairs: among the reasons given for his 
excommunication in 1239 was Peter’s imprisonment. 105
In general, English diplomacy during these years was reactive. No major 
initiatives emanated from Henry’s court. He confined himself to complying with the 
Emperor’s wishes and demands, assisting him in Lombardy, and lending him his 
support with the papacy. Henry may have realised that there was little hope that 
Frederick would mvolve himself in major projects as long as he had not satisfactorily 
dealt with the Lombards and the Holy Land. In this respect, these years differ little 
from the pattern which had become evident ever since Frederick’s return from the 
Holy Land. Nonetheless, some subtle changes can be observed, and in other areas the 
stmcture of Anglo-German relations undeiwent a tiansformahon which was to remain 
in place until the Emperor’s death in 1250. Henry Ill’s old allies, the Dukes of 
Brunswick and Brabant or the Archbishop of Cologne, make only a scarce 
appearance. Although they were not abandoned, they did not receive the same degree 
of attention as they had done previously. The King and his court concentrated their 
efforts on the Emperor. In the past he had thwarted Henry’s efforts, and it was clear 
that he alone could give the King of England the support and assistance he required. 
Frederick’s mairiage to Isabella Plantagenet had opened up the prospect that this was
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74now within reach, and there was no need any longer to rely on those who in the past 
had been used to circumvent or obstruct Frederick’s policies. The degree of support 
which the Emperor now received from the King of England certainly superseded 
anything that had been given since the beginning of Henry’s reign. Nonetheless, this 
only placed the King in the same rank of most other European monaichs. It remained 
to be seen whether, at some point in die future, Frederick would be willing and able to 
return Henry’s favours in kind.
Chapter IV 
The Snake and the Dragon^
(1239-45)
111 March 1239 Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick II.2 The Emperor 
responded by drawing on the contacts and allies he had won since his return from 
crusade. He requested military support, tried to form political alliances, sought to 
resist papal propaganda and to hinder Gregory’s preparations for war. In the case of 
England this meant that Henry III found himself pushed between tlie Emperor and the 
Holy See. He was unwilling and unable to challenge the Pope directly. At the same 
thne, the King relied on Frederick’s support for his brother’s crusade in Palestine, and 
he had not yet given up hopes for a military recovery of Poitou and Normandy. 
Frederick, in turn, became even more reluctant to challenge Louis IX. 3 Once again, 
events interfered with his plans and ambitions. Just when it seemed as if Frederick 
would at last be able to lend Henry the support he so eagerly expected, the Emperor 
found himself facing a challenge which, this time, was far more serious than it had 
been ten years earlier. The degree of Gregory's hostility as well as the range of his 
initiatives did not allow for a repeat of the coup Frederick had landed in 1229. It is 
within this context that Hemy III will have to be considered, his aims and ambitions. 
However far from worsening,^ relations with the Emperor remained steady. At the 
same time, it would be mistaken to view this as being based solely on the loyalty of the 
King of England and his perennial hopes for the Hohenstaufens’ support against Louis 
IX. Altliough such reasoning should not be dismissed too easily, we will also see that 
the King of England’s attitude towards the papal-imperial conflict differed little from 
that of his contemporaries.
IV. 1 Searching for allies - the political background
Immediately after pronouncing Frederick’s excommunication, the Pope is said 
to have begun a search for candidates to replace him as Emperor. Matthew Paris gives 
his version of a papal letter allegedly addressed to Louis IX. Gregory stated that the 
need had arisen to fund a suitable man to replace Frederick, therefore Robert of Artois, 
the King's brother, should be made Emperor. However, the proposal was rejected.5 A 
similar story is given by an annalist from Cologne, writing around 1260. James of 
Praeneste was sent to the King of France and other rulers to offer the kingdom of the
75
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.  76Romans. However, Louis IX refused.^ A late-thirteenth-century French source
mentions on the occasion of the death of the King of Denmark that his son had been
offered the Imperial crown after Louis IX had refused it.7 It is difficult to decide to
what extent these reports were based on the events after 1245, when Innocent IV did
indeed invite various European princes to replace the Hohenstaufen in Germany and
S i c i l y .8 In tlie case of the French chronicler, it also has to be taken into account that he
was writing shortly after Philip IE’s failed candidacy for die Imperial throne in 1273.9
The surviving documentary evidence records a papal mission to France, but remains
inconclusive as to its purpose. On 21 October 1239 the Pope wrote to Louis IX and
his mother, Blanche of Castile, informing them of the many dangers besetting the
Church. Gregory praised Louis for his interest in the affairs of the Holy Land, but
then continued to state that it would be even more meritorious would he fight those,
like Frederick II, who attack the Church from within. 10 Blanche was told that Bishop
James de Praeneste was to be sent as papal legate to France, and was petitioned to give
him all the advice and assistance necessary to fight the Emperor. H  However, little
mention was made of any attempts at replacing Frederick II. That James de Praeneste
was sent as papal legate to all the princes is also mentioned by Richard of San
Germano, a notary and chronicler from Sicily, who dates the beginning of his mission
to October 1239,17 and by William de Nangis, who, however, describes his mission
simply as promulgating the Emperor’s excommunication. 13 Even when taking into
account tliat this episode may have been coloured by the writers’ knowledge of later
events, the anecdote helps to exemplify the pressures Frederick found hhnself exposed
to. Gregory did not stop at condemning the Emperor, but aimed at inflicting the worst
possible political damage.
He soon carried the struggle into all of Frederick’s domains. Unlike the 
Emperor's first excommunication in 1227, the second had at least some impact on 
Germany. The Archbishop of Mainz, recently appointed guardian for Frederick’s 
infant son Conrad IV, assumed leadership of the anti-imperial forces. 14 The newly 
elected Archbishop of Cologne, Conrad of Hochstaden,15 too, was forced into the
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anti-imperial camp J  6 By 1240, however, most of this opposition seems to have been 
overcome. In May of that year, the German bishops and princes wrote to Pope and 
Emperor, urging them to make peace. 17 They also announced an embassy led by the 
master of the Teutonic Knights, Herman of Salza, a reliable ally of the Emperor, to 
press for negotiations. 18 By 1241, the situation had changed again. That year, the 
Archbishop of Mainz led ti’oops against Frederick’s partisans, 1  ^and in 1244, while 
dealings continued between Pope and Emperor, he travelled his diocese to whip up 
support against Frederick.70 However, it was not until after Frederick’s deposition in 
1245, that these efforts began to cause the Hohenstaufen serious problems. Altliough a 
number of prelates opposed Frederick, the majority of secular princes remained loyal. 
For instance, the Archbishop of Mainz’s successor as guardian for Conrad was Hemy 
Raspe, Landgrave of Thuringia, who did not desert the Emperor’s cause until 1246, 
when he was elected anti-King.
In the kingdom of Burgundy, however, the Pope soon found willing allies. In 
September 1 2 3 9 ,  Frederick opened proceedings against Raymond Berengar of 
Provence. He was accused of allying himself with the Emperor’s foes in the city of 
Arles and of expelling Frederick’s vicar in Arles and Vienne.71 This was followed by 
attempts to forge an alliance against him, including the Count of T o u l o u s e , 7 7  and 
Avignon, which was ordered to wage war on R a y m o n d . 7 3  initially, this alliance 
proved successful. In December, Raymond of Toulouse was awarded lands seized 
from the Count of P r o v e n c e , 2 4  and in August 1 2 4 0  a candidate supported by the 
Count was recognised as their podesta by the commune of A v i g n o n . 2 5  Furthermore, 
the King of France was asked for help against the Count of P r o v e n c e . 7 6  Raymond 
Berengar, in turn, was quick to realise the potential of a closer alliance with the 
papacy, and in November 1 2 3 9  he promised to support the Pope against Frederick in 
Lombardy, Italy or A p u l i a . 7 7  This papal connection is also referred to by a late 
thirteenth century French source. In response to unrest caused by heretics in Provence, 
Bishop James of Praeneste had called a council where it was decided that a French 
army should be used to fight the opponents of Raymond B e r e n g a r . 7 8  Louis’
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involvement soon put an end to Imperial successes.79 Early in 1241, the Count of 
Toulouse had to succumb to the needs of self-preservation and declared that he would 
help and assist the Church against the Emperor.30 This did not mean the end of his 
relations with Frederick. After the election of Innocent IV, he was one of the 
Emperor’s proctors in negotiating with the new Pope.31 By that time, the Counts of 
Toulouse and Provence had also overcome their divisions and fought alongside Henry 
III against Louis IX.37 At the time, however, this presented a serious setback to 
Frederick. One of his most reliable agents in Languedoc had been forced to submit to 
papal pressure, while the King of France used his power not to assist the Emperor and 
his claims, but those of Gregory IX and his supporters.
Another area in which Gregory IX made progress against the Emperor was tlie 
Holy L a n d . 3 3  in 1 2 4 3  Conrad, Frederick’s son with Isabella/Yolanda, came of age, 
and was supposed to take over the government of his realm. However, the Emperor 
refused to acknowledge this, and continued to dominate the affairs of Jerusalem. The 
baillie, for instance, appointed by Conrad was Thomas Count of Acerra, a Sicilian 
aristocrat closely associated with the Emperor. However, Frederick’s control over the 
kingdom had been severely weakened. The authority of the Imperial baillie was 
increasingly confined to Tyre, which, too, was lost to the rebels in 1 2 4 3 .  Gregory lent 
those opposing Frederick his full support. Papal mandates were sent to the military 
orders, the Italian communities in Acre, and to Genoa, exhorting them to fight 
Frederick. When the rebels decided to appoint their own baillie rather than accepting 
Conrad IV’s nominee, their decision to elect the Queen of Cyprus was confirmed by 
the Holy S e e . 3 4  Effectively, altliough Conrad continued to issue edicts and to appoint 
officials for the Latin Kingdom until his death in 1 2 5 4 , 3 5  this put an end to 
Hohenstaufen mle in Palestine. Gregory IX had thus seriously weakened Frederick’s 
position in Burgundy and the Holy Land. Inroads had been made into Germany, and a 
number of Italian communes had been won back from the E m p e r o r . 3 6
The curia also managed to prevent a series of potentially disastrous alliances. 
Most important amongst these were plans for a marriage between Conrad IV and a 
Capetian princess, and between Frederick II and the heiress of Austria. Neither
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undertaking seems to have proceeded beyond a preliminary stage. In June 1243 Walter 
of Ocra was sent to France to aiTange a marriage between Frederick’s son Conrad IV 
and a daughter of Louis IX, but no further evidence survives concerning the progress 
of negotiations.37 Had the project been successful, it would have greatly strengthened 
Frederick’s hand in ongoing negotiations with Innocent IV. As we will see, henry III 
reruained unwilling to comruit himself, while the rulers of Eastern Europe urged the 
two rivals to reach a settlement so, as their resources be more profitably spent on 
combating the Mongols. Should Louis have abandoned his stance of precarious 
neutrality, the pressure on Gregory IX and Innocent IV to end Frederick's 
excommunication would have become well nigh irresistible. The project also 
underlines the King of France’s key role in the papal-imperial conflict. Botli Innocent 
and Frederick looked to him for support and acceptance. Frederick’s hopes for an 
Austrian maniage did not proceed much furtlier.38 Deliberations to turn the duchy into 
a kingdom, promulgated in June 1245, were probably connected to his marital 
plans,39 and were mooted at about the same time when die Emperor's proctors opened 
negotiations with the Duke. If this was to sway the Babenbergs into supporting his 
endeavours, tlie Frederick was to be disappointed. His excommunication and - by then 
- imminent deposition had their desired effect. If Matthew Paris is to be believed, the 
prospective spouse was so horiified at the idea of being mairied to a persistent apostate 
that she steadfastly refused to consent.40 A similar connection is made by a later 
Italian chronicler, who describes the project as faltering after Innocent had informed 
the Duke of Frederick’s ongoing contumacy.41 Other projects met with equally poor 
success. Amongst these were plans for a Provencal marriage, also in 1245, which we 
will deal with further below.42 However, it was not all doom. In 1242, the Emperor 
married off one of his illegitimate daughters to Vatatzes, the Greek Emperor of 
Nicaea.43 This provided Frederick with an important ally on the eastern flank of 
Venice, one of the leading supporters of both the curia and the Lombard League.44 
More importantly, he managed to arrange a truce between Baldwin of Constantinople 
and Vatatzes.45 As this provided a much needed breathing period for the beleaguered
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80Latin Empire, it may not come as a surprise tliat Emperor Baldwin was amongst those 
arguing most persistently in favour of lifting Frederick's excommunication.46 we 
thus see the Emperor suffer a series of grave setbacks, and in danger of political and 
diplomatic isolation. Lacking a symbolic gesture of comparable impact to the liberation 
of Jerusalem, he found it increasingly difficult to counter the curia's diplomatic 
offensive.
Frederick soon realised the dangers posed by papal propaganda, and quickly 
tried to counteract it.47 From the beginning, the Imperial chancery churned out 
pamphlets which tried to reject and disqualify accusations levied against Frederick.
Thanks to the efforts of Matthew Paris, most of the letters addressed to the English 
court survive. One such extant epistle is the one sent to Richard of Cornwall in late 
April 1 2 3 9 . 4 8  Frederick’s excommunication was declared to be a rejection of God and 
j u s t i c e . 4 9  While the Emperor was willing to prove the orthodoxy of his beliefs, the 
Pope refused to listen to him.50 In fact, claimed Frederick, as Gregory was allying 
himself with the Lombards who were known harbourers of heresy, he himself had 
become a heretic and friend of heretics.^ 1 In a letter to the citizens of Rome from April 
1 2 3 9 ,  also surviving in Matthew Paris, these charges were elaborated further. 
Frederick called the Pope a blasphemer who falsely accused others of b l a s p h e m y . 5 2  
Simultaneously, letters were addressed to rulers across Europe, giving point by point 
responses to the Emperor’s alleged c r i m e s . 5 3  These were often combined with 
specific requests. In October 1 2 3 9 ,  for instance, the barons of England were petitioned 
to prevent papal legates from collecting funds against F r e d e r i c k . 5 4  Furthermore, the 
Emperor demonstrated his own orthodoxy by doing publicly what he had been 
accused of not doing. Instances include the privileges for the Hospitallers in the 
kingdom of Arles - one of the points in Gregory’s bull of excommunication had been 
the Emperor’s persecution of the military o r d e r s . 5 5  Similarly, Imperial support was
46 CM, IV, 371, 431, 447.
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promised to those preparing for crusades in the Holy Land, while the Pope was 
blamed for the Emperor’s inability to attend, as Gregory was wont to invade the 
kingdoms of absentee c r u s a d e r s , 5 6  Not Frederick, but Gregory endangered 
Christendom. Similar arguments were used during the Mongol attacks on Eastern 
Europe in 1 2 4 1 / 2 , 5 7  and after the fall of Jerusalem to Khwarizim Turks in 1 2 4 4 . 5 8  
Frederick thus emphasised the need for a peaceful settlement with Gregory, and 
shifted the blame for the ongoing conflict onto the Holy See. Also, letters from those 
who could testify to Frederick’s orthodoxy were used and distributed. Matthew Paris 
recounts how Walter of Ocra tried to convince the English clergy in 1 2 4 4  not to send 
funds to the Pope by reading out letters from the Latin Emperor of Constantinople and 
the Count of Toulouse, testifying to tlie Emperor’s orthodoxy and his devotion for the 
C h u r c h . 5 9  A fourth form of response were letters which outlined to various rulers 
how successful Frederick’s campaigns in Italy were, like the one sent to Ferdinand of 
Castile in September 1 2 4 0 ,  in which he gave an account of his recent v i c t o r i e s . 6 0  
These efforts served a variety of purposes. They allowed Frederick to claim the 
orthodoxy of his beliefs, they turned Gregory's and Innocent's propaganda against 
those who had designed it, and they emphasised that papal claims of the Emperor’s 
immment demise were premature. This may have been considered a necessary step 
towards enlisting the support of Frederick's fellow-monarchs. For, unless other rulers 
intervened on his behalf with the curia, the Pope was unlikely to agree to a peaceful 
settlement. The conflict, thus, soon involved Europe, from England and Scotland to 
the Spanish peninsula and the Balkans. This was the background against which 
English relations with the Empire have to be considered.
IV.2 The European Response
It seems as if contemporaries believed that Frederick’s excommunication was 
only temporary and that the underlying conflict could be resolved quickly. If Matthew 
Paris is to be believed, the quest for a settlement involved the upper echelons of the 
papal administration. In late 1 2 3 9 ,  a papal legate is said to have urged a truce with 
Frederick, and a general council to be held the following Easter.61 A similar account is 
given by t\i& Annals o f Dunstable: the patriarch of Jerusalem had been working to
AJ. Forey, ‘The militmy orders and Holy War against Christians in tlie thirteentli centiny’, EHR civ 
(1989), 1-24.
56 Ibid., V, 359-62, 396-8.
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61 CM, IV, 59.
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ensure peace, but without success. However, at the instigation of John de Columbna, 
a peace proposal had been accepted, and a general council was convened.62 John 
broke with the Pope in 1241 over his reluctance to negotiate with Frederick, and is 
said to have urged Frederick to come to Rome.63 Documentary evidence survives for 
the proposed truce. However, in September 1240 Frederick II rejected the idea as a 
ploy, designed to give the Lombards a respite before they began to wage war on him 
again. Instead, the Emperor raised the stakes and declared his willingness to negotiate 
for a proper peace, but refused to include the Lombards in any such aiïangement.64 
He must have been aware that this demand was unlikely to be accepted by Gregory IX 
and his followers. Similarly, the general council never convened. Frederick viewed it 
as yet another attempt to further wai', not peace. 65 He warned the prelates planning to 
participate that they would be viewed as enemies of the Empire and dealt with 
accordingly.66 Jn the end the Imperial fleet, together with that of Pisa, intercepted 
those sailing to Rome, and imprisoned them.67 Although this was to endanger 
Frederick’s relations with Louis IX, the most immediate danger had been averted. At 
the same time, as far as intransigence was concerned, and the unwillingness to 
compromise, the Emperor did not stay fai' behind his papal foe.
Diplomatic efforts to restore peace between Frederick and Gregory won an 
added sense of urgency in 1241, when some German princes tried to organise a 
crusade against the M o n g o l s . 6 8  Duke Frederick of Austria and Styria, under the tlireat 
of an imminent invasion, had written to the Kings of Spain, England and France and 
asked them to come in person to fight the M o n g o l s . 6 9  He also seems to have 
approached the Pope. Gregory responded by expressing his commiserations 
concerning the Duke’s recent misfortunes, but only gave an evasive answer as to the 
prospect of peace with Frederick: the Emperor would be taken back into the Church 
once he submitted and complied with its demands.70 The King of Hungary, the main 
victim of the Mongol onslaught, was equally unsuccessful. Frederick stated that he 
would be unable to help as long as the Pope waged wax- on him,71 and Gregory gave 
him the same response he had given Duke F r e d e r i c k . 7 2  in fact, the Mongol invasion 
soon began to feature in anti-imperial propaganda. Matthew Paris, for instance.
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reports rumours that it had in fact been the Emperor who had called the Tartars to 
assist him in fighting the PopeJ3 Ear from uniting the forces of Latin Christendom 
against a common foe, the Mongol attacks were used to exacerbate existing 
differences.
Gregory’s death in 1241 gave rise to hopes that the conflict might at last be 
resolved peacefully. In a letter to Henry III, Frederick wrote that, as the man who had 
brought disunity and war to Christendom had died, the prospect of peace had arisen. 
Once a new Pope had been chosen, the Emperor expected to be once again accepted as 
the faithful son and protector of the Church.74 However, when Innocent IV was 
elected in June 1243,75 he immediately confirmed Frederick’s excommunication.76 
The Emperor, though, remained undeterred, and sent proctors to the curia to sue for 
peace nonetheless.77 The same year Frederick also addmssed letters to the Emperor of 
Constantinople,78 Louis IX,79 the Duke of Brabant^O and other rulers,81 assuring 
them that, with the new Pope, peace could be ananged. Again, Frederick proved more 
optimistic than Innocent. In August 1243 tlie Pope declared that it was impossible that 
Frederick’s envoys would be allowed into his presence, as they had intercourse with 
excommunicates, and were thus themselves excommunicates. 82 Moreover, the 
podestas of Treviso and Faventia, leading exponents of the Lombard League, were 
assured that Innocent would not enter into a peace with the Emperor, unless they 
agreed and were part of it.83 The Pope would have been aware that these conditions 
were unlikely to be accepted by Frederick. Nonetheless, negotiations continued. 84 in 
Mai’ch 1244 demands for the Emperor’s submission to the Pope were made public. 
The conditions were stringent and their acceptance by the Emperor testifies to the 
desperation with which Frederick was searching for peace. For instance, he had to 
take back into his favour all those who had rebelled against him, and had to accept a 
papal judgement on how the Lombard question was to be dealt with. Furthermore,
83
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although Frederick had to forgive all acts committed since the outbreak of hostilities by 
his enemies, the Pope would decide what amendments the Emperor had to make for 
crimes and outrages committed by himself and his partisans.85 Effectively, this put 
him at Innocent’s mercy. Despite that, Frederick seems to have accepted these 
conditions, as evident in his letters to Conrad86 and to Henry HI of England.87 By 
June, however, dealings had reached a dead end.88 Innocent left Rome, and went first 
to Citta di Gastello and then to Sutri. It seems as if Frederick had begun to lose 
patience. He declared that he would not comply with the conditions proffered by 
Innocent’s proctors, unless he first received letters of absolution.89 in the meantime, 
Genoa offered the Pope its support should he decide to escape Imperial pressure.90 
This Innocent accepted, and fled first to Genoa and then Lyon,91 creating a diplomatic 
disaster for Frederick. After a year of negotiating and the publicly declared willingness 
of Innocent IV to take him back into the Church, the Pope had been forced to flee 
Rome secretly and put himself at the mercy of the Genoese and the King of France. 
Matthew Paris is our most outspoken source for the events of these yeais. Although he 
wrote well after the events he is describing, it is nonetheless obvious how he was 
trying to cope with the conflicting accounts of Frederick and his actions. All too 
frequently he was willing to blame papal propaganda, the curia's greed and coiTuption 
for the Emperor's undertakings. At other times, however, he took a wary stance 
towards the Hohenstaufen. In Frederick's case this was largely limited to refusing to 
his imperial titles after his deposition in 1245. Nonetheless, even he found it 
impossible to understand or excuse the failure of negotiations in 1244, and described 
the Emperor's actions as motivated by hubris and greed.92 To him it was Frederick's 
unwillingness to show humility which had prolonged the conflict, with all the 
disastrous consequences it entailed.93 We may assume that he was not alone in his 
interpretation of events.
Much has been made of Louis IX and his arbitration attempts. He has been 
contrasted favourably to his brother Charles of Anjou, and has been described as a 
pillar of righteousness and d e c e n c y . 94 However, a major difficulty in assessing the 
role of Louis IX is that the main near-contemporaiy source for his involvement was 
Matthew Paris, who frequently used the King of France to contrast him favourably 
with his own monarch. Under the year 1240, for instance, he recounts how Louis IX 
refused to allow the funds collected in France to be brought to Rome, This is
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85immediately followed by complaints of Henry Hi’s unwillingness to take a similar 
stance.95 Another difficulty in using Matthew is that he frequently confuses events.
This is exemplified by his version of Louis’ alleged reply when Gregory IX offered 
the Imperial throne to Robert of Artois. The King refused to take action against 
Frederick, unless his guilt had first been proven before a general council. Also, Louis 
allegedly continued, he would send envoys to Frederick to test his religious beliefs.
These found the Emperor shocked at allegations of heresy, and were convinced of his 
catholic beliefs.96 This is largely a conflation of several events. In March 1239 
Frederick suggested to the cardinals that he would be willing to let the differences 
between him and the Pope be decided before a general council.97 Furthermore, in 
June, the Emperor had sent two bishops to the cardinals, probably to assert the 
propriety of his actions.98 A French source reports that Louis IX had been sending 
envoys to Pope and Emperor to urge for peace,99 and Mattliew himself describes how 
a commission of four bishops, sent by the Pope to the Emperor, became convinced of 
his innocence and orthodoxy. 100 These events seem to form the various components 
of the anecdote told by Matthew. We have to keep these twin factors in mind when 
dealing with the King of France. The St Albans chronicler often got confused by the 
amount of material he had the opportunity to sift through, and he did so with a purpose 
which, all too often, was to criticise the actions of Henry HI.
However, Matthew is not entirely wrong in stressing Louis’ reluctance to get 
involved in the papal-imperial conflict. 1^1 Louis IX himself emphasised his neutrality 
when he asked Frederick n  to set free the prelates he had imprisoned in 1241. Louis 
stated that he had strenuously resisted papal attempts to use the resources of his 
kingdom against Frederick. However, should the Emperor not desist from detaining 
French prelates, it might be necessary to reconsider his position. 102 There is no 
evidence for funds or troops being sent against the Emperor. At the same time, it was 
not until after he had taken the cross in 1244, that the King began to work actively 
towards a settlement between Frederick and tlie Pope. 103 However, Louis did provide 
ships for the prelates to attend the council of L y o n ,  104 and he tried to utilise the 
conflict to furllier his own ends in Languedoc. During the wars between the Counts of 
Provence and Toulouse, for instance, Louis could use the inability of either Frederick 
or Gregoiy to pursue an active policy in Languedoc. The Emperor had to ask him for
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86support against the Count of Provence, while the papal legate relied on him to attack 
the Count of Toulouse. This provided a willingly seized opportunity to expand 
Capetian influence in the region. The King of France used the conflict to favour his 
own and Ms dynasty’s ambitions. As we have seen, the Count of Toulouse, all too 
frequently part of conspiracies and confederations directed against the French crown 
found that even being an imperial vassal did not protect him against the Capetians. 
However, Louis was not alone in doing so. In September 1239, for instance, the King 
of Castile had announced to tlie Pope that he was sending his heir to the Emperor to 
press his claims to the duchy of Swabia, which he claimed as the inheritance of his 
deceased wife, a daughter of Philipp of S w a b i a .  1^5 He also assured Gregory that this 
was no abandonment of traditional Castilian loyalty towards the Holy See. In fact, 
should the Emperor not comply with his demands, Castilian knights would join the 
papal a r m ie s .  106 The King and his son eventually switched sides when, in 1245, 
Innocent IV declared tliat he would grant the Infante of Castile all the help he needed, 
if he could prove his c l a i m s .  107 After nearly six years of unsuccessful attempts at 
mediating, the rulers of Latin Christendom began to accept a continuation of the 
conflict both as inevitable, and as an opportunity to further their own aims and 
ambitions. It is worth noting the similarities in the reasoning employed by Ferdinand 
and Louis IX. The King of Castile kept a precarious balance, but he also saw an 
opportunity to manifest a rather weak and distant claim which, under more stable 
circumstances, it would have been impossible to pursue. Louis IX, on the other hand, 
used the veiy prominence of his position which truly could tip the balancé between 
Frederick and the curia to solicit grants and concessions from both parties. The biggest 
prize he was to gain was the inheritance of Provence. The conflict thus did provide 
opportunities as well as challenges. Both Pope and Emperor were in a position in 
which they were hard pressed to grant favours to those whose allegiance they were 
tiying to win. To some, like the Duke of Austria and the King of Hungary, this proved 
a disaster. To others, like Louis IX it provided a welcome opportunity to enrich 
themselves. The question which we will have to address next is as to how Henry III 
fares in comparison with his contemporaries.
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IV. 3 English Involvement
Right from the start, Hemy DI and his subjects became embroiled in tlie rivahy 
between Pope and Emperor. A chronicle from Cologne reports how Gregory sent a 
legate to England almost immediately after the Emperor’s excommunication. His 
mission was to muster the financial resources of the English Church for the war 
against F r e d e r ic k .  108 T h e  legate’s doings became a continuing cause of complaint 
with Matthew P a r i s .  109 Other sources, too, commented on the ‘thesaurus non 
modicus’ which the legate collected.HO Annals o f Dunstable list the sums 
forthcoming from the diocese of Lincoln: £100 from the dean and chapter, 20 marks 
from Dunstable itself, and 600 marks from the Bishop of Lincoln and his secular 
clergy. 111 However, the car dinal did not stop at collecting funds. The consecration of 
St Paul’s, 112 for instance, was used to propagate the Emperor’s excommunication 
.113 It also seems that the legate was touring various religious houses, probably to 
oversee the collection of funds, but also to spread the reasons for the Pope’s 
excommunication of Frederick. Matthew Paris, for example, reports that shortly 
before leaving England, the legate excommunicated the Emperor at St Albans. 114 This 
exemplifies yet anodier feature of the propaganda which we have encountered before, 
that is each side's attempt to disseminate its version of the conflict as far and as widely 
as possible. However, Otto soon encountered difficulties. The English Church 
remained reluctant to pay. When he demanded that the indigenous clergy should 
follow the example of foreign beneficiaries and grant a Fifth, this met with protest. 
During a council at Reading, the prelates refused to comply, and declared that they had 
to consult the lower clergy first.H5 Matthew Paris uses this to paint a highly 
uncomplimentary picture of the King. When the nobles of England protested against 
papal extortions, the King refused to act,H6 and when the abbots came to complain 
about the activities of a papal money-collector, he threatened to imprison those who 
resisted papal d e m a n d s .  H7 Even when taking into account lliat Matthew may have 
exaggerated the degree of the King's compliance with papal demands, his 
mi willingness to confront the curia seems nonetlieless remarkable.
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Matters were furtlier complicated by Frederick’s efforts to woo Henry HI and 
his barons. In October 1239 the Emperor wrote to the nobility of England. He 
complained of the injustice done to him by Gregoiy, and invoked the solidarity of the 
English barons. His struggle was not merely a matter between Pope and Emperor, he 
claimed, but concerned all princes, magnates and barons. Frederick complained that 
his excommunication was made public in England, and exhorted the barons to move 
the King to assist his brother and f e l l o w - p r m c e . H ^  Similar requests were put forth in 
1240. Matthew Paris reports that two Imperial envoys had been sent to Henry III. 
They carried letters from Frederick, requesting that his excommunication not be made 
public in England, that the papal money-collectors be expelled and that the funds 
collected not be handed over. The King allegedly responded that he could not resist the 
Pope’s demand, as he was the Pope’s vassal and ally. However, Henry wrote to 
Gregory IX to aiTange a peace, alüiough without success, and he advised the legate to 
leave the country quickly and q u i e t l y .   ^19 Parts of Matthew’s story are confirmed by 
other sources. In Februaiy 1240, a Hugh Chabet, envoy of the Emperor, is recorded 
as receiving gifts and assistance for his journey homewards. 1^0 As far as the 
arbitration attempt is concerned, an entry in the 1241 Liberate Roll may be of 
relevance, in which a merchant from Florence received 300 marks to be handed over to 
the King's envoys soon to aixive ‘at the court of Rome and that of the E m p e r o r ’ . 1 ^ 1  
This would imply an attempt at mediating between the two hostile forces. The legate is 
known to have left England in December 1240.122 whether this was triggered by 
Henry’s gentle persuasion remains, however, uncertain. Most sources put his 
departure in the context of the planned council at R o m e .  123 The funds collected in 
England remained important. Matthew Paris reports that Walter of Ocra met Henry El 
in 1241. Just before he arrived, the money collectors had left England. Walter 
eventually convinced the King that the papal agents ought to be detained should they 
return. Immediately afterwards, he left for France. In Italy he caught up with the 
Pope’s agents and captured t h e m . 124 Walter is attested as leaving England in October
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891241,125 where he seems to have been since about May or J u n e ,  126 but no other 
evidence survives to coiToborate the picture presented by the St Alban’s chronicler. 
Confusing as this episode may be, it helps to underlme the wavering attitude of Henry 
in and his court. They were unwilling openly to oppose the Holy See, and they were 
equally reluctant to antagonise the Emperor. At the same time it highlights how both 
Frederick and Gregory IX employed similar means of propaganda. Walter of Gera's 
mission followed almost immediately on that of Cardinal Otto, and we may speculate 
whether he also followed a similar itmerary through England, spreading the Emperor's 
message and refuting tlie claims of Gregory's emissary.
Henry I ll’s compliance with papal demands obviously worried Frederick. 
However, in many respects the King’s attitude was not much different from that of 
Louis IX. He tried to avoid getting involved, and he hedged his bets. Henry, not 
unlike the Capetians, supported the planned council, and even sent his own envoys to 
accompany English prelates planning to attend it. 127 This could not have come as a 
surprise. To urge a peaceful settlement of the papal-imperial conflict was an entirely 
different matter from publicly resisting and opposing the head of Latin Christendom. 
Frederick overestimated his own position when he assumed that the Kings of England 
and France would disregard the papacy so far as to associate themselves openly with 
the Emperor i n s t e a d .  128 To criticise Henry III for lending his limited support to the 
Pope does not take into account the significance of the Holy See. The religious 
connection is too obvious to consider it in any detail. In addition, Heniy III owed his 
throne and his kingdom to the support and assistance he had received from the curia 
during his minority. Hemy may thus have felt a moral as well as a political obligation 
towards tlie Holy See. The King's reaction to papal requests for money is, therefore, 
not a good example to study his general attitude towards Frederick 11.129
It was only with Innocent IV’s pontificate that marked a change in English 
attitudes towards the papacy can be observed. In 1244 the Pope asked for further 
contributions from the English clergy for his campaigns against Frederick. This met 
with stubborn resistance. The prelates decided that they could not grant funds to be 
used against the Emperor, because he had not yet been found guilty of heresy by a 
general council of the C h u r c h .  130 However, as with earlier, similar efforts undertaken 
in 1228-9, it would be mistaken to deduct from this that this implied a fundamental
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hostility towards the curia's policies, or even open sympathies for the Emperor. 
Rather, the reluctance of the English clergy was an indication of their unease about yet 
more financial demands from the papacy. Nonetheless, Frederick II quickly managed 
to exploit dissatisfaction in England. During a meeting at London, intended to deal 
with papal requests for additional aids, Walter of Ocra was present. The very fact tliat 
an Imperial envoy was allowed to speak at a meeting, also attended by the Pope’s 
emissary, points to a minor diplomatic victory for Frederick. According to Matthew 
Paris, Walter implored the assembled prelates not to support tlie papacy. Letters from 
the Count of Toulouse and the Latin Emperor of Constantinople were read out to 
testify to Frederick’s good behaviour. Furthermore, should the King heed the 
Emperor’s advice, the annual tribute to Rome would be abolished, and all the other 
complaints against the Holy See would be dealt with. It is difficult to differentiate 
between what may have been Walter’s mission and what was a reflection of Matthew’s 
own complaints and grievances. Frederick may well have played on increasing 
disillusionment with what many perceived to be the greed and avarice of the Roman 
pontiffs. At the same time, these were also the themes which ran through most of 
Matthew's chronicle, and which he tided to press home repeatedly and forcefully, often 
putting his own complaints in the mouths of o t h e r s .  3^2 \Ye thus have to be careful in 
how much of this account we attribute to Matthew Paris, and how much to the 
Emperor's envoy. As far as the surviving administiative evidence is concerned, Walter 
seems to have come to England repeatedly between J a n u a r y  133 and November 
1244.134 ii remains unclear whether he stayed there for the whole of the time, as in 
May another envoy from the Emperor a r r iv e d .  1^3 However, what we can be sure 
about is that Walter was to state, defend and press Frederick’s case, and that he did so 
with some success. Hemy III took a more active diplomatic role. Despite the scarce 
evidence, one may assume that the possibility of a truce was among the issues 
discussed by Nicholas de Bolevill, who was sent to the Imperial court in November 
1244.136 In March 1245, Frederick referred to letters he had recently received from 
Henry 111,137 and in June the King of England requested that Innocent IV delay 
proceedings at Lyon, until Henry’s envoys had returned from the E m p e r o r .  1 3 8  Por 
the first time, the King was actively mvolved in negotiations. This may have been less
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than expected by Frederick, but it was as far as Henry was able to go without 
alienating Innocent. Henry III was unlikely ever to take up arms against the Pope. 
However, he had good reason to oblige the Emperor whose support, assistance and 
friendship was still deemed necessary for the fulfilment of the King’s ambitions and 
projects in Europe. At the same time, this conforms to the wider European picture 
outlined above. Most rulers remained unwilling to side openly witli one particulai* side, 
but largely remained at the sidelines, and confined themselves to urging moderation 
and compromise.
This picture is also confirmed by two more events which merit closer 
consideration: The crusade of Henry’s brother Richard, and the ill-fated Poitevin 
campaign of 1242/3. From an early stage, Richard of Cornwall had been embroiled in 
the squabble over the date and direction of a new crusade. While Gregory IX wanted 
to redirect the campaign towards Constantinople, 139 Frederick insisted that it assist 
the Christians in Palestine. As early as February 1238, the Emperor had written to 
Richard and repeated his arguments for a delay of the expedition until 1239.140 
Furthermore, he asked him to pass through Sicily on his way, and promised his help 
and advice. In November, Gregory wrote to Richard of Cornwall, Louis IX and 
Henry III, exhorting them to channel their resources towards the Latin Empire of 
Constantinople, rather than the Holy Land. 141 Furüiermore, letters were addressed to 
the legate in England, asking him to induce Richard to campaign in Greece. 142 
However, although the King of England was to give some support to the Latin 
Emperor, 143 none of the English crusaders were willing to comply with the Pope’s 
wishes. If Matthew Paris is to be believed, Richard continued to encounter papal 
resistance to his campaign once he reached the continent. While at Arles he met the 
papal legate who ordered him to delay his departure. Richard, however, decided to 
proceed, and left for Palestine from Marseilles, nominally under Imperial control. 144 
The St Albans chronicler also states that Richard was sending envoys to Frederick in 
Sicily. It may be significant that one envoy, Robert de Twenge, had come to notoriety 
as an anti-papist during the 1231 rebellion against foreigners in England. 145 
However, it would be mistaken to conclude from this that Richard was fundamentally 
hostile to the papacy. Rather, it showed an increasing independence in the crusading 
movement from the direction and leadership of the papal curia. Gregory IX's 
cmsading policies veiy much confoimed to the structural pattern outlined by Innocent
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ni, in particular tlie idea of an actual papal leadership during the campaign, ratlier than 
one that was limit to calling and organising it. Buy contrast, Richai'd was very much 
part of the tradition of secular crusaders and their often wilful disregard for the needs 
and wishes of the curia. We also have to take into account the role of the papal legate 
during the Fifth Crusade and its subsequent failure, to understand that Richard's 
actions were based on precedent, rather than on any open or veiled hostility towards 
the curia's policies.
Richard’s exploits in Palestine need not concern us h e r e .^46 However, he 
continued to act in unison with the E m p e r o r .  ^47 His main achievement was to 
conclude the negotiations, initiated by Theobald of Champagne, for another truce witli 
the Sultan o f  E g y p t ,  148 rather than entering an alliance with Damascus, as propagated 
by the Emperor’s opponents in P a le s t i n e .  1 4 9  i n  fact, in a letter from 1 2 4 5 ,  Frederick 
referred to Richard as having signed the treaty on his behalf. 1^^ Furthermore, his 
negotiations occurred while Egyptian envoys are known to have been in Sicily. 161 
Richard worked in close co-operation with the Emperor, as illustrated in the 
distribution of lands regained through the truce. Ascalon, for instance, was handed 
over to the Imperial baillie, rather than to the council or those who previously 
controlled the t o w n .  162 The Earl of Cornwall’s role should not be exaggerated. 
However, he was willing (and eager) to co-operate with Frederick and continued to 
view him as the rightful ruler of Jerusalem, even if this meant setting aside papal 
objections to close relations with the excommunicate Emperor. In this respect, his 
attitude was no different from that of Louis IX who, for instance, still accepted the 
Emperor's claims, at least pro forma, when leading his campaign to North Africa in 
1248.
In this context a curious letter, probably written in 1241, may be of 
i n t e r e s t .  163 There, the leaders of the anti-imperial opposition suggest that Simon de 
Montfort rather than the Emperor’s candidate act as regent for the infant Conrad IV. 
We should be beware, though, to read too much into this passage. Simon had also 
been assisted and helped by Frederick: while he went to Outremer, his wife stayed
92
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93behind as the Emperor’s g u e s t .  ^64 However, one of his cousins also happened to be 
the lord of T y r e .  165 addition, he descended from an illustrious line of crusaders, 
and untainted either by the rivalries of the Palestine nobility or any previous siding 
with the Emperor, he may have been a non-partisan candidate acceptable to both 
parties. Moreover, he was the leader of tlie next major crusading contingent aniving in 
Palestine, probably the most important argument in his f a v o u r .  166 The letter also 
indicates the difficult situation the anti-imperial camp faced in Palestine. During the 
summer of 1241, Richard Filangieri had begun to make ground and almost captured 
the rebellious town of A c r e .  167 it would go too far, though, to tiy and deduce from 
this any opinion as to where the English court stood during the papal-imperial 
struggle. Not only had Simon been forced into exile before his c r u s a d e ,  168 his career 
in Outremer was also more the result of the immediate political circumstances 
surrounding his arrival in the Holy Land, rather than any underlying political or 
diplomatic efforts undertaken by the English Court.
On his return from Palestine, Richard was involved in an attempt to arbitrate 
between Frederick and Gregory. In a rather boastful letter on his exploits in Syria, the 
Earl also refeixed to his visit at the papal curia where he tried to negotiate a settlement 
between Frederick and G r e g o i y . 1 6 9  Although Richai'd’s account gives no details of 
his meetings with the Emperor, Matthew Paris elaborates on the letter. For once, there 
is little reason to doubt his version of events, as Richard formed one of the major 
sources for the c h r o n i c l e r .  ^60 Having granted the Earl several days to recover from 
his journey, Frederick asked him to deal with Gregory IX. However, he achieved 
little, as the Pope remained unwilling to give up his position that Frederick’s 
excommunication could only be revoked if he submitted unconditionally to papal 
judgement. After having spent another two months in the Emperor’s presence, ‘quasi 
filius cum patre’, Richard returned to England. The Eail’s actions in Palestine and 
his arbitration attempts reveal an aspect of English diplomacy far more favourable 
towards Frederick, than the question of English payments to the papacy would imply.
They thus underline the degree to which English policy during these years followed a 
pattern similar to tliat of other European monarchs (Ferdinand of Castile, Louis IX and 
Baldwin of Constantinople may be quoted as examples), and that it certainly was not 
hostile to the Emperor. Rather, like them, Henry III was reluctant to challenge papal 
authority directly, but was willing to arbitrate, while trying to utilise Frederick’s 
predicaments for his own purposes.
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94This latter point is best understood in the context of Henry’s unsuccessful 
invasion of Poitou in 1242/3. Since 1239, the French court had formally begun to 
manifest its claims to tliose lands formerly held by the Plantagenets. In addition, the 
King’s remaining territories began to pose difficulties. In 1241 the seneschal of 
Gascony came to England, and is said to have stated that, unless the King appear in 
person, he would lose the duchy, too. ^ 62 This referred both to increasing unrest in the 
region, and to moves by Louis IX to edge further towards Gascony. The same year 
Louis’ brother was formally enfeoffed with Poitou, which was followed by an 
invasion of the lands of Henry’s stepfather, the Count of La Marche. ^ 63 Furthermore, 
the King of France began to move on Saintes and other places bordering Gascony. ^ 64 
This triggered immediate diplomatic activity at the English court. In 1242 an agreement 
was drawn up between the Count of Toulouse and Henry in which tliey promised each 
other mutual assistance against their enemies. ^  65 jn itself, this was a major success 
for Henry III, and the result of efforts at peace-making he had undertaken some years 
before. 166 Moreover, allies were sought on the eastern borders of France, including 
the Count of Geneva. 167 Furthermore, Peter of Savoy was sent to Imperial 
Burgundy, 168 while another envoy was accredited to Theobald of Champagne and tlie 
King's Savoyard relatives. 169 According to Matthew Paris, the Kings of Aragon and 
Castile were considered by the English Court, although with some apprehension in the 
latter’s case, 120 as was the King of Portugal. 121 Henry thus aimed at a wide-ranging 
alliance, covering the eastern and southern flanks of Capetian France. While these 
diplomatic preparations were under way, a paihament was called to meet in London in 
late January 1242.122 There, however, the King encountered resistance. Many nobles 
claimed that, as the truce renewed in 1240 had another three years to run, no action 
should be taken, and it was declared that no aid would be granted to the King. Henry 
III, though, was unwilling to let slip by this opportunity. Parliament was dissolved 
and the King proceeded towards Poitou regardless. 123
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The progress of his campaign need not concern us h e r e .  124 After initial 
s u c c e s s e s ,  125 it ended in inglorious retreat. 126 Louis IX quickly overcame the threat 
posed by the Count of Provence, and forced him, as well as the Count of La Marche, 
back into the Capetian fold. The Emperor’s role during the campaign merits special 
consideration. An Imperial envoy, Aymar de Gumpeis, left England in May 1242, just 
before Henry set out on campaign. 122 Frederick soon found himself the object of 
persistent overtures by Henry III. In June, Peter of Bordeaux and Bartholomew 
Pecche were sent to ‘Italy and Apulia’. 128 it seems that their mission was in part a 
response to the earlier embassy of the Emperor - in one copy of their letter of 
accreditation they are refeixed to as dealing with ‘certain articles sometime treated of by 
the envoys of the Emperor’. 129 At the same time, their brief went beyond that - a 
second copy of theii' accreditation describes thek mission as
‘to enter into a treaty between the Emperor and liim [Henry IB] of peace and truce, war and concord against all men, conventions made on the King's 
part with the church of Rome excepted’. 1^^
That this was directed against France is made clear by a separate letter which Henry 
sent to Frederick in September. He complained of the betrayal he had suffered from 
the Count of Provence, and requested that the Emperor punish his vassal. 
Furthermore, Hemy stated, he knew of many in Burgundy who would be willing to 
assist him, if the Emperor allowed tliem to do so.1^1 However, Henry did not confine 
himself to sending letters and emissaries. The King of England employed the full 
range of his political and diplomatic contacts. Also in September, the Count of 
Toulouse met the Emperor at Melfi, and we may assume tliat English requests for help 
were among the issues discussed. In June, just two days after Bartholomew 
Pecche’s and Peter of Bordeaux’s mission had been announced to Frederick, Peter de 
Viiiea was promised £40 worth of lands in England, ‘in consideration of his services 
and d e s e r t s ’ . ^^3 This was tlie more interesting, as Peter had received his annual fief of 
40 marks as recently as M a y .  1^4 The King curried the favour of those who in the past 
had benefited from his largesse. At the time Peter was still amongst the Emperor’s 
most trusted advisors. Negotiations continued until 1243. In January, Henry IB wrote 
to the Emperor once more. Having made a treaty of alliance with the Count of
95
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96Toulouse, the King requested that Frederick give his counsel, and asked him ‘to recall 
to his memory the last words of I. his wife, the King's sister, and fulfil them in 
deed’. ^85 Once again, Henry tried to utilise old contacts. In a separate mandate Peter 
de Vinea was requested ‘to lay these letters and the King's request before the Emperor 
and to be diligent in advancing die King's c a u s e ’ . 1^6 Simultaneously, sepaiate envoys 
were accredited to F r e d e r i c k ,  187 while some Imperial messengers, already in 
England, 1^^ were asked to advance ‘the matter’ with the Emperor, and to keep the 
English court informed about their p r o g r e s s .  1^9 The King of England was serious in 
his intentions, and he aimed at utilising his close contacts with the Emperor and his 
court to best effect. It is worth noting how he tried to use various levels of argument.
He promised his help and assistance (except if directed against the Pope), played on 
emotions by referring to the unspecified last requests of the deceased Empress, while 
freeing the Emperor initially of any personal involvement, as his men in Burgundy 
were ready to fight, waiting only for his permission, and he used those who were 
traditionally close to Frederick, such as the Count of Toulouse and Peter de Vinea, to 
argue in his favour. No stone was left unturned.
However, all these efforts came to nothing. Frederick did not abandon his 
French a l l i e s .  190 Attacking the Capetians would have gained Frederick little. He was 
still hoping to end his excommunication. That, however, depended on the attitude of 
the new Pope, and it would have been unwise to alienate Louis IX even further after 
the imprisonment of his prelates and e n v o y s .  191 Moreover, he was faced with a 
deteriorating situation in Palestine, which could only be remedied by a concerted 
European effort, which included the King of France. However, Henry Ill’s actions 
should not be dismissed easily. Although the Emperor faced a situation wliich made it 
difficult for him to side with his English relatives, from Henry’s perspective the time 
seems to have come to reap the rewards of his earlier support for Frederick. We have 
to remember that in 1242 the conflict between Frederick and the papacy seemed at its 
end. 192 Gregoiy IX had died, and whoever was to be his successor was considered 
likely to receive tlie Emperor back into the Church, restoring the concord which had 
been prevalent during most of the 1230s. Hemy IH’s expectations that now, at last, he 
would be able to profit from his maniage alliance with Frederick, does reflect these 
hopes.
The 1242/3 campaign was significant in other ways, too. Kienast is 
exaggerating when he describes its outcome as sealing Plantagenet attempts at
8^5 CPR 1232-47, 399. Empress Isabella had died in 1241: Rolandini Patavini Chronicon in factis et 
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recovering their lost possessions in France. 193 However, the wide-ranging contacts 
and alliances sought in preparing for Henry’s expedition opened up a new sphere of 
influence: the Mediteixanean. In fact, the most durable outcome of Henry’s sojourn in 
France were closer contacts with the rulers of the Hispanic peninsula, and the marriage 
between Richard of Cornwall and Sanchia of Provence early in 1243.194 The project 
continued.
Between 1239 and 1245, far from worsening, English relations with Frederick 
II moved along accustomed lines. The Emperor sought to solicit support against his 
foes, while Henry III was seeking to utilise his German contacts against Louis IX. 
The main channel of communication with the Empire remained Frederick II. 
Furthermore it is worth noting that Henry avoided associating himself with those, like 
the Archbishop of Cologne, hostile to Frederick. The Imperial princes played a 
negligible role in Henry’s relations with the Emperor. Amongst those recorded was a 
messenger from the Duke of Brunswick, 195 and Henry de Rumenham, a Brabantine 
clerk. 196 The Duke of Brabant makes an indirect appearance during the Poitevin 
campaign. The war was partly conducted by raiding the ships of enemy merchants. 197 
This, in turn, required the issue of safe-conducts for ‘friendly’ vessels. 198 Amongst 
those issued in 1242, merchants from Brabant feature highly. 199 in a mandate from 
August 1242, a number of Brabantine merchants are referred to by name, and its is 
stated that the Duke of Brabant had sent letters guaranteeing similar safe-conducts to 
English merchants in his lands.^OO Apart from this, no evidence survives for direct 
contacts. It is a matter of speculation whether Bartholomew of Hoveden, sent to 
Denmark and Saxony in 1240 to collect goshawks, was also on a diplomatic 
mission.21^ 1 An exception was a messenger from Conrad IV, recorded in late 1241, 
whose mission was probably connected to efforts at soliciting personal support from 
Henry against tlie Mongols.^^^ Apart from this, contacts with the Empire were 
aiTaiiged via and centred around Frederick II. There was little difference between 
Henry IE’s attitude towards Frederick and that of other rulers. Frederick could rely on 
the King of England’s diplomatic support, as long as he did not expect him to 
challenge the Pope directly. Henry III in turn continued to view Frederick as a
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98potential ally, likely to come to his assistance, once peace had been restored with 
whoever was to succeed Gregory IX to the see of St Peter.
Chapter V 
Doom  
(1245-50)
In 1245, during a general council at Lyon, at the borders between France and 
the Empire, Pope Innocent IV solemnly declared Frederick II to be deposed, and 
stripped of his dignities as Emperor, King of Sicily and King-regent of Jerusalem. 
Papal efforts to put this deposition into practice dominated European politics for 
another twenty years. Its immediate impact changed the balance of power in western 
Europe, and accelerated the Capetians’ rise to prominence. The ensuing wai* of 
propaganda soon embroiled the rest of Christendom, forcing rulers and princes to 
reconsider their policies, and witnessed a rapid change of loyalties. In the case of 
England, although the King avoided associating himself with the anti-Kings Henry 
Raspe and William of Holland, this coincided witli a widening of contacts in Germany 
and Italy. After ten years during which Frederick III had dominated exchanges with 
the Empire, others came to the fore once more. In addition, Hemy suffered a series of 
diplomatic setbacks. The Count of Provence died in 1245, and his lands fell to Louis 
IX’s younger brother, Charles of Anjou, in 1246. Finally, the disputed inheritance of 
Flanders threw the county into turmoil and brought most of it under French 
domination. Hemy III had thus been deprived of the main pillars of his anti-Capetian 
diplomacy. New allies had to be sought and new policies formed.
y .l Frederick and his foes
A detailed account of the proceedings at Lyon is given by Matthew Paris. 
Although the council is mostly associated with the deposition of Frederick II and of 
Sancho II of Portugal, it was also a forum to discuss the many concerns facing 
Christendom. Most prominent amongst these was the planning and financing of a new 
crusade. 1 In 1244, the Khwarizim Turks had sacked Jerusalem and disastrously 
beaten the Christian forces in Palestine,^ while Hungary was still recovering from the 
Mongol attacks, living in perpetual fear of a renewed onslaught.3 Christendom still 
smarted from its defeats and searched for ways to remedy an increasingly threatening 
situation. Other issues were dealt with, too. The English bishops, for instance, used 
the opportunity to press for the canonisation of Edmund Rich, the former Aichbishop
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of Canterbury,4 and to present a list of gravamina concerning papal demands.6 They 
also attended, as Henry III put it to Frederick, to broker an understanding with the 
Pope.6 Apart from the prelates, Ralph FitzNicholas, William Cantilupe, Philip Basset 
and the Earl of Norfolk were present as the King’s proctors.2 The council opened in 
July, attended, according to one chronicler, by 250 prelates,^ mostly from France.9
The situation of the Christian Diaspora dominated p r o c e e d i n g s .  10 The 
Patriarch of Constantinople began by outlining the manifold difficulties facing Latin 
Christendom in Greece. This was followed by the Bishop of Beirut, who gave an 
account of the problems besetting die Church in Outremer, Next came Innocent IV’s 
summary of the state of the Roman Church. It had many enemies, he claimed, most 
dangerous amongst whom, however, worse even than the Tartars and Saracens, was 
the Emperor. This lead to detailed accusations concerning Frederick’s various 
misdemeanours, and his proctors’ equally swift rebuttal. Eventually, the Emperor’s 
agents managed to secure a respite to consult with their lord. It seems, however, that 
Frederick saw litde chance for a peaceful settlement. He therefore denied the judicial 
basis of the council. His proctors declared that the Pope’s only purpose in convening 
the council had been to destroy the Emperor, acting botii as accuser and as judge. H  It 
cannot have come as much of a surprise when Innocent rejected their reasoning, and 
solemnly declared Frederick deprived of his offices.
Henry IH’s attitude towaids Frederick during the council has been described as 
hostile, symbolised by the presence of English p r o c t o r s .   ^3 However, to expect the 
King of England not to send his agents to attend the council ignores the political 
difficulties he faced at home. While many of the prelates present were concerned witli 
papal demands for m o n e y ,  14 Henry IE faced the far more serious threat of English 
prelates complaining directly to the Pope about his government of the Church. In June 
1245, for instance, those prelates setting out for Lyon had to swear ‘not to attempt 
anything against the King’s crown and d i g n i t y ’.16 Furthermore, one of the issues 
discussed at the council was the proposed canonisation of Edmund Rich, strenuously 
opposed by H e n r y .  16 The synod was, therefore, dealing with issues which directly
1 0 0
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concerned the King and requir ed the presence of Ms proctors. Moreover, Henry could 
not intercede on the Emperor’s behalf, or press for a peaceful settlement, unless he 
was represented by his agents. Finally, we should not forget that, although a 
settlement of the papal-Imperial dispute was amongst the issues to be discussed, 
neither Frederick nor most of the attending clergy seem to have expected the 
Emperor’s deposition.
A similar picture emerges from other sources. Henry III was trying to arbitrate 
between Frederick and G r e g o r y .  12 This is borne out by the authorisation he gave to 
his representatives, ‘to treat peace between the church of Rome and the Emperor’. 1  ^
Matthew Paris gives a detailed account of their role during the proceedings. When 
Frederick’s proctor, Thaddaus de Suessa, requested two weeks to consult with the 
Emperor, it was on the insistence of French and English bishops that Innocent granted 
a respite. 19 After Frederick’s refusal to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the synod, the 
English were those arguing most feiwently in his favour.^l) Finally, when Frederick’s 
deposition was announced, the English proctors argued in favour of his offspring, as 
the sons could not be punished for the sins of tliek fathers.^ 1 Although Matthew may 
have exaggerated the degree to which English and French prelates led die opposition to 
Innocent’s unrelenting stance, the general picture seems convincing. Henry III had 
little to gain were the Emperor succeeded by a Capetian prince, or by someone who 
had to rely even more on French support than Frederick did already. It must have 
seemed unlikely that the Hohenstaufen could easily be expelled from Germany, when 
Gregory had failed so badly even in Lombardy. Whoever was to challenge Frederick 
in his homeland would require strong support from outside Germany. As far as Louis 
IX was concerned, he had taken the Cross in 1244, and needed the Emperor for the 
plannmg of his c a m p a i g n . Even on a merely pragmatic basis, die Kings of England 
and France thus had reason enough to press for a settiement and to meliorate the 
sentence agahist Frederick as far as possible.
Matthew’s statement as to die Emperor’s children is revealing. The son born of 
Isabella and called Henry (after Henry II), was only one of three legitimate male 
children begotten by Frederick. The Emperor played upon any expectations the 
English King might have had as to the future role of his nephew. In 1247, he wrote to 
Henry HI, announcing that his nephew was to be made vicar of Sicily, and, as part of 
a settlement with Innocent IV, was to be baptised by the P o p e .  ^ 3 in addition, the boy 
wrote to his uncle, apologising that he had not been in contact earlier, but promised to
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do so now that he was of sufficient age and p o w e r . ^ 4  Henry’s elevation is confirmed 
by an entry in the registry of Frederick II, where tlie boy and his council received 
letters to be made public throughout S i c i l y .^ 6  Matthew probably exaggerates when he 
describes the young Henry as having been honoured and singled out before all others 
by F r e d e r i c k .26 The Emperor’s testament, however, lists him as heir should Conrad, 
Frederick’s son with Yolanda/Isabella, die without children. Moreover, he was to 
receive either the kingdom of Burgundy or that of J e r u s a le m .^ 2  Although these were 
the weakest link in the Hohenstaufens' Empire - comparable neither in political clout 
nor in resources to either Sicily or Germany and northern Italy -  Henry Ill’s nephew 
was nonetheless ensured to play an significant role in the affairs of the Empire. 
Moreover, by holding Burgundy, becoming the feudal overlord over the Counts of 
Provence and Toulouse, the young boy would have been in a prominent enough 
position to be potentially of use to his uncle, the King of England. Henry III had been 
trying to play on the Emperor’s emotions when asking for help in Poitou, and 
Frederick did likewise, by using Isabella’s only son to enlist English backing against 
the Pope.
A passage in the Emperor’s letter, refening to the boy’s imminent baptism by 
Innocent IV, also shows that even after his deposition hopes for a peaceful settlement 
had not been abandoned. This latter point is worth fuidier consideration. In April 1246 
two cardinals had been sent to Sicily, authorised to relax the Emperor’s sentence of 
excommunication.28 However, by the end of May, the Pope wrote ‘to the whole of 
Christendom’ that Frederick’s purgation had been found insincere and insufficient. 
Nonetheless, he was invited to come to Lyon to clear himself in person.29 Maybe 
even to the Pope’s surprise, Frederick decided to take up the offer. After the death of 
Henry Raspe that year^O he is said to have intended to settle his difficulties with 
Innocent in person, and proceeded tlirough Lombardy towards the Alps.31 A letter by 
Archbishop Boniface of Canterbury to Peter of Savoy illuminates the background, and 
reveals the pressures which forced Innocent to offer a compromise. Louis IX had 
complained of papal extortions, a renewed invasion of Hungary by the Mongols 
seemed imminent, and the college of cardinals was divided as to which policy to 
pursue towards Frederick.32 We may assume that it had been in the context of this 
visit that Frederick had intended to have his son baptised.33 However, when the
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The obvious explanation may have been that the Emperor was adamant tliat his conflict could soon be 
settled, and that his son’s baptism was to symbolise this reconciliation. For tlie delayed baptism of
Emperor reached Turin in the spring of 1 2 4 7 ,  he heard that Parma had fallen to his 
enemies, and was forced to r e t u r n . 3 4  Only luck saved Innocent IV from having to 
encounter his foe in person. In fact, in a letter to the cardinals remaining in Rome, 
Innocent described the desertion of Parma as a sign of God’s benevolence towards his 
c a u s e . 3 5  However, this was not the end of Imperial attempts to make peace. It seems 
tliat Henry III participated in these efforts. In June 1 2 4 7 ,  Robert de Anketil was 
dispatched to the papal court ‘for a second time’, and was to be accompanied by 
various messengers from the E m p e r o r . 3 6 This may imply concerted efforts by both 
the King of England and his brother-in-law. Matthew refers to another attempt made 
by Frederick in 1 2 4 8 . 3 7  The following year, after the death of one of Frederick’s 
illegitimate sons, yet another embassy was sent to the P o p e . 3 8  This, too, met with 
little success: in April 1 2 4 9 ,  the papal legate in Italy was assured that no peace would 
be made with F r e d e r i c k . 3 9  The last arbitration attempt is recorded for 1 2 5 0 . 4 0  
Innocent proved as unrelenting as his predecessor.
After Frederick’s deposition, renewed efforts were made to replace him as 
Emperor and K i n g . 4 1  Within a year of the synod’s dissolution, Conrad IV’s former 
guardian. Landgrave Hemy Raspe of Thuringia, was elected King of the R o m a n s . 4 2  
Innocent IV not only provided him with crusading i n d u l g e n c e s , 4 3  but also with 
copious f u n d s . 4 4  However, the Landgrave’s untimely death in 1 2 4 7 , 4 5  meant that he 
had little impact on German politics. In fact, the Hohenstaufen managed to strengthen 
their grip on Germany when Conrad TV married a daughter of tlie Duke of Bavaria in
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1246.46 It was duiiiig the montlis after Henry Raspe’s death that Frederick pursued 
once more the hope that he might be able to settle his conflict with Innocent peacefully. 
In this he was to be disappointed when, by September 1247, the Pope ordered the 
German princes to elect yet another anti-King, Count William of Holland.47 The new 
anti-King’s wide-ranging family connections made him a more formidable challenge. 
Amongst others, he numbered the Duke of Brabant and the Bishop of Liège amongst 
his in-laws.48 in 1248, to the surprise of Conrad IV and his supporters, William laid 
siege to Aachen,49 and after several months,50 entered the town and was crowned 
King of the Romans.51 Initially, the anti-King’s victory was of symbolic rather than 
strategic importance. The resting-place of Charlemagne and the traditional venue for 
the coronation of Emperor-elects had fallen to the Pope’s partisans. Nonetheless, 
despite William’s defeat by Conrad the following year,52 this proved to be a turning 
point in his fortunes.5 3 Conrad IV remained confined mostly to the south of 
Germany, and in 1251, he abandoned his lands north of the Alps altogether and left 
for Sicily.
Innocent pursued a similar policy in the Holy Land. In 1246, the new King of 
Cypms took over his mother’s role as hereditary regent of Jerusalem, and appointed 
his own baillie in opposition to the Emperor’s candidate.54 The following year. 
Innocent granted a request that the kingdom of Cyprus, nominally held as a fief from 
the Empire, would instead be held from the Pope.55 With wai* waging in Italy and the 
threat posed by successive anti-kings, Frederick could do little to prop up his or his 
son’s regime in Palestine. Instead, he had to be content with emphasising his rightful 
claims to Jerusalem, and did so by taking an active role in the preparations for Louis 
IX’s crusade. In September 1245 Frederick wrote to the nobles of France, announcing 
that he had asked Louis to intercede on his behalf with Innocent IV He also offered 
that either he or his son Conrad would personally lead a crusade in Palestine, once 
peace had been arranged with the Pope.56 A similar letter was then addressed to the
104
46 Annales Augustani Minores, MGH SS x, 9.
47 Continuatio Laurentii de Leodio Gesta, MGH SS x, 525; Annales Erphordenses, MGH SS xvi, 35 
(our main nanative source for the events of his reign); Hermanni Altahensis Annales, MGH SS xvii, 
394.
48 CM, IV, 624-5.
49 Annales Erphordenses, MGH SS xvi, 35-6.
50 Gesta abbatum Trudonensium Continuatio II, MGH SS x, 396.
51 Chronica Regia Coloniensis Continuatio S Pantaleonis V, MGH SS xxii, 542-3; CM,, V, 17, 25- 
7.
52 CM, V, 90.
53 As fai" as papal support for William is concerned, also significant: Burkliard Keilmann, ‘Papast 
Innocenz IV. und die Kirche von Woiins - Anmerkungen zur papstlichen Personalpolitik am Beginn 
des Interregnums’, Archiv fUr mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte xl (1988), 43-66, especially 44-6, 
48-54. For tlie military aspect helpful: Karl E. Demandt, ‘Der Endkampf des staufischen Kaiserhauses 
im Rhein-Main-Gebiet’, Hessisches Jahrbuch filr Landesgeschichte vii (1957), 102-64; Kempf, 
Interregnum, 90-178; Otto Hintze, Das KOnigtum Wilhelms von Holland (Leipzig, 1885).
Andrae Danduli, 301. For tlie political and family ties connection the nobilities of Cyprus and tlie 
Holy Land: Richard, ‘Pairie d’Orient latin’, passim.
55 HB, VI, 506-7.
56 Constitutiones, nr. 264.
whole of Christendom.57 The same promise had originally been made by Thaddaus 
de Suessa at the council of Lyon, although without success.58 in 1246 the Emperor 
went a step further: he would spend the rest of his life in Palestine, if the Pope agreed 
to revoke his excommunication and deposition.59 Frederick tried to show the sincerity 
of his promises. In November officials in Sicily were ordered to provide Louis with 
horses, arms, victuals and whatever else he might need, and to let him and his 
familiales pass the regno without interference and molestation.60 To have the King of 
France set out to tlie Holy Land via Sicily would have been a major diplomatic victory. 
However, Louis was aware of tliese implications, and set out from Marseilles, by tlien 
under his brother’s control, instead. He continued to avoid taking sides. In early 
1247, Louis promised that he would not act in a way which would prejudice Conrad 
TV’s or anyone else’s rights.61 This fell short of guaranteeing Hohenstaufen claims in 
Outremer, or of recognising tlie Pope’s deposition of Frederick and his sons in 1245. 
This was repeated in 1248. Louis responded to the Emperor’s request that any lands 
reconquered by him would be handed over to Conrad, by stating that he would not act 
to the prejudice of either Conrad IV or any other Christian. He also promised that he 
would not consent to victuals being given to tlie Emperor’s enemies, but continued 
that he would be unable to control or enforce this.62 This was probably all Frederick 
could have hoped for. Louis, too, found himself in a difficult situation. He could not 
afford to alienate either the Emperor, on whose support he depended for a successful 
campaign in Palestine, or the Pope and his allies in the Latin Kingdom of Jerasalem.
The necessity to have Frederick involved in any planning for a crusade, and 
his willingness to lead the Christian forces in Palestine was repeatedly urged in 
Imperial manifestos. Under 1246, Matthew Paris gives the text of a letter, allegedly 
written by the Sultan of Egypt in response to papal attempts at concluding a truce. In 
this the Sultan stated that he would not enter such an agreement unless the Emperor 
was part of it. Matthew goes on to state that Innocent accused Frederick of fabricating 
that letter.53 Frederick certainly tried to emphasise how willing he was to fight the
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Muslims, and how only the Pope’s unholy machinations prevented him from doing 
so. In August 1248, the King of England was informed of how the Emperor’s efforts 
to come to tlie support of beleaguered Christendom had been tliwarted by Innocent.64 
Similar complaints were directed to Louis IX in early spring 1249. Frederick 
particularly complained about the mendicants who, rather than converting the 
Muslims, sowed dissension amongst the Christians.65 Similarly, Blanche, llie Queen- 
regent of France was informed of how the Pope’s actions prevented Frederick from 
coming to Louis’ assistance.66 That Frederick was not alone in thinking that the 
Pope’s reluctance to negotiate jeopardised the state of Christendom, is reported by 
Matthew Paris. In 1246 Cardinal John of Toledo, an English Cistercian,67 is said to 
have complained to Innocent IV that the Church was beset by many foes, amongst 
whom he numbered the Tartars, the Saracens and the Greeks. Therefore, the Pope 
should take up the offers made by the Emperor, and negotiate for peace.68 Frederick’s 
offers to lead a crusade were the best way in which to ensure Ms reconciliation with 
the Church, and to enlist the diplomatic support needed to force Innocent into 
negotiations. What better way of showing Ms orthodoxy and subservience to the Holy 
See, than by sun-endeiing his worldly glory and setting out to fight the mfidel ?
V.2 The ascendancy of Capetian France
Despite Hemy Ill’s efforts at Lyons, it was Louis IX who was at the centie of 
most peace proposals put forth between 1 2 4 5  and 1 2 5 0 .  At around Christmas 1 2 4 5  
Innocent IV and the King of France met at Cluny. If Matthew Paris is to be believed, 
Frederick seized the opportunity, and sent messengers to Louis, putting forth his 
proposal that he would go to the Holy Land, once he and his sons had been accepted 
back into the C h u r c h . 6 9  That Frederick had been in touch with Louis is confirmed by 
the fragment of a letter, probably dating from February 1 2 4 6 ,  in which the Emperor 
outlined the manifold tribulations he had suffered from the papacy.70 However, this is 
the only evidence for contacts between France and the Empire in eariy 1 2 4 6 .  Later that
Frankish states’, Bulletin o f the School o f Oriental and African Studies xliii (1980), 67-76. For tlie 
propagandistic uses of tlie Hohenstaufens’ relations witli tlie Muslims: Christoph T. Maier, ‘Crusade 
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Sarracenorum Lucherie in Apulie', JMH  xxi (1995), 343-85. For an overview on Muslim sources 
about the Hohenstaufen in the tliirteentli century: H. L. Gottschalk, ‘Der Untergang der 
Hohenstaufen’, Wiener Zeitschriftftlr die Kunde des Morgenlandes liii (1957), 267-82.
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year, on the other hand, both the Pope and Frederick wrote to Louis. Referring to an 
embassy the King of France had sent to negotiate between them. Innocent declared 
that he was willing to grant Frederick the opportunity to prove his devotion to the 
Church 21 This effort met with little success, and in December Frederick complained 
to the King of France how his petitions had been refused by the curia In 1248 
another attempt was made. When setting out on crusade, Louis dispatched envoys to 
Innocent asking him to revoke Frederick’s excommunication, as the Emperor would 
then be able to join him on a campaign in Palestine.23 After the capture of Damietta, 
Louis is said to have been so moved by the help received from the Emperor, that he 
made yet another attempt to convince Innocent that peace ought to be made with the 
Hohenstaufen.24 Once again, this met with no success.25 in the winter of 1249, 
Frederick wrote to Blanche of Castile. He declared that he would assist her son Louis 
in the Holy Land, if only the Pope would allow him back into the Church. He also 
referred to an embassy he had received from Alfons of Poitou.2 6 This has to be 
viewed in the context of efforts undertaken by Louis’ brothers after the disaster at 
Daiuietta, when they approached Innocent in order to convince him to make peace witli 
Frederick. As they met with the by now common poor success, they turned to Henry 
III, who then decided to take the cross himself in 1250.22 As the leader of the biggest 
crusading expedition at the time, the King of France had a natural interest in settling 
the remaining conflicts in Europe, be they with England,28 or between Innocent IV 
and the Emperor.29 We should, therefore, not be surprised at finding him repeatedly 
courted by Frederick H.
The Emperor did not stop at trying to involve Louis in peace negotiations. 
Already in 1246, mention was made of a Franco-Imperial alliance. The offer was 
refeixed to by the King of France early in 1247. He wrote to Frederick and stated that 
he had made secret communications concerning the matter to the Emperor’s messenger 
who would confer them orally .H ow ever, what form this alliance was supposed to 
take remains obscure. It is doubtful whether Frederick’s expectations were realistic. 
The best Louis could do was to insist that the Pope take the Emperor back into the 
Church, but he could not and would not enter into projects and alliances going beyond 
that. His expedition to the Holy Land took priority. This is underlined by Louis’ 
general policies concerning the papal-imperial conflict. In 1247, when Frederick 
approached Lyon, Innocent IV could count on military protection from the King of
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Q1France, oJ- Equally, Louis does not appear to have hindered French knights fighting 
against the Emperor in Germany, although this may have been a question of whether 
he had the ability to control them or n o t . 8 2  Similarly, grateful as he was, the King of 
France tried not to be too closely associated with Frederick II. He refused to be 
involved in the squabbles amongst the inliabitants of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 
and he refused the offer of setting sail from Sicily. The King of France refused to take 
sides and increasingly found himself in a position in which he was half forced, but 
also eager to act as an arbitrator of the balance of power between the two rivals. He 
would not commit himself to the forced overthrow of either of them, but continued to 
urge instead for a peaceful settlement. In many ways, we thus find Louis adopting a 
stance not unlike that of Innocent III, Honorius HI or Gregory IX in preparation for 
then* crasades.
The years between 1245 and 1250 also witnessed Louis laying the foundations 
for France’s ascendancy in Europe. He did so not by failing to capture Jerusalem or to 
reconcile Pope and Emperor, but by an expansion of his family’s lands and influence. 
This, in turn, had important repercussions for Henry Ill’s role on the contemporary 
political stage. The Capetians’ most important acquisition was that of Provence. In 
August 1245, the Count of Provence died, leaving his youngest and still unmarried 
daughter Beatrice as his h e i r e s s .^3 This resulted in a mushrooming of politically 
motivated suitors, including Raymond of Toulouse, the Emperor, the King of Aragon, 
and Charles of Anjou. In 1245 Raymond of Toulouse had begun to court Beatrice. 
However, as they were too closely related, papal dispensation was n e e d e d .  84 
Innocent complied, and appointed a commissioner to investigate matters f u r t h e r . 85 
Frederick II sent the Imperial fleet to craise along the coast of Provence, to emphasise 
that his son, too, was in need of a w i f e . 8 6  The Emperor also contacted the Infante of 
Castile concerning P r o v e n c e . 87 Another candidate is said to have been a son of the 
King of Ai’agon who was beginning to attack P r o v e n c e .  88 All this came to an end 
when, quite unexpectedly, Charles of Anjou married Beatrice in January 1246.
The Provencal inheritance was dealt with when King and Pope met at Cluny in 
September 1245. What exactly happened there remains obscure. Matthew Paris 
viewed the council as designed to solve the papal-imperial c o n f l i c t , 89 whereas
8^  In a letter to tlie caidinals remaining at Rome, Innocent mentions that Üie King had promised to 
provide troops for the protection of the Church, if  necessary: AI, II, nr. 1040. In June, Innocent 
tlianked Louis for his offer to help the Church militarily: HB, VI, 544-7. This implies that 
Bartholomaei Scribae Annales, MGH SS xviii, 221, was mistaken in describing the march as having 
been instigated by Louis IX.
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109Guilliaume de Nangis, in line with the purpose of his work, described it as having 
been motivated by the King’s pious desire to meet the P o p e . 90 I n  a minute analysis,
Baaken has shown how the Provencal question was used by Innocent to woo Louis 
IX.91 Assuming a role as tlie young girl’s guardian, Innocent promised his support in 
obtaining the county for tlie Capetians, rather than allowing the young woman to 
marry someone potentially hostile to French interests in the region. In exchange, the 
Pope may have hoped to win a more ardent ally in Louis IX. Matters developed 
quickly. On 2 8  December, Charles of Anjou received papal dispensation for his 
marriage, and on 3 1  January the union was celebrated at A i x . 9 2  Simultaneously, 
troops were dispatched to the c o u n t y . 93  Although Louis never declared himself 
openly against Frederick, Charles of Anjou complied with papal claims and never did 
homage for his county to Frederick II. At the same, time, the union caused new 
difficulties. In April 1 2 4 4  Count Raymond had pawned several castles to Henry III of 
England, in exchange for a loan of 4 0 0 0  marks s t e r l i n g . 94 After the county had 
passed to the Capetians, the King of England demanded control over these lands, or a 
repayment. The issue began to feature in negotiations between Henry HI and Louis in 
1 2 4 6 , 9 5  involved the dispatch of English envoys to L a n g u e d o c , 9 6  and even went - 
unsuccessfully - before the papal c o u r t .97 To Louis, Ms control over Provence meant 
an end to the recurrent threat of unrest emanating from his southern borders. More 
importantly, the maniage severely limited Hemy Ill’s ability to wage war on France.
It also shows how the King of France was able to utilise the conflict between 
Frederick and Innocent for his and his house’s advancement.
Provence and Toulouse, though, were not the only aieas in which the King of 
England suffered diplomatic setbacks. Also in 1247, Hugh de Lusignan the elder.
Count of La Marche, died. This deprived Henry of yet another traditional pillar in his 
anti-French diplomacy. In Flanders, too, the Capetians managed to cement their 
p o s i t i o n . 9 8  in 1 2 1 2  Countess Margaret had married Burchard de Avesnes, who, 
however, at the time, had been in Holy Orders. The union brought two children, John 
and Baldwin, but was later annulled. Her second maniage to Walter de Dampieixe was 
also annulled, as the spouses were too closely related. After the Countess’ death in 
1 2 4 4 , 9 9  tbe succession dispute began. Both the Avesnes and the Dampierre children
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110demanded that they succeed to the counties of Flanders and Hainault. This became 
embroiled in the papal-imperial conflict, with Jean de Avesnes requesting help from 
Frederick, and his half-brothers relying on Louis IX and Innocent IV. A compromise 
was suggested in 1246, granting the county of Hainault to John de Avesnes, and 
Flanders to William de Dampierre, but this found little acceptance with the warring 
brothers. Nonetheless, the Dampieixes maintained their control over most of Flanders.
With their reliance on Capetian support they were unlikely to join any future 
campaigns against France.
Louis’s successes provide the background for some of the contacts Henry III 
continued to have with the continent. In December 1246 for instance, Joan of Flanders 
complained to Hemy that he was harbouring those who had plotted many evils against 
her.^^0 In April 1250, John de Avesnes received a safe-conduct on coming to 
E n g l a n d .  101 Similarly, the same year messengers of the commune of Marseilles, at 
the time involved in an ongoing rebellion against Chailes of A n j o u ,  102 were received 
in E n g la n d .  103 While on crusade, Louis had to ask the Pope several times to explain 
to Hemy III what an un-Christian thing it would be to attack absent c r u s a d e r s .  104 
This sheds doubt on the assumption that Henry had abandoned his plans and projects 
in France. If nothing else, although we do not know to what extent these contacts 
were based on the initiative of the English Court, the fact remains that Henry was still 
perceived as someone likely to provide help and assistance against the Capetians.
This, in turn, underlines the wisdom in Louis’s IX’s decision to take control of 
Provence and Toulouse.
V.3 England and her friends
As dui'ing the pontificate of Gregory IX, the war against Frederick soon led to 
demands for aids from England. In 1246 papal agents arrived and collected 6000 
m a r k s .  105 Once again, the Pope did not stop at asking for money. In 1247 Innocent 
IV sent legates across Europe to preach die Cross against F r e d e r i c k .  106 This 
continued until the Emperor’s d e a t h ,  107 and was combined with further requests for 
financial h e lp .  108 Payments to fund the Pope’s campaigns in Gennany and Italy were 
only one of many points of complaints. In 1246, the English abbots had protested
100 pQydi Letters, II, nr. 442 [but printed between letters ni'. 448 and 450].
101 CPR 1247-58, 62.
102 Peter Herde, Karl I. von Anjou (Stuttgart, 1978), 32; Jean Dunbabin, Charles I o f Anjou: power, 
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103 CLR 1245-51, 314.
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I l labout papal provisions of benefices in England, which often deprived the resident 
monks of their l i v e l i h o o d .  1^9 1245, if Matthew Paris is to be believed, the nobles
estimated that annual payments to Rome amounted to 60,000 marks. This seems to 
have given rise to considerable unease with papal demands, as may be implied by the 
orders Archbishop Boniface allegedly received from Imiocent in September 1249, that 
even those who secretly spoke in favour of the Emperor were to be 
excommunicated, m  It would be luistaken to read this as an indication of English 
support for Frederick. As before, the point of conflict was not opposition to the 
Pope’s policies, but to his financial demands.
Innocent’s efforts to extract funds and troops from England also led to several 
Imperial missions being dispatched to Henry’s court. In July 1246, Frederick sent two 
envoys,! !2 carrying with them a letter to the nobles of England, presenting his case.
His excommunication had been unjust, and he promised to help Christendom against 
its many foes, if only the Pope would make peace with him .ü3 At about the same 
time Walter of Ocra wrote to Henry III, giving an account of recent successes in Italy 
and G e r m a n y .  ! !4  However, once again Henry had been reluctant to resist papal 
demands, and Frederick continued to c o m p l a i n . !  15 Later that year', probably in an 
attempt to press his master’s case in person, Walter visited England.Ü6 In August 
1248, the Emperor was once again coruplaining to Henry III how his efforts at making 
his peace with Innocent had been thwarted by tlie Pope’s insistence on supporting and 
assisting the Lombards.Ü2 Imperial missions continued to be received. In July and 
November 1246,!!8 June 1247,!!9 and January 1250,1^0 imperial envoys are 
recorded being in England, not counting visits by Walter of Ocra and various letters 
addressed to Henry III from the Imperial court.!^! The King, however, despite trying 
to avoid any real commitments, still emphasised his friendly relations with the 
Emperor. In 1248, for instance, Henry ordered his falconer to present Frederick with 
four select birds. !^^ The dilemma in which the King of England found himself now, 
was the same as it had been in 1239, aggravated by his increasingly difficult situation 
with regard to France.
109 CM, IV, 532.
110 Ibid., IV, 419. The issue as a whole is dealt witli by Powicke, Hemy III, 276-82.
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This is underlined by Henry’s relations with Germany. The Archbishop of 
Cologne, the driving force behind the elections of Henry Raspe and William of 
Holland, remained conspicuously absent from English r e c o r d s . ! ^ 3  Only an indirect 
reference is made in December 1 2 4 8 ,  when the bailiffs of Yarmouth were ordered to 
set free merchants from Cologne and Brabant whom they had unlawfully a i x e s t e d . ! 2 4  
However, after the council of Lyon, Henry’s court involved itself to a degree, 
unprecedented since 1 2 3 5 ,  in the affairs of Germany. Such old acquaintances as the 
Duke of Brunswick and the ruler of Brabant feature more frequently and regularly in 
English records. At the same time, as with Henry’s expanding contacts in Italy, it 
remains difficult to draw a line between what might have constituted a change in 
policy, and more mundane matters such as family relations, and the King's need to 
rewai'd friends and followers.
The renewed English interest in the Duke of Brunswick, for instance, shows 
that contacts with Germany should not be viewed in exclusively political tenns. In 
April 1 2 4 5 ,  Francis de Bren was sent as the King’s envoy to B r a n s w i c k , ! 2 5  which 
resulted in a ducal embassy to England shortly a f t e r w a r d s .  !^6 Although no further 
exchange of envoys is reported until 1 2 4 8 ,  Henry, listed as the aichdeacon of 
Bremen, appeared regularly to collect his annual f e e . ! ^2 Although Bremen was not 
within the Duke’s domains, it was surrounded by his lands and remained under his 
influence. One may assume that the aichdeacon would have delivered any important 
messages exchanged between the two partners. It was not until August 1 2 5 0  that 
another envoy from tlie Duke anived in E n g l a n d . ! ^8 Xo what extent these exchanges 
were concerned with 'high' politics is difficult to ascertain. However, other matters, 
too, seem to have played an important role. In June 1 2 4 8 ,  for instance, Jordan of 
Brunswick was authorised, with the consent of Richard of Cornwall,
‘ to bring from beyond seas to England at the King’s expenses all persons who know anything of mintage and exchange of money, to do what 
belongs to their several duties in the k i n g d o m ’ . ^29
112
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124 CR 1247-51, 130.
125 CLR 1245-51, 43.
126 Ibid., 46, 48, 53; CR 1242-7, 421. Already by 5 June, Francis was sent to the Duke of Brabant: 
CLR 1245-51, 57.
127 Ibid., 26, 99, 165. This Henry is difficult to identify. In April 1247, Henry ‘son of Vologaid, 
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commune of Bremen: Epistolae, II, nr. 328. D. R. Ehmck and W. v. Bingen, Bremisches UB, vol. 1 
(Bremen, 1873), list only two archdeans named Henry, one Henry of Tossem, appearing around 
1259/60, and anotlier from c. 1280. However, the first Henry, before being made dean of Bremen had 
been a canon there and archdeacon of Hadeln. Neither candidate thus fits chronologically. However, in 
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Bremen to the abbey of Oberholz: Ibid., I, nr. 233.
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113This refers to the Earl of Corn wall's recently assumed control over the coinage in 
1 2 4 7 ,  one of the greatest projects of mint-reform undertaken in the Middle A g e s .  1 ^ 0  
In June, it had been agreed that the Earl was to share the profits from the Mint and the 
exchange of money with the King, after an initial loan of 1 0 , 0 0 0  marks had been 
repaid. Considering that, since the days of Henry the Lion, the Dukes had 
exercised control over the once rich silver mines at Goslar, and taking into account 
their traditionally good relations with England, they seemed an obvious choice for 
foreign expertise. Furthermore, although Goslar had long ceased to produce silver, it 
still produced Goslar, and die legal and technical framework developed there remained 
a standard across Europe, adopted, amongst others, by the King of Bohemia at around 
that t i m e .  xhe duke of Brunswick also seemed a wise choice, as further contacts 
with the Archbishops of Cologne might have caused serious political embairassment.
The Welfs, on the other hand, avoided being drawn into the political turmoil 
embroiling Germany at the lime, leaving little doubt as to their loyalty to the Emperor, 
witliout alienating papal forces either.
The timing of the first mission to Brunswick in over fifteen years is also 
important. Within four weeks of having been sent to the North of Germany, Francis 
de Bren was announced as the King’s envoy to the Duke of Brabant. This initiated 
a phase of intense diplomatic activity. By August 1 2 4 7 ,  messengers of the Duke left 
E n g l a n d .  134 xhis was followed in October by another English mission to 
B r a b a n t .  135 August of the following year, two of the Duke’s knights were sent as 
the King’s m e s s e n g e r s .  1 3 6  One of tliem, Walter de la Hast, is recorded once more in 
May 1249.137 The reasons for this suddenly reawakening interest in the Duke may 
have been twofold. In November 1 2 4 5  reference was made in a mandate for the 
King’s treasurer to ‘militibus et aliis de paitibus transmarinis et comiti F l a n d r ’ . 1 3 8  
Tliis probably refers to foreign mercenaries hired for recent campaigns in S c o t l a n d l 3 9  
and Poitou. In this context, troops from Brabant may also have been hired. In 1 2 5 2 ,  
for instance, when returning to Gascony, Simon de Montfort is said to have been 
offered troops by the Duke.l'^^ More important, though, were the plans for a maniage 
between the King’s eldest son, Edward, and one of the Duke’s daughters. The only 
account of these plans is given by Matthew Paris. In 1 2 4 7 ,  he wrote, John Maunsel
Denholm-Young, Richard o f Cornwall, 58-67 for a detailed account. Natalie M. Fryde, ‘Silver 
recoinage and royal policy in England, 1180-1250’, in: E. van Cauwenberghe and F. Irsigler (ed.), 
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was sent to Brabant to arrange the proposed union. However, for reasons which 
remain obscure, the project failed. 1^1 The mission to the Duke of Brunswick thus 
coincided with major diplomatic efforts being undertaken in Germany.
In the context of Henry Ill’s relations with Frederick, the Dukes' political 
affiliation is worth considering. This may also help to illuminate the ‘obscure reasons’ 
cited by the St Albans chronicler. Initially, Duke Henry III of Brabant had remained 
loyal to Frederick. In 1243 he had been amongst those to whom the Emperor 
expressed his great optimism that the election of Innocent IV would herald the end of 
his excommunication. ^ 42 July or August 1246 Walter of Ocra referred to the Duke
of Lotharingia (i.e. Brabant) as having been present at the Imperial court. 1^3 At the 
same time, his family connections put Henry into a difficult position. One of his 
daughters was married to Otto of Bavaria, thus making him Conrad IV’s grandfather- 
in-law, while another had been married to Henry Raspe, Frederick II’s first anti- 
King. 1^4 Furthermore, Henry Raspe’s successor, William of Holland, was a distant 
relation. He therefore soon became embroiled in the papal-imperial conflict. In 
1246 the Duke was amongst those who were exhorted by the Pope to elect Henry 
Raspe as anti-King. 146 However, that in itself does not mean that he had been a 
supporter of Henry’s candidacy. Similar letters had been addressed to the Dukes of 
Brunswick, Bavaria and Saxony, as well as the Margraves of MeiBen and 
Brandenburg. None of them were known to be ardent supporters of the anti-King. In 
fact, around Pentecost 1247 Duke Henry had been one of those the Emperor had 
called upon in preparations for his planned journey to Lyon. 147 Later that year, 
however, he is listed, together with the Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, Trier and 
Bremen as having elected William of Holland King of the Romans. 148 When exactly 
he changed sides is unclear. An early indication may have been a privilege from April 
1247, in which Innocent IV granted one of the Duke’s messengers the rights of 
legitimate birth, despite his illegitimate descent. 149 Within a couple of months, Duke 
Henry led William’s troops. In August 1247, the papal legate in Germany was ordered 
to waive canonical restrictions concerning the marriage plans of several of the Duke’s 
knights, as they had taken the cross against Frederick. 150 in November the Duke 
himself was granted remission of his sins for fighting the Emperor. 151 The failure of
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115English negotiations with Brabant thus coincided with the Duke assuming a leading 
role in William of Holland’s government.
Whether this episode was an attempt by Henry III to forge closer relations with 
the opposition to Frederick remains doubtful. The continuing strong links with 
Frederick, as well as the lack of any official contacts with William’s government even 
after the Emperor’s death in 1250, would undermine such a hypothesis. It is probably 
safe to assume that Henry Ill’s primary interest was in links with the duchy of 
Brabant, both for commercial reasons, and in the context of his ambitions on the 
continent. Henry’s court was certainly aware of the Duke’s role in Germany. Matthew 
Paris, for instance, lists him as a possible candidate to succeed Henry R a s p e .  ^52 
However, should these marriage plans have aimed at closer links with William’s 
government, the Duke seems an odd choice, especially if the Archbishop of Cologne’s 
role is taken into account. He, more than anyone else, could have arranged and 
secured contacts. In fact, we may assume that the links between Duke Henry and King 
William may have been among the very reasons for the project’s ultimate failure. Like 
Louis IX, the King of England remained unwilling to commit himself firmly to either 
the Pope's or the Emperor's cause, he was willing to press the case for negotiations, 
and he refused to let his men fight against his erstwhile brother-in-law. In addition, 
although Frederick did not receive the degree of support he may have expected, he 
could rest assured that neither would his enemies be able to count on English backing.
A similar picture emerges when looking at the English court’s involvement in 
Italian affairs. There, however, the problem is to differentiate between Henry Ill’s 
efforts to reward his relatives, and wider political aims. In January 1 2 4 6  Count 
Amadeus of Savoy did homage to Henry III for the castles and towns of Susa, 
Avigliana, St Maurice-on-the-Isère, and B a r d ,  153 exchange for an annual payment 
of £ 1 0 0 0 . 1 5 4  The deal had been brokered by Peter de Aigueblanche, Bishop of 
Hereford, who tried to warm the King’s heart towards the arrangement by stating that 
the Count would wage war on any of the King’s enemies, and that Henry III should 
make as many friends and subjects as possible to confound his f o e s .  155 These lands 
certainly would have been of strategic significance with regard to any action being 
undertaken, for instance, in Provence. Furthermore, as Cox has pointed out, there 
was a long tradition of English rights and privileges in the a r e a . 156 it seems, though, 
that Fritz Trautz is right in interpreting the episode as being primarily a reward for the 
Savoyards, without excluding the possibility that they could later to be utilised
*52 However, he does so s. a. 1251: CM, V, 201.
*53 Ibid., IV, 550.
*54 CPR 1232-47, 469.
*55 DD, nr. 254.
*56 Cox, Eagles, 151. Earlier in the thirteenth century, at Bard, Hugh de Bard had taken the place as a 
fief from the English court, and the English court paid a fee to the Emperor to receive permission to 
do so. However, Cox gives no sources for this statement.
116elsewhere in E u r o p e .  15 / Difficult as it may often be to draw a clear distinguishing line 
between family relations and 'high' politics, in this paidcular case the patronage of the 
King's relatives was probably the overriding motivations, rather than any direct 
involvement in the affairs of Italy, or even political ambitions on the King’s side. 
Nonetheless, this grant does pose questions as to the state of Henry Ill's relations 
with Frederick II.
The English comt certainly had its qualms concerning the violation of Imperial 
lights. After all, Heniy III received lands which were nominally under the Emperor’s 
jurisdiction. Matthew Paris, for instance, states that the Count had been able to receive 
these lands from Hemy without prejudice to Imperial claims, ‘cum nihil praeter aquas 
et transitas teneat de i m p e r i o ’ .^ 5 8  if nothing else, tliis implies that some consideration 
had been given to Frederick’s possible reaction. Henry III was indeed treading 
dangerous ground. After all, the Savoyards were split amongst Peter of Savoy, the 
Ai'chbishop-elect of Lyon, and thus a member of Innocent IV’s inner circle, and 
Amadeus, who for some time had been prevaricating between Emperor and Pope. In 
1 2 4 4 ,  for instance, he had ignored Frederick’s orders, and had ensured that Innocent 
could safely pass through his lands to L y o n .  1 5 9  1 2 4 7 ,  however, he tried to utilise
the Emperor’s reliance on his services for the advancement of his own interests, and 
joined the camp of Frederick’s supporters. When the Emperor proceeded towards 
Lyon, the Count refused to let him pass through his territories, unless he first received 
certain grants which he had for a long time claimed to be his. 160 led to a series of 
prolonged negotiations, conducted by Walter de Ocra. First results were made public 
in April 1 2 4 7 .  Amadeus’ daughter Beatrice was to marry Manfred Lancea, the 
Emperor’s illegitimate son. 161 A little over two weeks later, this was confirmed by 
Frederick himself, who also promised to restore to Amadeus the castles he 
demanded. 162 The grant thus formed part of the wider preparations Frederick had 
undertaken for his planned march on Lyon. The Counts of Savoy continued to play an 
important role in Imperial politics. In November 1 2 4 8 ,  for example, the Count’s 
brother, Thomas, received various towns and castles, 163 including Turin, 164 and 
was made Imperial Vicar* upwards from Pavia. 165 Frederick also appointed Thomas 
and Amadeus as his proctors in arranging peace with Innocent IV. 166 Unlike the 
Duke of Brabant, the Counts of Savoy were and remained loyal to the Emperor.
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117Henry III, although unwilling to challenge Innocent IV openly, was nonetheless 
willing to support and assist some of Frederick’s most loyal lieutenants. It is worth 
emphasising tliat this seems to have followed an attitude similar to that in dealings with 
the Dukes of Brunswick and Brabant. Even when no formal alliance was amongst the 
issues under consideration, those who either remained neutral in the conflict between 
Innocent or Frederick, or those who sided with Frederick, were far more likely to be 
contacted by the English court, than those who actively supported the Pope. The Duke 
of Brunswick, rallier than the Archbishop of Cologne was approached to provide the 
expertise for Henry's monetary reforms. Count Amadeus of Savoy received a major 
grant just when he had proven his loyalty towards the Emperor, while at the same time 
preventing a course of action which could have led to the Pope's captivity or death.
The Duke of Brabant's marriage proposals came to nothing, just as the Duke was 
assuming a leading role in the movement against the Hohenstaufen. Henry III did not 
abandon his old friend, tlie Emperor.
That many of these diplomatic initiatives fell into the period after 1245 may 
have been mere coincidence. In the Duke of Brunswick’s case, for instance, contacts 
coincided with the need to make good the financial losses incuiTed during the Poitevin 
campaign, after a parliament in 1247 had refused to grant Henry an aid. The 
Savoyards may have offered an opportunity to make good the damages done by 
Louis’s acquisition of Provence. However, it is also worth noting that these contacts 
were undertaken at a time when Henry's policies in France ran into increasing 
difficulties, and when the Hohenstaufen began to lose their grip on the affairs of 
Germany and Northern Italy. Like others, henry was trying to further his own goals, 
and he became ready to fill the vacuum which was slowly beginning to spread.
The years between 1 2 4 5  and 1 2 5 0  also saw a widening of English relations 
with the Hispanic peninsula. It may well be possible that these were, at least in part, 
an attempt to compensate for the allies Henry had lost in Languedoc and Flanders. 
Embassies to and from Aragon are recorded in February, May and June 1 2 4 6 ,  May 
1 2 4 8  and May 1 2 4 9 , ^ 6 7  t o  and from Castile in May and August 1 2 4 6 ,  April 1 2 4 7  and 
May 1 2 4 9 . 1 6 8  Many of these contacts were high-ranking, including the Infantes of 
Castile and Ai'agon. As so often, little evidence survives to allow further investigations 
of what exactly these missions had aimed at. However, one may assume that they 
were related to the events in Portugal, where, after King Sancho IPs deposition in 
1 2 4 5 ,  civil war waged. That soon began to involve other rulers on the peninsula, 
divided roughly into those allied with Louis IX and those who sought other 
p a r t n e r s .  169 Also, the King of Aragon had had a significant part in the struggles
167 CLR 1245-51, 26, 21, 111, 236.
168 Ibid., 73, 75, 117, 119, 120, 123, 232.
169 Edward Peters, The Shadow King: rex iniitilis in medieval law and literature, 751-1327 (New 
Haven, 1970), 135-69; Jose Mattoso, ‘A crise de 1245’, in: his Portugal medieval: novas
concerning the inheritance of Provence, and, as we will see, the rulers of Castile 
began to play an important role in the affair s of Gascony.
Henry I ll’s Hispanic connections also brought him in close, but indirect 
contact with Frederick II. In late 1242, for instance, while the King was in Poitou, 
safe-conducts had been issued for a Castilian envoy bringing horses to Frederick’s 
court, and for an Imperial envoy escorting a rouncey to I t a l y .  170 Contacts between 
Castile and the Empire had been frequent, despite a temporary cooling of relations 
after Frederick’s deposition. In 1245/6, Alfonso (the future IX), Infante of Castile, 
had sent an envoy to the Imperial court, dealing, amongst others, with the Provencal 
inheritance, 171 and in the summer of 1250, the King of Castile formed part of 
Frederick’s wider diplomatic efforts to ensure his reconciliation with Innocent, prior to 
a campaign in the Holy L a n d .  172 Although it is unclear to what extent Henry himself 
was involved in these contacts, they help to illustrate the wider range of his diplomatic 
activities after 1245, and they conform to the pattern of contacts primarily with those 
who were not openly opposed to Frederick.
Although Henry’s role was less prominent than that of Louis IX, Frederick 
could still rely on his former brother-in-law to help and assist him in his efforts for a 
reconciliation with Innocent IV. The King of England was willing to press the case for 
negotiations, he continued to accept Frederick as Emperor, but he remained reluctant 
to side openly against Innocent IV. Frederick’s dependence on the King of France 
must have caused much disappointment. Furthermore, the deaths of the Counts of 
Toulouse and Provence, and the passing of Languedoc under Capetian control forced 
the King of England to look for new allies. This may have informed his reactivated 
relations with the Dukes of Brabant and Brunswick, his acquisition of lands along the 
Alpine passes, and regular exchanges with the kings of Ar agon and Castile. Old 
alliances collapsed, and new friends were sought. For Henry III, as for most other 
rulers, these years were a period of transition. New horizons lay ahead.
1 1 8
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119Chapter VI 
Interm ezzo  
(1250-4)
1250 marked a watershed in European politics. In December, Frederick II died, 
leaving Sicily and the Empire to his son Conrad. Louis DCs inglorious crusade to 
Damietta did little to harm his standing with the curia, but it posed considerable 
difficulties to Heniy IE. Bereft of a potential ally in the Empire, with many of his old 
friends and supporters dead, plans for a reconquest of his inheritance seemed finally 
doomed to fail. In these circumstances, a new opportunity offered itself, which was 
eagerly seized by Heniy EL In March 1250 he declared his intention to lead a crusade 
to tlie Holy Land. This came to dominate his actions over the following years and was 
never really abandoned. Neither his acceptance of the crown of Sicily on behalf of his 
younger son in 1254, nor the baronial uprising of 1258 put an end to his crusading 
ambitions. Preparations for this campaign included efforts to settle relations with 
France, and brought the English court into closer contact with the rulers of the 
Mediterranean. Contacts with Germany and the Empire underwent a fundamental 
change. At last, the rulers of Germany were willing to offer the English King what he 
had always been hoping for: support against France. William of Holland looked to 
Henry IE when he needed allies to fight his Capetian foes in Flanders, but Henry was 
now too pre-occupied with liis planned expedition to Palestine. William’s overtures 
were perceived as a nuisance and potentially embarrassing. Circumstances had 
changed.
VI. 1 The King's Crusade
In March 1250 Henry IE took the Cross. 1 Although he never fulfilled his vow, 
diplomatic and financial preparations for his campaign dominated the years up to 
1254.2 Despite the great caie taken in pmparing the campaign, which was to set sail by 
June 1256,3 it has frequently been criticised as the shallow promise of a fickle King4 
who was soon to abandon the liberation of the Holy Land for a preposterous claim to 
the throne of Sicily. This interpretation, however, ignores the extent to which the 
Sicilian Business initially formed part of the King’s crusading venture. Moreover, the 
surviving evidence leaves little doubt as to sincerity of Henry’s intentions.5 It was not
1 CM, V, 101-2.
2 Generally, of. Alan Forey, ‘The crusading vows of tlie English King Henry IIP, Durham University 
Journal Ixv (1973), 229-247; and, putting tlie episode in a wider context, Simon Lloyd, ‘King Henry 
III, the Crusade and the MediteiTanean’, in: Jones and Vale (ed. ), England and her Neighbours, 97-119.
3 CR 1251-3, 201-2, 214.
4 This point in particular was much lamented by Mattliew Paris, who viewed the King's vow as yet 
another attempt at extortion and oppression: CM, V, 101.
5 Lloyd, ‘Henry III’, 110-2.
until the English court realised the extent of problems facing it in its conquest of Sicily 
that the King requested a commutation of his vow from fighting the Muslims in 
Palestine to fighting the Hohenstaufen in Sicily.
Henry’s preparations were thorough and wide-ranging. Great care was taken to 
put the campaign on firm financial footing, and to ensure its logistics and 
infrastructure. Early contacts were made with the prelates of the Holy Land, the Kings 
of Cyprus and Armenia, the prince of Antioch and other Palestine nobles, the Italian 
communes of Genoa, Pisa and Venice, and the military orders.6 The Kings of Cyprus 
effectively controlled what was left of the Latin kingdom, and the Kings of Armenia, 
although increasingly pushed in an uncomfortable position between the Mongols and 
the Mamluks, remained amongst the few Christian rulers still holding out against the 
Muslims. The Italian sea ports were needed for the shipment of régulai* supplies and 
naval protection.7 Only the military orders had the infrastructure and military 
experience needed to maintain a sustained militai*y effort in the Holy Land. They, thus, 
found themselves amongst the earliest of Hem*y’s contacts.8 The King left little doubt 
as to the sincerity of his intentions. He was eager to avoid the disasters which had 
beset crusades in the past, such as insufficient supplies or fraught relations with the 
Christians of Oiiti'emer.
Henry’s diplomatic efforts were not confined to the provisioning of ships and tlie 
recruitment of troops. Guaranteeing the infrastructure of a campaign was only one 
amongst many tasks. Of equal importance was the need to safeguard the integrity of 
the realm during the King’s absence, hi Henry’s case this meant that a solution had to 
be found to his conflict with the Capetians. Not only would he need their support to 
leave from Marseilles, as he had intended,9 but he also had to make sure that neither 
the King of France nor his brothers would capitalise on Heni*y’s absence and interfere 
in Gascony. Consequently, within a week of assuming the Cross, the English court 
sent envoys to France to arrange a truce ‘usque ad terminum sexdecim annorum, vel 
usque ad ulteriorem t e r m i n u m ’ . 10 However, this soon proved a more difficult 
undertaking than expected. H  A deep-seated distrust continued to vex relations 
between England and France, with Gascony at the centre of dissension. In 1252 and 
1253, for instance, Heni*y complained to Queen Blanche and Alfons of Poitiers that the 
French Crown was supporting rebels in Gascony. 12 At the time, the English King 
was facing serious discord amongst the Gascon barons, which was to result in the 
rebellion of 1253/4. However, Henry was also unwilling to let slip by an opportunity
6 CPR 1247-58, 158.
7 Foedera, 1,285.
8 CPR 1247-58, 158.
9 Ibid., 188.
1® Royal Letters, II, nr. 463.
11 CPR 1247-58, 307.
12 CR 1251-3, 187-8, 442.
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121to press his claims to Poitou and Nonnandy. In 1252, asked by Louis IX to hasten his 
departure for Palestine, the King of England responded that he would do so, once 
Louis had restored Plantagenet rights in F r a n c e .  13 The English court saw the necessity 
of an anging peace with Louis DC, but tliis did not mean that the opportunity to settle an 
old grievance was easily abandoned. Settling the King’s affairs with France therefore 
soon proved to be the most difficult part of his crusading prepaiations.
Nonetheless, Henry remained consistent in his efforts, and turned down 
numerous opportunities for alliances against France. At the same time, his court was 
still viewed as a potential source of help for those opposing the Capetians. In August 
1251, for instance, just before Charles of Anjou embarked on a lengthy siege of 
Marseilles, the commune’s messenger was received. 14 Although this may have been 
connected to the planned crusade which, after all, was to depart from Marseilles, the 
timing seems suspicious. Similarly, while in Gascony, Henry III met an envoy of 
John de Avesnes, the claimant to the county of Flanders and foe of Louis’ ally, the 
Countess Joan. 15 It remains unclear, though, whether these were contacts actively 
encouraged by the English court, or whether the initiative was taken by those who 
were struggling to hold out against the Capetians. Should tliey have hoped for military 
support, they were certainly disappointed. No troops or funds were sent to those 
rebelling against Charles of Anjou, or the Countess of Flanders. In fact, Henry went to 
great lengths to accommodate not only Louis IX, but also his brothers. In November 
1253 for example, over £7,000 were paid in damages to the Count of Toulouse’s men 
who had been wronged by some of Henry’s Gascon subjects. 16 In May 1254 hectic 
diplomatic efforts were undertaken to find a peaceful solution for recent infringements 
of the truce. 17 The necessity to settle the conflict diplomatically remained paramount.
But Louis IX was not the only ruler with whom peaceful relations had to be 
established. The King of Navarre, for example, agreed to a truce concerning 
Gascony. 18 This proved an added benefit when he was later called upon to provide 
troops for Henry's campaign against Gaston de Bearn and the Gascon rebels. 19 In 
Britain, the King of England managed to put relations with Scotland onto a firmer 
basis, when, in 1251, Alexander III of Scotland married Henry’s daughter 
Margaret.20 This put an end to edgy relations which in the past had all too frequently 
required resources which were now needed in the Holy Land.
13 CPR 1247-58, 157, 158. Matthew Paiis reports tliat Louis was willing to comply, but failed due 
to opposition by the French nobility: CM, V, 280-1.
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122The King of England also found himself involved with those whose support was 
either to be enlisted for his campaign, or who tried to enlist Hem-y’s for theirs. In 1251 
Ferdinand of Castile sent envoys to England, who were to convince Henry to fight in 
Spain rather than Palestine.21 Ferdinand had recently captured Seville and was now 
trying to establish his control over a territory he lacked the manpower and funds to 
defend effectively, unless further inroads were made into Muslim tenitory. In 1253/4, 
during negotiations with Ferdinand’s successor Alfonso X, a Castilian-led campaign in 
North Africa was mooted, and Henry’s support was requested. This may also hold the 
key to understanding increasing contacts with N o r w a y .2 2  Although there is no definite 
indication that these was directly related to Heniy’s planned crusade, it is worth noting 
that King Haakon of Norway was soon to conclude an alliance with Alfonso 
concerning the planned expedition to North A f r i c a .23 Besides plans for the King’s 
own campaign, other caisaders were received and supported by Henry’s court, as, for 
instance, the Frisian caisaders stranded at Winchelsea in 1254.24 English diplomacy 
in preparation for the King’s departure was both wide-ranging and, initially, 
successful.
Soon, however, difficulties abounded. Foremost amongst them was the situation 
in Gascony, where a restive population continued to resist attempts at establishing 
effective royal control.25 The events in the province also serve to highlight the extent 
to which Mediteaanean rulers began to dominate English affairs on the continent. In 
1253 a change of governor coincided with a rebellion under the leadership of Gaston 
de Bearn.26 When looking for support, the rebels found a favourable reception with 
the new King of Castile, Alfonso X, who viewed this as a welcome opportunity to 
state his claims to Gascony. To support his claims Alfonso produced a charter, 
allegedly issued by Henry II and confirmed by Richard and John, which granted the 
duchy to tlie King of Castile.27 Warned that the province would be lost unless he
21 CM, V, 231-2; tlie Bishop of Morocco, a prominent member of tlie Castilian court, is attested as 
being in England in March 1251: CLR 1245-51, 339. He eventually left by early July: Ibid., 363, 
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the gift o f a new crown: CR 1251-3, 151, 265. In 1253, the King of the Isle of Man received 
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26 CM, V, 368.
27 CM, V, 365-6. This had already caused problems during Henry Ill’s coronation in 1220: Eales, 
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hurried to France, the King of England left for Gascony by early August 1253.^^ 
After initial successes, Henry’s progress stalled at La Reole in N o v e m b e r . ^ 9 
Simultaneously, negotiations began with Alfonso.30 From then on, the chronology 
becomes confusing. It was not until February the following year that Henry made his 
negotiations public in England.31 Even then, he still requested troops and support. 32 
It has been suggested that this may have been an attempt to elicit funds from a 
baronage which had proved reluctant to grant the King the financial aid he needed.33 
The threat of a foreign invasion, may thus have been a welcome opportunity to press 
the case for stronger financial support, and could explain why these negotiations had 
been kept secret. However, although Henry painted a vivid picture of the threat posed 
by the Christian and Muslim forces which Alfonso was mustering, and which were 
said to tlireaten England as well as Gascony,34 a parliament meeting in Januaiy 1254 
refused to accept tlie King’s demands.35 Even die offer made by Richard of Cornwall, 
the King’s regent, that Magna Carta was to be re-confirmed and obeyed, had little 
effect.36 The fact that, at die time, Henry had accumulated a treasure of 28,000 marks, 
sheds doubts on his claims of penury, and may have contributed to his barons' 
reluctance to agree to any extra taxation.37 The fact that most of the King's treasure 
had probably been intended for the planned campaign would have earned little weight 
with a parliament which became increasingly distrustful of Henry's financial 
management. In the end, however, no troops were needed, as a peace agreement was 
reached by March 1254.38 Alfonso surrendered his claims to Gascony,39 and ceased 
to support Gaston and his fellow-rebels.40 To symbolise their new concord, Henry 
Ill’s eldest son, Edward, was to marry the King of Castile’s sister.41 In addition the 
King of England promised to support for Alfonso’s planned crusade in North 
Africa.42 Gascony had been secured and pacified. More importantly, the links with 
rulers of the Iberian peninsula were strengthened.43 in fact, next to a more friendly
123
28 CM V 378-9, 381, 383.
29 Annals of Waverley, AM  II, 346; Annals o f Tewkesbury, AM  I, 154.
30 CM, V, 396-400. For a somewhat odd interpretation of die role of Henry’s chief negotiator, Joseph 
Baylen, ‘John Maunsell and the Castilian tieaty of 1254: a study of tlie clerical diplomat’, Traditio 
xvii (1961), 482-491.
31 CM , VI, Lib. Add. 284-6.
32 CR 1253-4, 115-6.
33 Powicke, Hemy III, 235.
34 CR 1253-4, 109; CPR 1247-58, 362.
35 CM, V, 423-5, 440-1, 447.
36 Royal Letters, II, nr. 499.
37 David Carpenter, ‘The Gold tr easure of Hemy UV,Thirteenth Century England i (1983), 61-88, at 
65.
38 CfR 7247-Jg, 279-80, 281.
39 DD, nr. 270.
40 Ibid., nr. 273.
41 CPR 1247-58, 312, 351.
42 CR 1253-4, 316. Hemy asks for papal permission to transfer his campaign to North Africa [18. 9. 
1254].
124standing with the court of Louis IX, this extension of English interests remained the 
most important feature of English diplomacy during these year s.
The King’s interests in the Mediterranean soon began to expand. While in 
Gascony, the crown of Sicily was accepted on behalf of prince E d m u n d . 4 4  it seems, 
though, as if Henry had little idea of the complications tliis would involve, and it 
would certainly be mistaken to view his acceptance of the Apulian throne as putting an 
end to his crusading plans. No doubt was left about the King's priorities. For instance, 
iiumediately after Henry had accepted the Sicilian throne, renewed efforts were made 
towar ds die completion of Westminster abbey before the King ‘takes his journey to the 
Holy L a n d . ’ 4 5  Simultaneously, preparations for the King’s campaign in Palestine 
were hastened and further funds and aids requested from the papal c o u r t . 4 6  initially, 
the Sicilian Business was thus little more than a sub-plot to the planned conquest of 
Jerusalem.
In many ways, Edward's Castilian marriage formed part of a much wider 
picture. Ensuring the continuation of one's dynastic line was a traditional feature of 
crusading policy. Just as Henry (VII) had found himself the subject of a number of 
proposals in 1225, immediately prior to his father's campaign, so did Edward during 
the years immediately following Henry's taking of the Cross. In another parallel,
Edward became a much-courted prospective spouse just as the end of his minority was 
imminent. 47 Suitors included Alfonso of Castile, as well as the King of Aragon and 
the Duke of Brabant. In the end it was the threat posed to Gascony which ensured the 
success of the Castilian proposal. However, this does not mean that the other 
proposals had been doomed from the start. Nor were political problems the only 
difficulties besetting Jaime of Aragon or Henry of Brabant, just as important were 
financial problems. In October 1251, for instance, Henry claimed that any delay in 
negotiations concerning the Aragonese proposal was not his fault, as he had already 
written to the King explaining how much money he expected to reeeive.48 . Little 
evidence suivives to illuminate this passage further. However, considering the habitual 
penury of the Catalan kingdom in the thirteenth century,49 the King of Aragon's 
ability or inability to pay Henry III the sums he demanded may have been as a 
important a factor in determining the ultimate failure of these maniage plans as was 
Alfonso's interference in Gascony. Also in 1251 the Duke of Brabant was asked to
43 Generally, also, Antliony Goodman, ‘England and Iberia in the Middle Ages’, in; Jones and Vale 
(ed.), England and her Neighbours, 73-96, at 75-77.
44 Foedera, I, 301.
45 CPR 7247-5S, 279-80, 281. ■
46 Also Lloyd, ‘Henry III’, 112-3.
47 Edward was bom in 1239: FeHx Liebermann, ‘The Annals of Lewes Priory’, EHR xvii (1902), 83- 
89, at 88.
48 CR 1247-51, 566-7. This seems a valid reason, considering the habitual penury of the Aragonese 
Kings in the mid-tliirteenth century:
49 j. N. Hillgartli, The Problem o f the Catalan Mediterranean Empire 1229-1337 (London, 1975), 5.
125wait until Easter 1 2 5 2  before his marriage proposals could be dealt with. Once more, 
financial matters were said to pose the biggest p r o b le m .5 0  it i s  interesting to observe a 
reversal of roles which was probably incidental, but which remains symbolic 
nonetheless. The very Henry III who had gone to great pains to seek an alliance with 
the German princes, who had put no resistance to Frederick II's financial demands 
when the Emperor courted Isabella, who did not even want to settle for a dowry when 
he himself married, put financial considerations at a very prominent place where the 
marriage of his own son was concerned. Naturally, this may have been connected to 
the very reasons which, two decades earlier, had led to Frederick II's courtship of 
Isabella: a need for financial as well as military support in pursuing his various 
projects, most notably the crusade. However, this also shows how Henry's priorities 
had changed. The rivalry between the Kings of Aragon and Castile posed the danger of 
drawing the King of England into yet another conflict, and of driving Alfonso into the 
arms of Louis IX, having the whole of Gascony suiTounded by the Capetians and their 
allies. A Brabantine marriage, too, would have pushed Henry into siding with those 
whose company he had recently begun to avoid: the Avesnes brothers and those on the 
look-out for allies against the Countess of Flanders and her Capetian allies. Although 
the hope that Henry, one way or another, might be able to regain his lost inheritance 
had not yet been abandoned, a military recover was no longer an option. Had the King 
been in any doubt about this, his experiences during the Gascon campaign must have 
made this clear to him. It now remains to be seen how these shifting parameters 
influenced English relations with Germany and the Empire.
VI.2 England, Germany and the Empire
In Germany, Frederick’s death marked William’s ascendancy and Conrad’s 
demise. William of Holland soon won support even from within the Hohenstaufen's 
traditional heartland, and he gained recognition abroad. In 1 2 5 1 ,  for instance, Duke 
John of Burgundy did homage for Lausanne and B e s a n c o n . 5 1  This alliance soon 
increased in significance when one of the Duke’s daughters manied into the Duke of 
Brabant’s family in 1 2 5 3 , 5 2  and his son into that of the burggraves of Nuremberg in 
1 2 5 5 . 5 3  Not only did this strengthen William’s position at the eastern borders of the 
Empire, he also gained control over Nuremberg, once a centre of Hohenstaufen 
p o w e r . 5 4  The erstwhile anti-King had thus successfully filled the vacuum left by
50 CR 1247-51, 527.
51 Layettes, III, nr. 3935.
52 Annales Parchenses, MGH SS xvi, 607.
53 Layettes, III, nr. 4186.
54 For a general outline of tlie history of the town in the tliirteenth century of. Gerd Pfeiffer, ‘Der 
Aufstieg der Reichsstadt Nürnberg iin 13. Jahrhundert’, Mitteilungen des Vereins fUr die Gescliichte der 
Stadt Nürnberg xliv (1953), 14-24; Josef Kraus, ‘Die Stadt Nürnberg in ihren Beziehungen zur 
Rômischen Kurie wahrend des Mittelalters’, Mitteilungen des Vereins fUr die Geschichte der Stadt
Frederick II's death. His triumph was completed in 1 2 5 2 ,  when William celebrated his 
marriage witli one of the Duke of Brunswick’s daughters, thus gaining ground in the 
distant North of Germany. More importantly, he decided to repeat his election as King 
of the Romans. This time, his elevation was confirmed by those who in the past had 
either ignored or opposed his royal s t a t u s . 5 5  O n l y  Duke Louis of Bavaria, the father of 
Conrad IV’s pregnant w i f e , 5 6  remained hostile. However, when Louis murdered his 
wife in 1 2 5 3 , 5 7  he was left ostracised and without real political clout. Not only had 
those who in the past remained aloof from the ongoing conflict joined William's camp, 
but his opponents were left as political and moral parialis. William had at last secured 
control of Germany, with his authority and power largely unchallenged.
He quickly decided to use this for a campaign against the Countess of Flanders. 
In July 1 2 5 3  an army, led by Baldwin de Avesnes, inflicted a disastrous defeat on the 
combined forces of Flanders and F r a n c e . 5 8  The Dampierre brothers were captured, as 
were the Counts of Bar and G u i n e s . 5 9  The triumph was, however, short-lived. Soon 
after the battle Countess Margaret offered Hainault to Charles of A n j o u , 6 0  and agreed 
to pay the cost of fighting William. In early 1 2 5 4  Charles conquered Hainault without 
encountering much resistance. William had to give way to Capetian pressure. Louis 
IX, asked to arbitrate between the various parties, decreed tliat both the DampieiTe and 
the Avesnes brothers had to take their lands as fiefs from the Count of Anjou, thus 
giving a Capetian prince control over what was once Imperial tenitory. However, the 
Avesnes brothers remained reluctant to accept a compromise which fell well short of 
what they claimed to be rightfully theirs, and efforts to undo the results of the 1 2 5 4  
campaign remained at the heart of William’s diplomacy.61
Comad IV soon realised that he had little chance of securing his position north of 
the Alps, and left for Sicily in 1 2 5 1 . 6 2  jje was quickly recognised by most Apulian 
towns and nobles. In addition, negotiations began with Innocent TV to put an end to 
the young King’s e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 6 3  if Matthew Paris is to be believed, these
N ürnberg  xli (1950), 1-153, at 3. Also, Die Zeit der Staufer, Exhibition Catalogue, 5 vols., 
(Stuttgart, 1977-9), vol. IV, maps 5,7,9.
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57 Annales Saxonici, MGH SS xvi, 431.
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127included plans for a marriage between Hemy, Frederick II’s son by his maniage with 
Isabella Plantagenet, and a papal niece. 64 However, the Pope had left tittle doubt as to 
his intentions. Innocent was unwilling to consider the possibility of acknowledging tlie 
rights of any Hohenstaufen claimant. As soon as news of Frederick’s death had 
reached the curia, the preaching of a crusade against Conrad began.65 Similarly, the 
Sicilian aristocracy was exhorted not to adhere to any of Frederick’s sons.66 While 
Conrad was attacked in Italy, measures were taken to undermine his German base even 
further. In 1253 William was asked to enforce an earlier decision which deprived 
Comad of the duchy of Swabia,67 and the Duke of Brabant was promised that the 
Church would never enter into peace with its enemies, as long as Conrad ‘qui se pro 
imperatore gerebat in Alemannia regah honori remaneat decoratus’.68 There was little 
hope tliat the papal-Hohenstaufen conflict could be resolved by peaceful means.
It was only after much pressure from Louis IX and after a series of papal defeats 
that Innocent began to consider negotiating with C o n r a d . 6 9  The Hohenstaufen was 
granted a respite to allow him to prove his orthodoxy, as a step towards proper 
negotiations.^^ In the end, the young King’s deposition and excommunication were 
confmned. However, Innocent was spared having to enforce his decrees, as Conrad 
died in May 1 2 5 4 . 7 1  This left the Pope free to pursue his aims in Sicily. He 
triumphantly entered Naples, where he stayed until his death in November 1 2 5 4 . 7 2  At 
the tiiue, it seemed as if Innocent had acliieved what he and Gregory had been fighting 
for since 1 2 3 9 .  The Hohenstaufen were defeated and the papacy took, at last, control 
of Sicily. Amongst Frederick’s heirs, only Conradin, a two year old safely confined to 
the Duke of Bavaria’s lands, and Manfred, Frederick’s illegitimate offspring, were left 
to pursue tlie family’s claims. In Germany, William of Holland was at the height of his 
power, and in Sicily, Henry III, a loyal son of the Church, was to establish a new 
dynasty.
English contacts with Germany during these years continued, but" remained 
marginal. Henry had little use for those who wanted him to fight the French. Relations 
were confined to the Dukes of Brabant and Brunswick, and contacts with William or 
Conrad remained indirect and few. As so often, evidence survives for various 
missions from the Empire, but their purpose remains a matter of conjecture. It is safe
64 Ibid., V, 274-5. He continues to explain tliat tlie project failed because the Imperial nobles were 
unwilling to countenance such a slight on the dignity of the Imperial dynasty. This was probably a 
veiled attack on Henry III, rather than an apt reflection of reality.
65 Registres Innocent IV, nr. 5032.
66 Ibid., nr. 5339.
67 Epistolae, III, nr. 186.
68 Registres Innocent IV, nr. 6397.
69 Epistolae, III, m-. 255.
79 For a list of accusations CM, Lib. Add., CM, VI, 298-304. Also CM, V, 448-9 for a short 
summary.
71 Annales Scheftlarienses Minores, MGH SS xvii, 344.
72 Chronicon Marchiae Tamsinae, RIS 8,111, 24.
128to assume, though, that William’s need for allies remained at the centre of German 
relations with England. Although there is little indication of any close links, some 
evidence suggests that contacts with some of the traditional addressees of English 
diplomacy were maintained. In April 1 2 5 2  and in May 1 2 5 3 ,  for instance, Master 
Geoffrey, a clerk of the Duke of Brunswick, received a fee at the E x c h e q u e r . 7 3  This 
could imply a regularity of contacts between tlie ducal court and that of Henry III. 
Geoffrey may also have brought news of William’s recent successes in Germany, 
including his marriage with one of the Duke’s daughters. Other messengers were sent 
as well. In December 1 2 5 2  a knight from Brunswick was in E n g l a n d , 7 4  where he 
seems to have stayed until early Januaiy 1 2 5 3 . 7 5  That a certain degree of cordiality 
prevailed in relations with the Welf Duke of Brunswick is implied by the fact that this 
embassy was given robes 'sicut valletis r e g i s ' . 7  6 These months also witnessed the 
built-up to William’s campaign in Flanders, and this mission may, thus, have been 
concerned with attempts at winning military and diplomatic backing from Henry III. 
However, other matters may have been dealt with as well, as was probably the case 
when the Duke’s knight visited the English court again in September 1 2 5 3 . 7 7  Then, 
his sojourn may have been connected to the matter of various North Geiman merchants 
imprisoned in J u l y . 7 8  This would explain why he contacted the regents in England, 
rather than the King in Gascony. This suggests that, despite cooling relations with the 
court of William himself, contacts continued with those who had traditionally been at 
the centre of English diplomacy in Germany. However, should they have hoped that 
their traditional links could induce Henry to challenge Louis IX, they were 
disappointed.
A similar experience was to be had by the Duke of Brabant. He continued his 
prominent role in Imperial affairs after the Emperor’s death. In early 1 2 5 1  the Duke 
was asked to lead yet another cmsade against C o n r a d , 7 9  and he was one of William’s 
most important allies during the 1 2 5 3  campaign in Flanders.80 At the same time, 
closer links with England continued. When returning to Gascony in 1 2 5 2 ,  Simon de 
Montfort was offered troops by the Duke. 81 Furthermore, the project of a Brabantine 
marriage for Edward of England was dealt witli a g a i n . 8 2  Little is known about the
73 CLR 1251-60, 43-4, 128.
74 CR 1251-3, 296.
75 CLR 1251-60, 97. ■
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progress of negotiations, and any hope for success was shattered with the Castilian 
union of 1254.
In an interesting parallel to relations before 1235, contacts with Germany were 
arranged via the Imperial aristocracy, rather than the King himself. The closest to an 
official exchange with William of Holland was the request made by Henry m  in spring 
1253, that Bern and other places, cunently held by the Counts of Kiburg, be returned 
to Peter of Savoy.83 At the time, Thomas of Savoy was performing a precarious 
balancing act. Matthew reports that he had been involved in ananging a truce between 
the Hohenstaufen and Innocent IV in 1252.84 in February 1254 it was at the Count’s 
instigation that Conrad had been granted a respite before a formal trial would be 
opened against him.85 By the time of Conrad’s death, however, the Count was firmly 
siding with the papal forces: on 30 May 1254 Innocent IV ordered William of Holland 
to grant Thomas possession of a castle between Asti and Alexandria.86 Henry’s 
intercession on Peter’s behalf, though, was probably related to the king’s patronage of 
his Savoyard relatives,87 rather than to an involvement in German affairs. Also, the 
role the Counts played in Henry’s crusade planning has to be considered. In June
1253, for instance, Henry appointed John de Amblione, the dean of Monte St Andrea 
in Savoy, and papal chaplain, as his proctor at tlie curia, ‘to sue and obtain graces and 
indulgences for the subsidy of the Holy Land’.88 Although John was later to play an 
important role in the Sicilian B u s i n e s s , ^9 his earlier involvement was primarily 
concerned with the planning of the King’s crusade. He provided an important link 
between the English court, the papal curia and tlie counts of Savoy. Similarly, Henry’s 
intercession on Peter’s behalf was connected to the crusade. After all, Peter remained 
one of the most important recruits tlie King had been able to m u s t e r . 9 0  The King may 
thus have tried to use whatever standing he had in Germany to further the case of his 
supporters and relatives. To read more into this anecdote would be mistaken. In fact, 
mostly due to economic reasons, relations between die William and Henry deteriorated 
quickly. In November and December 1254 mandates were issued to arrest merchants 
from Holland and Zeeland, as English merchants imprisoned there had not yet had 
their goods restored, despite William’s promises.91 Furthermore, also in December
1254, the homage done by Joan of Flanders for an annual fee of 500 marks was
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a c k n o w l e d g e d . 9 2  At the time, Henry III was Louis DCs guest in Paris, and her 
homage may thus have been connected to this v i s i t . 9 3  Not only was Henry reluctant to 
support William against the Capetians and their allies, he also forged stronger links 
with those hostile to the Geiman King.
Conrad IV did not fare better. Until he got involved in the Sicilian Business, 
Henry stayed clear of the conflict between Hohenstaufen and papalists in Italy. The 
main source for relations between the two rulers is Matthew Paris. In tlie context of the 
Sicilian Business he mentioned that Conrad had thanked Richard of Cornwall for 
rejecting the papal offer of the Apulian throne.94 Interestingly enough, an embassy 
from Conrad is recorded as being in England by March 1253,^5 only a few months 
after Richard had been offered the crown of Sicily. More importantly, the same day 
Conrad’s envoy was attested, Henry III sent one of his officials to Apulia.^6 
Moreover, Matthew states that Richard, still hesitant about accepting the crown, 
consulted Conrad about the affairs of Sicily.97 Whether the English mission was in 
fact, as suggested by the St Albans chronicler, to consult Conrad on how best to 
overthrow his regime, remains a matter of speculation. It may, however, have been 
concerned with discussing recent events in general, and may have been connected to 
events surrounding the Khig of England’s nephew, Hemy. After all, one of the alleged 
reasons for Richard’s refusal of the crown was that this would deprive Hemy of his 
inheritance.98 Little is known of Henry apart from his death in 1 2 5 3 / 4 . 9 9  Even that 
was soon used in propaganda against Conrad. A Genoese source mentions that Conrad 
had strangled his brother Henry after returning to S i c i l y .  100 This was rejected by 
Mattliew Palis who reported that Conrad loved liis brother above everyone else. 101 in 
fact, he blamed those rumours on the papacy who was trying to sow discord between 
the King of England and his Apulian in-laws. 102 He goes on to blame Innocent for the 
young boy’s death. After the Sicilian nobles had heard of Richard being offered their 
realm, they conspired against the boy. 103 To what extent this is a reliable 
interpretation of events remains doubtful. Almost any event described from 1 2 5 4  
onwards was used by Matthew to illustrate either the King’s incompetence and
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i „ .  131oppression, or the Pope’s immorality and r u t h l e s s n e s s .  104 Nonetheless, should
Henry’s or Richard’s involvement have constituted a threat to the young boy, this
could explain the English mission from March 1253. However, the English court
stayed clear of involving itself in the Italian wais. Any involvement in these affairs was
not actively sought, but was encouraged by Innocent IV and, to a lesser extent, Conrad
IV.
Between 1250 and 1254, Henry IE had been primarily occupied with organising 
and preparing his crusade to the Holy Land. In this context, he strove to improve 
relations witli France. At the same time, the need to secure and defend what was left of 
his continental inheritance led to a strengthening of already existing ties with the 
Hispanic peninsula. Under these circumstances, the Enghsh court had little interest in 
the affairs of Germany. Contacts with the Empire were with or in the interest of the 
King’s favourites and relatives, and remained subordinate to the King’s affairs and 
aspir ations in the Mediterranean.
*94 Richard Vaughan, Matthew Paris (Cambridge, 1958), 146-7; Karl Schnith, England in einer sick 
wandelnden Welt (1189-1259): Studien zu Roger Wendover und Matthdus Paris (Stuttgart, 1974), 152; 
Weller, Mattliew Paris'.
Chapter VII 
The Sicilian Business 
(1254-63)
After Frederick II’s death in 1250, attempts began to replace the Hohenstaufen 
dynasty in Sicily as well as Germany. 1 The regno was offered unsuccessfully to 
Richard of Cornwall and Char les of Anjou, before Henry HI accepted it on behalf of 
his youngest son Edmund, ten years old at the time, in 1254.2 Although neither the 
King nor his son ever reached Italy, the affairs of Apulia came to dominate English 
politics. Already existing ties witli the Mediterranean were strengthened, and renewed 
impetus was given to Henry’s attempts at securing a permanent settlement with France. 
After all, the island could only be reached if Louis and his brothers were willing to let 
an English army pass through their lands. When these negotiations ran into difficulties, 
alternative routes had to be found. This led to renewed contacts with Germany, 
culminating in tlie election of Hemy’s brother Richar d as King of the Romans in 1257. 
The negotium Sicilie soon changed the course of English politics and diplomacy, with 
serious repercussions not only for Henry’s relations with the continent, but also 
included his domestic affairs. In 1258, at Oxford, he was forced to hand over the reins 
of government to a baronial council. Many of the complaints made on that occasion 
were linked to or originated in his acceptance of the Sicilian throne.
VII. 1 Negotiations and promises
The English court had always been the papacy’s favourite to replace the 
Hohenstaufen in Sicily.3 Matthew Paris refers to overtures being made as early as 
1250, in die context of Richard of Cornwall’s visit to Lyon.4 The earliest documentary 
evidence survives from August 1252, when Innocent IV contacted Henry III, offering 
the regno to Ear! Richard.5 Little else is known about the ensuing negotiations. By 
November, a papal notary, Albert of Parma, who was later to deal with Charles and 
Henry, is reported as being in England,6 and by January 1253 Henry thanked the
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Pope for the offer of Sicily.7 However, dealings with the Earl made little progress,8 
and by June 1253 negotiations began with Charles of Anjou.9 In the end Charles, too, 
found that other areas in Europe offered easier and more promising prospects. In the 
autumn of 1253 he accepted the county of Hainault from Margaret of Flanders, and 
began his campaign against William of Holland and the Avesnes brothers.
In December 1253 Albeit received papal authorisation to submit the conditions 
for an enfeoffment with Sicily to Henry m .H  What exactly Innocent IV’s terms had 
been we do not know. However, they are unlikely to have been different from those 
submitted to Charles of A n j o u .  12 The Pope’s demands aimed at guaranteeing the 
safety of papal lands and the separation of Imperial territories from the kingdom of 
Sicily. For instance, Charles had to promise that, in case he or his successors should 
only beget an heiress, she would never many an Emperor or the son of an Emperor, or 
anyone likely to become Emperor. Innocent IV viewed the establishment of a new 
dynasty in Sicily as an opportunity to end the stranglehold into which the union 
between Sicily and the Empire under the Hohenstaufen had brought die papal state. In 
addition, the Count of Anjou was requested to pay 1,000 ounces of gold on accepting 
the kingdom, 10,000 towai'ds the rebuilding of Benevento, a papal enclave in Apulia, 
an annual tribute of 2,000 ounces, and to provide 50 knights in the service of the 
papacy. Once more, these terms aimed at underlining the status of the Sicilian Kings as 
vassals of the Holy See, All in all, papal demands were neither unreasonable nor 
excessive. What mattered most to Innocent IV at this point was to rid liimself of his 
Hohenstaufen foes, and to ensure that the problems which had beset relations between 
Sicily and the curia in the past be resolved.
Hemy and his court saw litde difficulty in agreeing to these teims, and by early 
March 1254 Albert confirmed Edmund as King of S i c i l y .  13 it seems, though, as if 
Henry HI had underestimated the speed with which Innocent IV expected him to act. 
Already in May, when confirming Edmund’s enfeoffment, he urged the King to 
prompt his son’s departure for S i c i l y .  1 4  To enable him to do so, the Pope promised to
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Richard favourably witli his brother. The Earl's alleged comment was thus intended as a criticism of 
Hemy HI and has to be handled with great caution.
9 Registres Innocent IV, nrs. 6806, 6818.
*9 On Charles’ negotiations witli the Holy See in tlie context of his relations with tlie papacy in 
general, Henri-Marc-Boiinet, ‘Le Saint-siège et Charles d’Anjou sous Innocent IV et Alexandre IV’, 
Revue Historique cc (1948), 38-65, at 49-62.
** Epistolae, III, nr . 446, in an account given by Albert concerning his negotiations with Henry III.
*2 Registres Innocent IV, nr. 6819. Baaken, lus Imperii, 392-5 for a more detailed discussion.
*3 Foedera, I, 297.
*4 Ibid., 301. This was repeated a week later, when Innocent exhorted Henry to avoid unnecessary 
expenses to hasten his departure for Sicily: Ibid., 302.
134pay 100,000 livres tournouis towards Henry’s expenses, granted an extension of the 
period during which a tenth for the planned crusade could be collected, as well as a 
commutation of the King’s vow from freeing Jerusalem to conquering Apulia. 15 
Innocent, thus, gave all the assistance he could. Henry, however, found himself beset 
by problems. His attempts at soliciting funds from his English subjects had failed, 
Gascony had not yet been pacified, 16 and he had to see through his son Edward’s 
Castilian marriage. 17 More importantly, relations with France remained to be 
settled. 1  ^Under these circumstances it was unlikely that he would set out for Sicily 
soon. Nonetheless, preparations began. These included, amongst others, the 
appointment of Thomas of Savoy as prince of Capua. 19 Thomas had served Frederick 
n  as Imperial Vicar, and he had been involved in negotiations between Conrad IV and 
Innocent, thus possessing an unrivalled knowledge of Italian affairs. In October 1254, 
the Archbishop of Embrun and the Bishop of Hereford were announced as royal 
envoys to the citizens of Sicily.20 If Henry saw himself unable to come to Sicily soon 
or in person, he at least took steps to assert his and his son’s authority. Innocent 
himself, now resident at Naples, managed to win important allies. Most important 
amongst these was Berthold margrave of Hohenburg.21 He had been Manfred’s 
guardian and was appointed regent of Sicily by Conrad IV.22 This ensured that 
Edmund’s regime would have the support of some of the most high-ranking and 
experienced members of Conrad’s administration.23 Other recruits included men like 
Richard Filangieri, once Frederick’s governor in Palestine,24 Richard de Montenero, 
formerly grand justiciar of Sicily, and Peter Ruffus, marshal and governor of 
Calabria.25 During the early months of the project, neither Henry IE nor Innocent IV 
seem to have had any doubt concerning the likelihood of the project’s eventual 
success, despite the progress made by Manfred during the autumn and early winter of
15 Ibid., 301, 303, 304.
16 CPR 1247-58, 364.
17 Ibid., 312.
18 Ibid., 311.
19 Foedera, I, 308.
20 CPR 1247-58, 344.
21 Foedera, I, 311.
22 Manfred Doeberl, ‘Berthold von Hohenburg’, Deutsche Zeitschrift fiir Geschichtswissenschaft xii 
(1892), 201-278 for tliis and tlie following. For Bertliold’s literary output, Friedrich Neumann, ‘Der 
Markgraf von Hohenburg’, Zeitschrift fUr deustches Altertum und deutsche Literatur Ixxxvi (1955/6), 
119-60.
23 Amongst tlie more interesting coincidences in tlie later development of the Sicilian Business is the 
appearance of lohannes Saracenus, nephew of Henry Ill’s erstwhile proctor at tlie curia, Petrus 
Saraceiius, as Archbishop of Bari from 1259 onwar ds: Karnp, Kirche und Monarchie, 596-601.
24 R f  nr, 4644c. Interestingly enough, Walter of Ocra, elect of Capua and once regular recipient of an 
English rent, remained amongst Manfred’s partisans: Kamp, Kirche und Monarchie, 132.
25 Rodenberg, Innoenz IV., 177 n. 4 ,186.
1254.26 By the time of Innocent’s death in December it must have seemed as if 
Edmund’s anival in Sicily was only a matter of time.27
At this stage, the negotium Sicilie was still very much part of Henry’s 
crusading plans. To him, the two projects existed side by side.28 As early as 1253, 
when Henry III first acknowledged the offer of Sicily to his brother, he also requested 
that crusade preaching be extended beyond Britain.29 As much as the prospect of 
ruling Sicily must have pleased him, the affairs of the Holy Land still had priority. 
Even after Henry’s involvement in Apulia, planning for his crusade continued.30 in 
fact, the Pope’s offer of commuting Henry’s vow from a crusade in Palestine to one 
against Manfred was not taken up.31 Rather, the King requested to be allowed to 
campaign with Alfonso in North Africa instead.32 it seems, thus, that the planned 
campaign against the Muslims and the imminent conquest of Sicily existed side by 
side. In fact, as Alexander IV was to point out to Henry III in 1255, the kingdom of 
Apulia would be an ideal base from which to set out for a conquest of the Holy 
Land.33 This was an apt reflection of past experiences. Most crusades which avoided 
taking the land-route to Palestine had proceeded either via Marseilles or Sicily.34 Later 
in the thirteenth century, Charles of Anjou was to use the regno"s geographical 
position and naval expertise not only to further his ambitions in Greece, but also to 
press his claims to the crown of Jerusalem.35 in many ways the negotium Sicilie was 
a logical extension of already existing ties with the Mediterranean. Moreover, the 
English court must have been aware of papal negotiations with Charles of Anjou. 
Although strenuous efforts were made to settle relations with France, they met with 
repeated setbacks. Preventing an expansion of Capetian power not only into 
Languedoc and Flanders, but also into Italy may, thus, have been amongst the reasons 
for Hemy Ill’s acceptance of Innocent’s offer.36 in the context of English relations 
with the continent, the Plantagenets’ involvement in Sicily was a reasonable course of 
action.
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28 L loyd ,‘Hemy III’, 110-119.
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30 Ibid., 369.
31 Foedera, 1 ,304. On crusades against Manfred and Conradin: Norman Housley, The Italian Crusades: 
the Papal-Angevin alliance and the Crusades against Christian lay powers, 1254-1343 (Oxford, 1982, 
repr. 1986), 222-31.
32 Foedera, I, 308. For Alfonso’s crusading plans, which were not limited to North Africa alone: 
Robert Lee Wolff, ‘Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor’s son: Castile and the Latin Empire of 
Constantinople’, Speculum xxix (1954), 45-84.
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136Only after Innocent’s deatli did difficulties begin.3 / His successor, Alexander 
IV, at first strove to resolve the conflict with Manfred peacefully. Negotiations 
continued until March 1255.38 Once these faltered,39 renewed efforts were made to 
hasten Henry Ill’s departure for Italy. In March Alexander refused the King’s request 
to commute his vow from crusading in Palestine to a campaign in North Africa, but 
later offered to commute the vow towards a campaign in Sicily instead.40 Also, he 
confirmed Edmund’s enfeoffment with Sicily, but insisted on a new set of 
conditions.41 Most of these were a clarification of the demands made by Innocent.42 
For instance, Edmund was banned from ever standing for election as Emperor. 
Obligations towards the papacy were extended. The military service owed to the curia, 
for instance, was increased from 50 to 300 knights. These new terms probably 
reflected the need for a stronger military basis in upholding papal claims in central 
Italy. During the early 1250s tlie papacy had repeatedly been faced by rebellions and 
internal warfare in its domains, and the lack of military strength must have been bitterly 
felt. Measures were taken to ensure that Henry would honour his promises. Most 
importantly, either Henry HI himself or a suitably provisioned proctor would have to 
be in Sicily by October 1256. In tlie meantime, the Pope alone could decide upon the 
granting of lands and privileges in the regno. By making Edmund’s exercise of some 
of the most important regal rights dependant upon his arrival in Sicily, the Pope may 
have hoped that this would provide the necessary incentive for the English court to 
hasten its preparations. It was also a reflection of the difficult situation in which 
Alexander found himself after Manfred’s recent successes. Furthermore, Innocent’s 
promise of paying 100,000 livres tournouis was withdrawn. Instead, Henry had to 
pay the expenses incurred by the papacy to the extent of 135,541 marks. This latter 
point has been viewed as revealing the preposterous nature of the whole project.43 
However, this fails to take into account the specific circumstances under which Henry 
n i and Alexander IV acted. These conditions aimed not at emasculating the King of 
England financially, but at forcing him to attend to the affairs of Sicily, and to do so 
soon. In the meantime, the necessary finances had to be secured to maintain the loyalty 
of those recently won for the papal cause, and to continue military efforts at 
overtlirowing Manfred’s regime. The Pope’s demands had been born out of necessity, 
not greed or avarice.
By spring 1255 Manfred had won contiol over most of Sicily, and began his 
siege of B r i n d i s i .4 4  in Apiil, a papal army, under the leadership of Ottaviano Ubaldim
37 Frank Tenckhoff, Papst Alexander IV. (Paderborii, 1907), 24-75 for much of the following.
38 Epistolae, III, nrs. 380, 382, Foedera, 11, 315.
39 RI,  nr. 8966.
40 Foedera, I, 316, 319.
41 Ibid., 316-8.
42 Baaken, lus Imperii, 397-8.
43 Tencklioff, Alexander IV., 39, Wachtel, ‘Die sizilische Thronkandidatur’, 113-4.
44 RI,  nrs. 4650d&e.
was disastrously b e a t e n . 4 5  Alexander IV found himself in a situation in which he 
required military help, and quickly. He could not accept Henry’s continuing 
prevarications. Furthermore, although he made stringent demands on die king’s purse, 
he also gave Henry El whatever assistance he could. Not only did he permit the King 
of England to commute his vow towards a campaign against Manfred, he also gave 
permission that the crusading moneys already collected be used for Sicily instead. In 
addition, the papal grant of a Twentieth from the Scottish Church was extended by 
another three y e a r s . 4 6  Moreover, other crusaders, such as the King of Norway, were 
requested to commute their vows from the Holy Land to S i c i l y . 4 7  The demands made 
of Henry El were m a n i f o l d , 4 8  but the sums requested were not impossible to muster. 
Sicily was renowned for its r i c h e s . 4 9  Although not too much credence should be given 
to the sums listed, Matthew Paris’ version of Frederick’s testament is nonetheless 
impressive. In all, the sums promised to various beneficiaries amounted to 1 2 0 , 0 0 0  
ounces of g o l d . 5 0  Nor should English resources be underestimated. Effectively, the 
money needed was little more than the ransom for Richard Lionheart in 1 1 9 6 , 5 1  and 
could have been collected had it been possible to apply similar means of extra taxation. 
Even witliout that, by 1 2 5 9 ,  nearly half of the required sums had been p a i d . 5 2  Had the 
reluctance of Henry’s English subjects to pay for the King’s plans been overcome, and 
in combination with Edmund’s anticipated Sicilian revenues, 1 3 5 , 0 0 0  marks seem a 
less incredible sum. In their contemporary context, Alexander’s conditions were 
reasonable, designed to solve the most urgent problems facing papal forces in Sicily, 
and to induce Henry IE to keep his promises.
It seemed as if the curia"s demands had achieved their desired success. In 
October 1 2 5 5  the Bishop of Bologna arrived and officially confirmed Edmund as King 
of S i c i l y . 5 3  Preparations were made for military action. A visit by Arnold, count of 
Guines, once amongst the great mercenary leaders of his time, may point in that 
d i r e c t i o n .5 4  This certainly was the case with Henry of Castile, Alfonso X’s younger
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brother, who arrived in England to lead a campaign to S i c i l y . 5 5  in addition, diplomatic 
contacts were made. These included negotiations with the King of France for an 
English army to pass through his d o m a i n s . 5 6  Also contacted were members of leading 
families in Rome, such as Matthew Annibaldi, the pro-consul of R o m e , 5 7  and with 
potential allies in Italy, such as M i l a n . 5 8  Henry III and his court thus worked hard to 
broaden their basis of support. At the same time, new difficulties arose. Thomas of 
Savoy, recently enthroned as prince of Capua, and one of the main pillars of English 
diplomacy in Italy, was captured by the citizens of A s t i . 5 9  Thus, Heniy found himself 
deprived one of his most able and experienced allies. This, and the French court’s 
reluctance to see an English army pass through Capetian territory caused yet another 
delay.
To make matters worse, Alexander IV lost patience. He repeatedly complained 
of the King’s slackness, and Henry was blamed for the many disasters besetting 
Christendom in Italy.60 This was more than mere rhetoric.61 Since the breakdown of 
negotiations in April 1255, Manfred had steadily expanded his authority towards 
central Italy.62 Naples offered its submission, and by June he effectively controlled 
the Terra di Lavorio, immediately to the south-west of the papal state.63 Moreover, 
Conradin confirmed Manfred as his captain and governor of Sicily, thus thwarting 
papal attempts at splitting the Hohenstaufen camp.64 in addition, several towns within 
the papal state rebelled against the curia. In Rome itself, Brancaleone, a staunch 
supporter of Frederick II and his sons and recently re-instated as senator, allied himself 
with Manfred.65 Alexander IV thus found himself in a situation in which he required 
military and financial assistance, and naturally looked to England. By September 
additional grants were made to alleviate the King’s financial difficulties,66 and the 
Bishop of Worcester was ordered to ensure that Heniy in declaie a definite date for liis 
arrival in Sicily.67 The Pope needed help, and he needed it soon.
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139Henry III, however, found himself unable to comply. His petitions for funds 
had been refused by the barons and clergy, and the King was forced to ask for an 
amelioration of terms, as he explahied to Alexander in 1256:
‘Nec enim credimus quod hodie princeps aliquid regnat in terris qui ita
subito tantam pecuniam posset habere ad m a n u m . ’ 6 8
Not only would he have to repay papal debts, he was also required to fund the costs of 
conquest. Heniy viewed these demands as impossible to meet, and asked for better 
conditions. These were granted in October 1 2 5 6 . 6 9  However, the King still seemed 
optimistic about fulfilling his obligations.70 It would be mistaken to view Henry’s 
complaints about his financial hardship as the beginning of the end of his Sicilian 
ambitions. Alexander IV was in a desperate situation, and it may have been possible 
that the English court tried to utilise this to alleviate some of the pressures to which it 
found itself exposed. As such, the King’s complaints may have been less a sign of 
royal frustration, than of bargaining.
This certainly is the impression given by the course of events in 1 2 5 7 .  Far 
from sending an expedition to the Mediterranean, as promised the year before, Henry 
continued to play for time. In Januaiy he wrote to the cardinal of St Maria in Via Lata 
that, due to the opposition he had encountered at a recent parliament, he could not 
cuiTeiitly pur sue tlie affairs of Apulia. He also blamed his difficulties on the harshness 
of the conditions he had been forced to agree to, and asked for an alleviation.71 By 
April, Master Rustand was ordered not to collect any more funds for the Sicilian 
Business, ‘as the King is not sure whether the business of Sicily ought to proceed or 
n o t ’ . 7 2  In June, the Archbishop of Tarentaise, Simon de Montfort, Peter of Savoy and 
John Maunsel were sent as proctors to the curial^  They brought with them detailed 
instructions. They were to ask either for a papal legate to arrange the desired peace 
with Louis IX, to make a composition with the Church, to ask for an amelioration of 
conditions, to renounce the said realm or to continue as b e f o r e . 7 4  At the same time,
Henry declared his willingness to pursue the conquest of Sicily, once peace with 
France had been agreed. If Henry III was considering reneging on his promises, he 
was insincere. While indicating to Alexander that it was possible for Henry to simply 
give up on Apulia, he continued contacts with Italy. A letter by Philip of Ravenna, a 
papal legate in Italy, implies that negotiations had been conducted with Venice.7 5
68 CR 1254-6, 404-6.
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Furthermore, the King repeatedly promised to send a captain to Sicily and to do so 
s o o n  76 Finally, when announcing Richard’s election to the curia, Henry expressed 
his hopes that the Earl would deal with the affair of Sicily in person, presumably while 
he would be in Rome to be crowned E m p e r o r . 7 7  The impression thus emerges that 
Henry III was still planning to conquer his son’s realm, but that he saw both an 
opportunity and a need to ameliorate tlie conditions under which the kingdom had been 
offered. Alexander IV, however, remained reluctant to comply, and insisted on the 
fulfilment of the conditions agreed upon in 1 2 5 5 .  His situation was made more 
difficult too, when, in May 1 2 5 7 ,  Brindisi, one of the last papal outposts in Apulia, 
was captured by M a n f r e d . 7 8  More than ever before, drastic and decisive action was 
needed.
This was to become a recurrent pattern. In early 1 2 5 8 ,  for instance, Heiiot, a 
papal notaiy, was sent to E n g l a n d . 7 9  He was authorised to excommunicate the King 
and his barons, should they not settle their outstanding debts towards the Holy See.^O 
Heniy was successful in his attempts to fight off the worst effects of Heiiot’s mission, 
and received an extension for his departure until the autumn. 81 In the meantime, the 
English court left little doubt about its intentions. The citizens of Teano were assured 
that the King would soon set sail, as was John of Ebulo, while matters concerning the 
Muslim colony at Lucera were discussed with Count Thomas of A c e r r a . 8 2  Even the 
Provisions of Oxford, which in the past have so often been described as sounding the 
death bell for Edmund’s Sicilian c a r e e r , 8 3  had little immediate impact. Writing to 
Alexander IV, Hemy declared that his barons had agreed to support him in Sicily, once 
the state of the realm had been reformed. He also used the opportunity to request a 
further mitigation of t e r m s . 8 4  Henry did not blame his inability to make true his 
promises on the barons until 1 2 6 1 , 8 5  when he complained that the barons had broken 
their promise of assisting him in pursuing the affairs of Sicily and A p u l i a .  8  6  To what 
extent these accusations were justified remains open to debate. It has to be taken 
account that Heniy’s grievances were presented to the Pope in an attempt to win papal 
absolution from the promises made in 1 2 5 8 .  Initially, though, as will be shown below, 
there was little reason to suspect baronial sabotage of the King’s Mediterranean
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141ambitions. In fact, although Alexander IV initially declared that he was to absolve 
Hemy III from all his promises concerning Sicily,87 dealings continued as usual. 8 8 
The conclusion of the Treaty of Paris in 1259 was announced as an important step 
towards an invasion of Sicily,89 knights from Apulia were received,90 and 
negotiations continued with the papal court.91 Various prelates and nobles in the 
kingdom were contacted,92 and even in 1262 funds were still handed out to loyal 
supporters,93 while Edmund restated his claim to Urban IV.94 By that point, 
however, negotiations with Manfred had broken down, and the Pope decided to solve 
the Hohenstaufen problem once and for all.95 Therefore, negotiations began with 
Charles of Anjou,96 and in July 1263 the Archbishop of Cosenza97 was sent to 
England to free Hemy III from any promise he had taken regarding the regno!^^ Soon 
after, Charles of Anjou was enthroned as King of Sicily, and quickly found himself 
confronted by problems similar to those which had beset Henry III.99 However, 
unlike die King of England he was not dependant on the good-will of Louis IX or diat 
of a restive baronage. Also, by being present in Italy, he exercised greater freedom of 
action and eventually managed to complete what Hemy and Edmund had set out to do: 
to drive the Hohenstaufens from Sicily.
The negotium Sicilie was an ambitious project. At the same time, it was no 
more fooUiardy or vainglorious than the attempted conquest of England by die Duke of 
Normandy in 1066, or that of France by a King of England in 1337. Henry made 
considerable progress in preparing the ground for his expedition diplomatically. He 
aiTanged a permanent settlement widi France, and he ensured his brother’s election as 
King of the Romans. Ultimately, the Sicilian Business foundered because of Henry’s 
failure to win support at home, and this is the point to which we should therefore turn 
next.
87 CM, Lib. Add., CM, VI, 410-6.
88 PRO SC 1/63.
89 CPR 1258-66, 52.
90 CLR 1251-60, 461. 483.
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VII.2 Sicily and England
The English court soon realised that finances were its biggest p r o b l e m .  1^0 
Although Henry increased his efforts at soliciting aids from his subjects, recent 
experiences, such as during the Gascon campaign, must have alerted him to the 
difficulties this would pose. Nonetheless, for April 1255 a parliament was called to 
Westminster. Henry III requested an aid and the levy of a long-forgotten tallage, 
horngelth. However, when the barons demanded reforms of the reahu in exchange, the 
meeting was postponed. 102 Consequently, more drastic measures had to be taken. 
Diuing a separate meeting at Reading, Heniy asked the prelates to affix their seals to a 
blank charter. 103 Soon after, the Bishop of Hereford and Robert Walerand were sent 
to the curia. Presenting the charters to Alexander IV, they suggested that this could be 
used to force a contribution from the prelates. The names of creditors and the sums 
‘owed’ were inserted, and the bishops and abbots threatened with excommunication 
should they refuse to pay. 104 The amounts demanded were considerable. St Albans 
was asked to contribute £400,105 the Bishop of Hereford himself 4,000 marks, 106 
and Oseney 200 mai’ks. 107 Matters were further aggravated by the actions of Rostand, 
a papal notary. Calling the English abbots and bishops to a meeting at London in 
October, he confronted the prelates with his demands. Dissenters were threatened by 
both King and Pope, who, according to Matthew Paris, acted ‘like shepherd and wolf 
allying to destroy the flock’. 108 The episcopacy was was further alienated by the fact 
tliat the English Church aheady contributed to the King’s planned crusade. 109 in early 
1256, however, new demands were made, including a tenth, the usufruct of vacant 
benefices, an universal obligation to pay up 150,000 marks worth of loans, half of the 
income from non-resident benefices, and the goods of those dying intestate. HO Both 
magnates and prelates objected.m Nonetheless, some progress was made. According 
to Matthew Paris, the barons declared their willingness to co-operate, once the King 
had confirmed Magna Carta. 112 It seems that Henry’s subjects were trying to use his 
predicaments to press for concessions. This resulted in some progress. During the 
Easter parliament 1257, the prelates agreed to a one-off aid of 52,000 marks, in
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exchange for the King’s promise that he would upkeep and observe Magna C a r t a .  H 3 
It needed two years of repeated meetings, and considerable papal pressure, before the 
barons and clergy were willing to contribute. This could only hinder preparations for 
an invasion of Sicily. In particular amongst the prelates who had to bear the brunt of 
obligations and contributions, hostility was ripe. In 1256, for instance, Henry had to 
command the barons of Dover to prevent any cleric from leaving the country for 
Rome, unless they had first sworn to undertake nothing to the detriment of the Sicilian 
a f f a i r .  H 4 Similarly, little enthusiasm could be incited amongst the barons. 
Alexander’s offer tliat crusading vows could be fulfilled by joining the King’s 
campaign against Manfred met with only a lukewarm r e c e p t i o n .  H 5 fact, the only 
case of a major noble receiving papal dispensation was Maurice FitzGerald, Henry’s 
former Justiciar in Ireland. H6 if Henry was enthusiastic about his prospects in Sicily, 
his subjects were not.
Their i-eluctance to support their King, however, was neither as unanimous as 
Matthew suggests, nor directed primarily against the negotium Sicilie. The affairs of 
Apulia were a symptom, not tlie cause of Henry’s fraught relations with his subjects, 
and money was only one amongst many grievances. This is exemplified by the 
complaints put before the King between 1256 and 1 2 5 8 .H7 Amongst them were the 
destmction and impoverishment of England by itinerant judges and various prises and 
oppressions, as well as the King’s and the kingdom’s poverty. Some of these 
complaints were familiar. In 1254, for instance, during the Gascon campaign, an aid 
had been refused, because, the barons claimed, the whole realm was beset by 
exactions, from which respite was n e e d e d .  H  8 More important were complaints 
concerning the King’s administration of justice, a point which was made whenever die 
obseiwance of Magna Caila was requested. The criticism allegedly made by Richard of 
Cornwall points in a similar direction: the Sicilian Business had been embarked upon 
without his or the barons’ c o u n s e l .  H9 That the King was to be guided and bound by 
his barons’ advice was an essential demand of both Magna Carta and the 
P r o v i s i o n s .  HO The complaints against the negotium Sicilie thus formed part of a 
wider and more general dissatisfaction with the way Henry III governed England. At 
the same time, it has to be taken into account tiiat most chronicles were written after
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1 2 5 8 ,  and may thus have been coloured by later events. This throws some doubt on 
tlie naiTative sources for much of the earlier discontent. Accounts like the one given by 
Annals o f Burton that, in 1 2 5 5 ,  the barons had demanded that Justiciai*, chancellor 
and treasurer be elected by the m a g n a t e s , H I seem suspiciously close to the demands 
of the Oxford p a r l i a m e n t .  H 2  Much of what we know about these years has been 
written with the benefit of hindsight, and may present events in the knowledge of 
things yet to come.
One should also beware of putting too much trust in reports of universal 
opposition towards the Sicilian Business. Even Matthew Paris, amongst the most 
persistent critics of the King’s plans, has to admit that no unified opposition could be 
put up against his proposals. In 1 2 5 5 ,  for instance, he blames divisions amongst the 
episcopate on the fact that most bishops were either the King’s appointees or his 
r e l a t i v e s .  H 3  ^  is time, though, that a number of prelates assisted Henry. In October 
1 2 5 6  the Abbot of Westminster and the elect of Salisbury are said to have acted as 
Henry’s proctors in R o m e . H 4  The Abbot of Westminster, interestingly, had to 
perform an oath that he would not undertake anything detrimental to his community 
while at the curia, probably in connection witli business he had to conduct concerning 
S i c i l y .  H 5 Similarly, Henry could count on a number of his barons, such as the Earls 
of Leicester, Gloucester and Warenne. Even Richard of Cornwall, despite some 
apprehension, came round to assist the King in his p r o j e c t .  H 6  By the autumn of 1 2 5 6  
at the latest, his support must have become evident. After all, Richard was willing to 
embark on a venture not dissimilar to his brother’s, and negotiated for his election as 
King of the Romans. Although opposition to the Sicilian Business existed, it was 
divided, with a considerable number of prelates and magnates in support of the King.
The most fervent criticism Richard is said to have made was directed at the 
King’s decision to embark on the Sicilian affair without his barons’ counsel. Henry 
certainly did not call a parliament or a larger assembly of magnates to discuss 
proceedings, and he relied heavily on his foreign relatives and court officials for 
advice. In November 1255, for instance, the witnesses to a memorandum that all 
provisions concerning Sicily had been made with the King’s assent and in his council, 
included the Bishop of Hereford, the Bishop-elect of Winchester, Godfrey de 
Lusignan, the Earls of Hereford and Warwick, John Maunsel, Philip Lovel, Ralph
121 Ibid., AM, I, 336.
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his brother was equally unsuccessful: Ibid., V, 520-1, 524. It would be mistaken, tliough, to view tliis 
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145FitzNicholas, and Henry de B a t h o n i a . H 7  pierre der Aigueblanche, Bishop of 
Hereford, was prominent in the administration of the King’s Sicilian affairs, and was, 
like William de Valence, the elect of Winchester, and Godfrey de Lusignan one of the 
King’s h a l f - b r o t h e r s .H 8 The Earls of Gloucester and Warwick were the only 
representatives of the English magnates, with Richard de Clare soon to take a more 
active role in the King’s affairs. John Maunsel was one of Henry’s must trusted 
advisors and the closest he had to a chief-diplomat, while Philip Lovel was Henry's 
treasurer. Ralph FitzNicholas had been of some importance in the 1235 marriage 
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  H9 The council, on this occasion, thus included a (small) number of 
barons, but mostly the King’s relatives and officials. A similar pattern can be observed 
with regal'd to those who later came to be involved in the Sicilian Business. These 
included, at various stages, Peter of S a v o y , HO peter Chaceporc,H l .Robert 
Walerand, the chancellor Henry de W e n g h a m H 2 ^  and Simon de M o n t f o r t .  H3 Most 
of tliese were either the King’s officials, or, like Simon de Montfort, Peter of Savoy 
and Peter Chaceporc, were foreign lords who also held lands in England. This may 
have been appropriate inasmuch as those were the people who could provide either the 
expertise or the loyalty necessary to prepare a project like the conquest of S i c i l y .  H 4 
However, this fell short of the broad consultation envisaged by Magna Carta, and it 
did little to help an undertaking which could only be achieved with the whole-hearted 
support of the King’s subjects.
The Sicilian Business was to assume considerable importance for the political 
development of England. Although it would be mistaken to blame the Provisions of 
Oxford solely on the King’s Mediterranean ambitions, they remain amongst the 
contributing factors. David Carpenter has argued convincingly that one reason for 
events during the Oxford parliament was increasing exasperation with the King’s 
Lusignan r e l a t i v e s .  H 5 The leaders of the reform movement, as well as some of the 
clauses in the Provisions were concerned with the King’s patronage of his half- 
brothers, and may have been aimed at preventing their reinstatement. However, this 
still does not explain why action was taken in 1258, rather than at any other time. We 
also have to take into account that during spring and summer 1258 England was beset
127 CR 1254-6, 240.
128 CR 1256-9, 462-3. On tlie King's patfonage of his Lusignan relatives, Huw Ridgeway, ‘Foreign 
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by famine, war and the threat of i n t e r d i c t .  H 6 The two parliaments called that year, 
first at Westminster and then at Oxford, were primarily concerned with averting the 
King’s excommunication. In March, Heiiot, a papal notary, had arrived from the 
curia, demanding that Henry pay his outstanding debts, and set sail to Sicily s o o n .  1 3 7  
How serious that threat was remains a matter of conjecture. The King himself certainly 
seems to have viewed it with some apprehension. Matthew Paris reports that Simon 
Passelewe was sent to various abbeys to ensure additional funds to meet the legate’s 
d e m a n d s .  1 3 8  in combination with Henry Ill’s failure to keep his repeated promises of 
observing Magna Carta, his obstruction of justice in favour of his Lusignan half- 
brothers, and the political disasters threatening England as a result of this, may have 
contributed to a feeling that urgent measures had to be taken. The more so, as Herlot’s 
demand were made at a time when England was plagued by f a m i n e .  1 3 9  Conditions 
were serious enough to make Richard of Cornwall send provisions from G e n n a n y . 1 4 0  
Under tliese circumstances, additional financial demands could have aroused little 
enthusiasm. More importantly, the instability of relations with Scotland, and a 
rebellion in Wales threatened the realm. 141 An insurrection led by Llywelyn ap 
Gruffudd since 1256 had left English control in shambles. Several campaigns had 
ended either m defeat or equally inglorious stalemate. We have to keep in mind that one 
of the points on teh agenda of the 1258 Oxford Parliament had been to muster troops 
for a Welsh campaign. Combined with increasing tensions between the Lusignans and 
other members of the King’s inner circle, it was only a matter of time before these 
problems combined. Although complaints about Sicily formed part of the grievances 
brought forth in 1258, the primaiy target had not been the Sicilian Business itself, but 
the King’s disregard for Magna Carta, his financial demands, his patronage of the 
Lusignans, and his failure in Wales. The baronial rebellion put an end to the Sicilian 
Business, but its demise was accidental ratlier Üian intentional. However, it was not aU 
doom for Henry III. His diplomatic preparations were amongst the most successful 
projects of his reign, and laid the foundation both for the ultimate recovery of royal 
authority in 1265, and for his and Ms family’s continuing role in Europe.
VII.3 The European Connection
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When, in 1258, tlie English bai'ons gave their reasons for opposing the Sicilian 
Business, they criticised, amongst other things, the fact that Henry would have to pass 
through hostile lands, i.e. France, to reach I t a l y .  H2 This was a pessimistic, but apt 
reflection of realities. Despite his best efforts, Henry IB remained unable to reach a 
permanent settlement with Louis IX. The existing truce was subject to repeated 
infringements, requiring hectic diplomatic activity to patch over still fragile 
r e l a t i o n s .  143 However, witliout at least tacit support from France, an English invasion 
of Sicily was unlikely to proceed. Henry El was well aware of this. Two days after 
Alexander’s confirmation of Edmund’s elevation as King of Sicily, Simon de Montfort 
and Peter of Savoy had been sent to France to prolong the truce. 144 This continued 
earlier efforts, undertaken by the King himself, 145 and remained at the heart of 
English diplomacy over the following years. 146 in fact, the unsettled state of affairs 
with France was frequently cited as the reason for a delay in the King’s departure for 
Sicily. 147 English relations with the Capetians were of concern not only to the papacy 
and the English court, but also to other rulers. Alfonso of Castile, for instance, sent 
envoys to facilitate a peace agreement. 148 To him peace between Henry and Louis 
must have been an essential precondition for further action in North Africa. However, 
all these efforts came to notliing. For 1256, the Chronica Maiora report a parliamentimi 
at Paris. Representing Henry III, John Maunsel requested a safe-conduct for an 
English army to pass tlirough France on its way to Sicily. However, the St Albans 
chi'onicler continued, the petition was refused. 149 That the English envoy also pressed 
for a restitution of Normandy and Anjou will have done little to assuage French 
suspicions as to the hostile intents underlying Henry’s diplomacy in the 
Mediterranean. 150 English fears as to the effect this might have on the Sicilian 
Business are highhghted by a letter from Hemy III to Ins proctor at the curia in sprmg 
1256. He warned of French conspiracies, wliich, if successful, could jeopardise the 
Sicilian Business. 151 Relations between the two countries were still beset by mutual 
distrust.
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Partly in response to his lack of success in France, Henry HI tried to strengthen 
links with William of Holland. Once the Sicilian venture had been embarked upon, 
missions to and from the Empire increased in frequency. In February 1255, Jean de 
Avesnes sent two envoys to the English c o u r t .  H 2 One of his agents was still in 
England by J u n e ,  H 3 and was joined by another messenger in O c t o b e r .  H 4 
November, the Dukes of Luxembourg and Limburg came to E n g l a n d .  H5 The English 
court was, thus, contacted by some of the foremost members of William’s entourage. 
This time, however, it seems as if German overtures were returned. In August 1255, 
for the first time in almost ten years, Hemy III sent an envoy to G e r m a n y ,  which 
was followed, in October, by the mission of Prior John o f  N e w b u r g h .  H7 The exact 
purpose of these embassies remains obscure. It would seem plausible, though, to 
assume that the affairs of Sicily featured in negotiations. After William’s death, for 
instance, one of the reasons given for English involvement in German affairs was that 
only a King favourably disposed to English interests, and unswayed by pressure from 
France, could safeguard success in S i c i l y .  H 8 Another consideration may have been 
the need to isolate the Hohenstaufen in Sicily from those in the Empire. It is hard to 
think of an outcome which could have been more harmful to Henry’s Mediterranean 
ambition than the election of Conradin as King of the Romans and Emperor-to-be. 
There is no reason to doubt that similar deliberations had guided these earlier 
c o n t a c t s .  H 9  However, any hope that these dealings would result in a swift 
arrangement, were shattered when William was killed in January 1 2 5 6 . HO
Henry III immediately set out to influence the imminent election of a new 
K i n g . H I In the end, William was to be succeeded by Richard of Cornwall, a fact 
which has influenced most studies of English involvement in Germany over the 
following m o n t h s .  H 2 initially, though, the Earl had not even been amongst the
148
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c a n d i d a t e s .  H3 r  was not until after the candidacies of the Count of H e n n e b e r g , H 4  
Margrave Otto of B r a n d e n b u r g ,  H 5  and the King of Bohemia had failed, that Richard 
entered the field. H6 He was a last resort, witli the earliest evidence for his candidacy 
surviving from late November 1 2 5 6 . H7 Until then, the English court had been content 
with tiying to influence the outcome of the election, rather than supporting a particular 
candidate. A first step was taken in February, when William Bonquer was accredited 
as Henry Ill’s envoy to the cwria.HS March and April he received a commission, 
ordering him to request papal support in ensuring that no one be elected King of the 
Romans who would pose a threat to the Sicilian B u s i n e s s .  H 9  To achieve this, 
Alexander IV was to send a legate to Germany. The connection with the negotium 
Sicilie was further emphasised by the King’s promise to pay his remaining debts, and 
either to go himself or to send a representative to Apulia soon. However, that would be 
impossible, unless favourable conditions had first been created. The Pope, though, 
was reluctant to comply. All he was willing to do was to write to the Archbishop of 
Mainz in July that no Hohenstaufen was to be elected King of the R o m a n s .  HO The 
English court, thus, had to take measures into its own hands. In June 1256 Robert 
Walerand and Richard de Clare were sent ‘to all the princes of Almain’, who were 
asked to listen carefully to the message they were to c o n v e y . H I it would be mistaken 
to view this as an early indication of Richard’s c a n d i d a c y .  H 2 At the time, llieir main 
concern was with the Sicilian Business. Robert Walerand, the King’s steward, was 
generally considered to be amongst the driving forces behind the Sicilian B u s i n e s s ,  H3 
and Richard de Clare, tlie Earl of Gloucester, was amongst the King’s most trusted 
advisors, and repeatedly involved in the affairs of the r e g n o .  H 4 At this point, the 
English court was primaiily concerned with ensuring tlie necessary diplomatic contacts 
for a successful crossing to Sicily. Any Gennan prince would do, as long as he was 
not hostile to English ambitions. To achieve tliis, Henry did not confine himself merely 
to sending envoys. John de Avesnes became a regular and richly rewarded visitor to 
the English court, hi April, John received part of his annual fee of now £2 0 0 . H 5 The
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fee was collected by his brother Baldwin, and by John de G a s t e l l o .  H 6 The latter 
seems to have returned by the end of June, shortly after the English mission had been 
announced to G e r m a n y . H 7 Henry’s court was trying to ensure the support and 
assistance of those once close to the deceased King to further its interests in the 
election of William’s successor. That it ignored traditional allies, such as tlie Duke of 
Brunswick, may be connected to the fact that they were not amongst the electors, as 
was probably known in E n g l a n d .  H8 Henry’s primary concern in his dealings with 
Germany was to safeguard his Apulian a m b i t i o n s . H 9 in 1256 de Clare’s and 
Walerand’s main objective had been not to obtain yet another apanage for a Plantagenet 
prince, but to ensure what Louis IX had refused to grant, i.e. unhindered access to
S i c i l y .  1 8 0
After all these missions failed, more decisive action had to be taken. In 
November 1256 the Count Palatine of the Rhineland and Duke of Bavaria, and in 
December the Archbishop of Cologne promised to elect Richard of Cornwall King of 
the Romans, with the Aichbishop of Mainz following suit later. 181 Henry soon tried 
to utilise his brother’s election for the affairs of Apulia. During the Christmas 
paiiiament at Westminster in 1256, Richai'd’s elevation was used in an attempt to woo 
the English barons. 182 While the parliament was in session, envoys from Germany 
arrived, 183 bringing news that Richard had been elected King of the Romans. 184 
When offered the crown, the Earl gave the required display of humility, 185 and
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151refused. Eventually, he was swayed by advice which was dhected as much at him as at 
the assembled nobles and clergy. He was exhorted not to follow the example of Robert 
Curthose, who had refused the crown of Jerusalem. For this act of pride God 
punished him, and he was pursued by misfortunes ever after. The moral conveyed by 
this counsel was that refusing to seize honours and dignities once they had been 
offered was a sin against the will of God. Richard had been singled out by divine 
favour, and it would be presumptuous to act contrary to His w i l l . H 6  j f  this was true 
for the Earl of Cornwall becoming King of tlie Romans, it must have been true also for 
Henry’s son becoming King of Sicily. Henry continued to exploit the parallel. A 
parliament was called to coincide with the Earl’s departure for G e i m a n y , H 7  and was 
combined with Edmund’s formal coronation as King of S i c i l y . H 8 Richard, too, 
continued to support his brother’s projects. Once in Germany, he wrote to the prince 
E d w a r d ,  189 the Archbishop of M e s s i n a ,  190 the mayor and citizens of London, 191 
and the Bishop o f  L i n c o l n ,  192 extolling his great successes, his warm reception, and 
the ease with which he overcame those opposing him. As these letters were found in 
various chronicles, they probably had been intended for a wider circulation. They 
painted a glorious picture of English successes abroad and may have been aimed not 
only at calming fears concerning the risks of the Sicilian Business, but also at inciting 
much needed enthusiasm. More importantly, they conveyed the message that 
opposition could easily eb overcome, without much military effort, once a King 
appeared abroad.
The Earl of Cornwall’s success in the Empire also initiated swift progress in 
relations with France. Even before Richai’d had left for Germany, contacts with Louis 
IX were r e n e w e d .  193 This eventually resulted in a meeting between English, French 
and German proctors at Cambrai in November 1 2 5 8 , 1 9 4  laying the foundations for
Farmer (eds. and trans. ), Magna Vita Sancti Hugonis: the Life o f St Hugh o f Lincoln, 2 vols., 
(London, 1961), I, 35 In the context of twelfth century Canterbury tliis has been discussed by Michael 
Staunton, ‘Eadmer’s Vita Anselmi: a reinteipretation, JMH xxiii (1997), 1-14, at 4-5; Marylou Ruud, 
“‘Unwortliy servants”: tlie rhetoric of resignation at Canterbury, 1070-1170’, Journal o f Religious 
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186 Mattliew Paris certainly was aware of tlie implications this would have for tlie Sicilian business. 
Consequently, he emphasises the close familiarity between the English and the Germans, the fact tliat 
Richaid had many friends in the Empire, and that he was chosen by the people: CM, V, 603. All of 
which were points which he criticised tlie King for not possessing in his conquest of Sicily: Ibid., 
457-9.
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152what was to become the treaty o f  P a r i s .  195 The final agreement set to rest the ancient 
conflict over Normandy, Anjou and Poitou, with Henry surrendering his claims, and 
doing homage for Gascony. This paved the way for English ambitions in the 
Mediterranean. One clause stipulated that Louis IX was to assist Henry HI either with 
500 knights for two years or with 1,000 for o n e .  196 in a separate document, evoking 
tlie tone and spirit of the Treaty of Catania between Frederick II and Philip Augustus,
Richard suggested an alliance of mutual support and assistance. 197 This, at last, paved 
the way diplomatically for Henry’s planned conquest of Apulia. It would be mistaken, 
however, to view the document as an act of disinterested generosity on Louis’ part. 
Although he had gained acceptance of Capetian rule in what had once been Henry m ’s 
inheritance, he was now faced with the prospect of Plantagenet rule in Geiinany and 
Sicily. Moreover, Richard was on his way to being crowned Emperor and looked set 
to establish his authority across the Empire. 198 The Treaty of Paris was as much an 
acknowledgement by Henry III that there was little hope of ever regaining Normandy 
or Poitou, as it was an attempt by Louis IX to avoid being placed between two hostile 
neighbours. 199 At the same time, it symbolises tlie shift in English attentions, away 
from the remnants of the Angevin Empire towards the new opportunities offering 
themselves in die MediteiTanean.
Richard’s election, however, had repercussions not only for English relations 
with France, but also for those with Iberia. After all, the Earl of Cornwall was not the 
only one to be elected King of the Romans. For m April 1257 the Archbishop of Trier, 
acting on behalf of the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Saxony and the Margraves of 
Brandenburg, had chosen Alfonso X of Castile.200 Even earlier, in June 1256,
Alfonso of Castile’s proctors had agreed with the commune of Pisa that they elect him 
E m p e r o r . 2 0 1  Whether the English court was aware of this remains an open question. 
Matthew Paris, for one, pleads ignorance and accuses tlie German envoys to England 
of having kept Alfonso’s candidacy s e c r e t . 2 0 2  Although Alfonso later complained that
^95 Pierre Chaplais, ‘The making of tlie Treaty of Paiis and the royal style’, EHR Ixvii (1952), 235- 
253; Powicke, King Heniy HI, 247-52; I. J, Sanders, ‘The texts of the Treaty of Paiis, 1259’, EHR 
Ixvi (1951), 81-97.
^96 This seems to have been part of negotiations from an eaily stage. Cf. Hemy’s letter to Alexander 
IV from 30 July 1258, CR 1256-9, 325-6.
197 AI, m*. 564.
198 Barbiche, Les Actes Pontificaux (Vatican, 1975), nr. 1001.
199 This formed, of course, part of his crusading preparations. A similar settlement of a long-standing 
territorial dispute had been achieved in 1258 with Aragon in the treaty of Corbeil: Layettes, nrs. 4439- 
4400, 4411-2, 4433-5; Jordan, Louis IX, 199-200. For tlie place of the Treaty of Paris in tlie 
diplomacy of Henry III and his successors up to tlie beginning of the Hundred Years War: O.P. 
Cuttino, English medieval Diplomacy (Bloomington, 1985), 54-83.
Annales Wormatienses, MGH SS xvii, 59. They were later to be joined by tlie King of Bohemia, 
who, however, was also negotiating with Richard: cf. chapter VIII.
201 Constitutiones, nrs. 392-5. The best account remains Arnold Busson, Die Doppelwahl des Jahres 
1257 und das rOmische Kaiserthum Alfons X  von Castilien (Münster, 1866); tliis also forms the basis 
for Cayetano J. Socarras, Alfonso X  of Castile: a study on imperialistic fi'ustration (Barcelona, 1976); 
for a modem account: O’Callaghan, The Learned King, 198-213.
202 CM, V, 657.
Richard had ignored the earlier Castilian negotiations, he stayed clear of accusing 
Henry of thwarting his Imperial a m b i t i o n s .  ^ ^3 At the same time, throughout 1 2 5 6 ,  
envoys had been sent to or received from C a s t i l e , 2 0 4  and in late January 1 2 5 7 ,  
English envoys were sent to Spain, Gascony, Germany and G o t l a n d . 2 0 5  As this 
happened so shortly after Richard’s election, one may assume that it was amongst the 
issues discussed. However, there is little indication that this may have been an attempt 
to assuage Alfonso. In late January 1 2 5 7 ,  Henry III thanked the Bishop of Hereford 
for his efforts in arranging a treaty with Alfonso, and mentioned, more in passing, 
Richard’s e l e c t i o n . 2 0 6  Henry even provided a vessel for a Castilian envoy to 
N o r w a y . 2 0 7  Simultaneously, negotiations continued for the planned African Crusade, 
with Henry renewing his solemn promise to support the King of Castile with troops, 
ships and f u n d s . 2 0 8  There were, thus, sufficiently regular contacts to assume that the 
English court may have heard of Alfonso’s ambitions. However, it has to be taken into 
account tliat Alfonso himself did not publicise his new found dignity. He did not begin 
to issue grants for Germany until September 1257,^^9 and his contacts in the Empire 
were initially confined to Pisa and M a r s e i l l e s . Furthermore, Alfonso may have had 
good reason to keep his ambitions secret from the English court. The treaty with Pisa 
guaranteed the commune’s rights in Sicily, should Alfonso, his son or their 
representative conquer the regno. T o  what extent this reflected Castilian intentions 
remains unclear. Alfonso had little to gain from alienating Henry. Pisa, on the other 
hand, continued to pose a threat. In 1 2 5 8  several of his Sicilian subjects warned 
Edmund that Genoa and Pisa were conspiring to conquer the i s l a n d . 2 1 2  should Henry 
n i  have been aware of this, it may have given added urgency to English diplomacy in 
Germany, and may hold the key to understand Henry’s seeming disregard for his 
Castilian ally.
At the same time, the King of England tried to avoid being drawn into the 
internal squabbles of Spain. Several offers made by Alfonso’s estranged father-in-law, 
Jaime of Aragon, were turned down. Relations between the two rulers were far from 
c o r d i a l . 2 1 3  They repeatedly clashed over Navaire and Murcia, and eyed each other’s 
moves suspiciously. The conflict at vaiious points threatened to involve both Capetians
153
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154and Plantagenets. In early 1 2 5 5 ,  for instance, Alfonso asked Henry that his Gascon 
subjects assist him against his Aragonese f o e . 2 1 4  Although there is no record of 
Henry complying, he also refused to enter into an alliance with Jaime against Castile.
In December 1255 Henry thanked the King of Aragon for his offer of an alliance, and 
promised to send an envoy by next P e n t e c o s t . ^  H  Little seems to have come out of 
tliis, and the King of England remained reluctant to abandon Alfonso. In fact, in April 
1256 Henry III suggested yet another maniage to Alfonso, this time between 
Alfonso’s brother and one of Henry’s d a u g h t e r s . ^ H  in June 1257, after Richard’s 
election had brought into the open his conflict with Alfonso, another Aragonese 
embassy was received. However, Henry III insisted that he was not willing to break 
any of the clauses agreed upon in his truce with A l f o n s o . ^  H  Even after Castilian 
claims to the Empire had caused a cooling of relations,718 Henry saw little reason to 
abandon his alliance with Alfonso. This was done probably not only with an eye on 
G a s c o n y , 219 but also on the danger Castilian hostility might pose to English projects 
in the MediteiTanean.
In many ways, tire Sicilian Business further developed an already existing 
trend in English diplomacy: its re-orientation towards the South. This did not stop at 
creating a permanent settlement with France or safe-guaiding relations with Castile.
The necessity to protect English claims in Apulia led to a quest for a l l i e s . 2 2 0  e i  June 
1 2 5 6 ,  for instance, a clerk from the Queen of Cyprus arrived in E n g l a n d . ^ 2 1  
Negotiations soon centred around a planned double-marriage between Edmund and 
Queen Plaisance, and between Henry’s daughter Beatrice and the infant King of 
C y p r u s . 2 2 2  r  seems that tlie project had been supported by at least some members of 
the cwna.223 An alliance with Cyprus would have been profitable, not only for 
Henry’s affairs in the Mediterranean, but also for his crusade. Not only had the 
island’s rulers been regents of Jerusalem since 1 2 4 2 ,  they also were to provide the 
basis for most of the crusading ventures undertaken in the later Middle Ages.^^4 Their 
geographical position made them one of the most formidable Christian outposts in the 
Levant. If successful, the Plantagenets would thus not only have ruled Cyprus, but 
also most of the Eastern M e d i t e i T a n e a n . ^ 2 5  many ways, this was not dissimilar to
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225 Lloyd, ‘Hemy IIP, 115, is, however, going too far in assuming that Edmund could actually have 
exercised the regency on behalf of his intended step-son cum brother-in-law (quite apart from tlie 
canonical implications this might have had). He himself was only ten years old at tlie time.
Frederick IFs policies^^6 or to Charles of Anjou’s actions after he had seized the 
rggMo.227 However, the marriage failed to materialise. At the same time, it had been 
only one amongst several projects. Also in 1256, the Archbishop of Tarentaise and 
Master Rustand received plenary powers to arrange a marriage for Edmund.^^8 
Support from within the college of cardinals was enlisted. That these marriage plans 
were directed at the regno itself is implied by the presence of an Apulian knight in 
England at the t i m e . 2 2 9  who exactly tliis prospective spouse was is revealed in a letter 
by Master Rustand to Henry III, in which he repeated the advice of an unnamed 
cardinal, that a marriage between Edmund and one of Manfred’s daughters could 
salvage Henry Ill’s prospects.HO it seems unlikely that Alexander IV would have 
supported such plans, and this may have been one of the reasons why the marriage 
was never finalised. Nonetheless, the episode helps to illustrate both the divisions 
within the papal curia at the time, and that many still thought Henry capable of 
providing the leadership necessary to replace Manfred as King of Sicily.231
Henry’s court had shown both imagination and pragmatism in pursuing its 
ambitions. In many ways, the negotium Sicilie continued trends which had been 
visible since the early 1240s, and brought to a culmination English efforts at finding a 
new sphere of influence, away from Normandy and Poitou towards the* MediteiTanean, 
Outremer and Iberia. Its impact proved momentous. It brought the King’s brother onto 
the German throne and found a settlement for relations with France which, despite 
some unease, was to last until 1337. When tlie Sicilian Business failed, it did so, not 
because Henry III and his council had been unable to build up the necessaiy support 
abroad, but because they had been unable to convince those who really mattered, that 
is the King’s English subjects.
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156Chapter VIII 
The Reign o f King Richard 
(1257-72)
In January 1257 Richard of Cornwall was elected King of tlie Romans. In many 
ways Henry III had thus at last found a ruler of Germany sympathetic to English 
interests. However, circumstances had changed. The conquest of Normandy or Poitou 
was no longer an option. The establishment of a cadet branch of Plantagenets in the 
Mediterranean had taken precedence. This turned out a blessing for Richard. After 
peace had been airanged with France in 1259, the Earl was free to seek his coronation 
as Emperor from the Pope without having to worry about French support for rival 
candidates. Alfonso X was marginalised, while the surviving Hohenstaufen were 
unable to pose much of a challenge.
At the same time, despite Ms best efforts, Richard remained an English magnate. 
This, too, was to prove a blessing, as well as a curse. His wealth and status had 
enabled him to pursue Ms candidacy, but, in the end, tlie baronial rebellion in England 
was to put an end to his Imperial ambitions, not Conradin or the Ghibellines. Despite 
the political turmoil he encountered at home, in Germany Richard remained 
unchallenged. In fact, he even managed to win over most of those who had initially 
sided with Alfonso. His policies and administration laid the foundations upon which 
his successor, Rudolf of Habsburg, was to build.
VIII.1 Securing the Throne (1257-9)1
Richard was no newcomer to Imperial politics. He had been appointed to 
represent Henry III at Vaucouleurs in 1236/7,^ and unsuccessfully tried to mediate 
between Frederick and Gregory IX in 1241 .3  Both Emperor and Pope had looked to 
him for support.^ However, the Earl rejected their overtures, as well as papal offers to 
make him King of Sicily.^ But developments in southern Italy and his brotlier’s needs 
made him change his mind in 1256/7. Henry IB required an ally who would safeguard 
not only English interests in the Mediterranean, but also ensure the safe passage of 
troops to Sicily. In addition, personal motivations should not be excluded. Matthew 
Paris, although not always an unprejudiced observer, reported that the Pope had 
offered Sicily to Richard in 1252, knowing that the Earl 'laboured insatiably, like 
someone suffering from drospy, to acquire riches and temporal dignities'.^ When, in
1 The best secondaiy coverage of Richard’s early reign remahis Johann Ferdinand Bappert, Richard von 
Cornwall seit seiner Wahl zum deutschen Kd'nig, 1258-1272 (Bonn, 1905), 3-36.
2 CM, III, 393.
3 Ibid., Ill, 471-2; IV, 145-8.
4 Ibid., IV, 569-75, 577-8; V, 111-2, 117-8, 201.
5 Ibid., V, 346-7, 457.
6 Ibid., V, 346-7.
1571250, Richard was approached about the Latin Empire of Constantinople, this was 
done with the knowledge of his 'greed and ambition'. Richard was called upon notnonly because of his great wealth, but also because of his abundant vanity. Becoming 
King of the Romans was a first step towards being made Emperor, and Richard may 
have seen tliis as a fulfihnent of his quest for gloiy and power.
As far as his German supporters were concerned, Richard could offer what 
none of the other claimants could - a career untainted by the internal squabbles and 
rivalries of German politics. In addition, unlike Alfonso of Castile, he was not tied up 
by the affaiis of a realm he had to govern already. Moreover, as a candidate who had 
shown his support for Frederick II, while at the same time avoiding being drawn into 
the papal-imperial conflict, Richard could present himself as a non-partisan ruler. He 
was not yet another anti-Hohenstaufen King. This may explain tlie support he received 
from the Count Palatine. At the same time, this offered Louis an opportunity to end the 
political isolation into which he had been brought by his wife’s execution.8 The 
symboHsm of having Conradin’s guardian and effective leader of the Hohenstaufen in 
Geimany on his side, should not be underestimated, hi the case of Archbishop Conrad 
of Cologne, the underlying motivation was probably the chance to re-assert his once 
dominant position in Germany. From 1255 onwards, he and William had repeatedly 
clashed over policy, culminating in a bungled attempt at assassinating the King and a 
papal legate in 1255.9 By the time of Richard’s election, the prelate was still under 
excommunication, and one of the promises Richard had to make was that he would 
exert his influence with the curia to restore peace between legate and Archbishop.
Thus, the Earl’s election may have been viewed as a solution to many of the problems 
previously besetting German politics, while at the same time ensuring his electors’ 
retmm to power and influence.
Richard’s approach was markedly different from his brother’s, as he took great 
care to ensure a sufficiently strong basis of support. This can partly be explained by a 
political system fundamentally different from die one Henry encountered in Sicily. No 
candidate had emerged as clear front-runner to fill the vacuum left by William, and 
there was no feudal overlord who could simply confer the kingdom on whoever he 
f a v o u r e d .  H  Richard had to ensure that at least some hnpeiial princes were willing to 
elect him before he could put forth his claims. This had been achieved in November 
1256, when Jean de Avesnes and tlie Bishop of Cambrai, acting as Richard‘s proctors, 
concluded a treaty with Louis, Count Palatine of the Rhineland and Duke of Bavaria.
In exchange for 12,000 marks Louis would support Richard‘s candidacy for the 
German throne. Richard had to promise that he would not hinder the claims of 
Frederick IE’s grandson Conradin to the kingdoms of Sicily and Jerusalem or to the
7 Ibid., V, 112.
8 Redlich, ‘Wiener Biiefsammlung’, ni*. 4.
9 RI, nr. 5213a.
9^ This point was also pressed by Matthew Paris: CM, V, 601-3.
11duchy of Swabia. In December Conrad of Hochstaden, Archbishop of Cologne,
too, agreed to vote for Richard. He was promised 8000 marks and a decisive role in 
12the new government. The Aichbishop of Mainz, at that point held captive by the
Duke of Brunswick, was to be paid another 8000 marks if he declared himself for 13Richard. Thus, the Earl could rightly claim to be supported by three of the most 
powerful and influential princes of the Empire. More importantly, unlike Alfonso, 
whose claims rested on his proclamation by Pisa and Marseilles, the Earl was to be 
elected by princes ‘in whose power it was to elect the King of the Romans’, as a later 
phrase runs.H
The fact that Richard paid considerable sums of money to his supporters has
often been commented u p o n . H  However, offering financial rewards to one’s
supporters was not at all unusual in the context of thirteentli century Germany.
Richard’s generosity pales in comparison with that of later candidates: in 1292, the
electors of Mainz and Cologne received 20,000 and 25,000 marks respectively, in
1298, 40,000 marks were paid to the elector of Bohemia. Even Frederick II had
paved his way to Germany with money, and Rudolf of Habsburg was to pawn17Imperial lands and cities to reward his supporters. All that was unusual about 
Richard’s candidature was that his agreements had been put into writing, a procedure 
made necessary by his being, unlike his predecessors, an absent candidate who had to 
negotiate tlirough proctors.
In addition to securing a basis of support, soundings were taken as to the 
situation in Germany. In January 1257 the Earl of Gloucester, acting on Richard’s 
behalf, travelled to the R l i i n e l a n d . H  Even then Richard d i d  not cross to Germany. He 
waited until the Easter parliament, when the Archbishop of Cologne arrived in England 
to report the Earl’s e l e c t i o n .  1 9  Only then were preparations made for his departure. 
Ships were requisitioned,^^ Richard appointed proctors during his absence^l and a 
formal treaty of friendship was concluded between the newly elected King of the
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Romans and his b r o t h e r . I n  the meantime, sufficient funds had been s e c u r e d ^ 3  and 
Richard was freed of some of his feudal obligations.24 The Earl’s preparations were 
circumspect and wide-ranging. Not only did he ensure sufficient support in Germany, 
but also that he had enough funds to maintain it.
The Earl's entourage was kept deliberately small. The safe-conducts issued list 
no more than 50 n a m e s . Furthermore, most of them were valid only until 
Michaelmas 1257, Tliis takes die sting out of Matthew Paris’s comment that Richard’s 
English knights were sent home because the Germans did not want to be ruled by 
f o r e i g n e r s . ^ 6  His visit was certainly not planned to be an invasion, which would have 
been neither desirable, nor necessary. Richai'd’s progress through Germany had to be 
effortless in order to be successful. Excessive use of force would have helped neither 
the Eai'l nor his brother. After all, by the time of Richard’s departure in early May, 
Alfonso’s rival candidacy was known in England, as well as Germany and at the 
curia.^^ Therefore, Richard had to convince his brother’s English subjects, those in 
Germany who were still undecided in their allegiance, and ultimately the Pope, with 
whom the decision rested who to crown Emperor, that he was the only legitimate 
claimant. Alfonso’s pretension had to be unveiled as such, and the best way of doing 
so was by regaiding them with ostentatious disregai d. That this was a consideration is 
underlined by some of Richard’s letters back home, as well as to the citizens of Rome 
and members of the curia, all of which emphasise the ease with which he found 
himself accepted all across G e r m a n y .28 Similarly, this would explain statements as in 
Richard’s letter to the Lord Edward, describing the Archbishop of Mainz’s martial 
exploits. Richai'd’s wish that England, too, might have such wai-like p r e l a t e s , ^ 9  was 
less an expression of naivete on his part,30 than an illustration of the strength and 
power of his supporters.
This is not to say that Richard bluffed. He was too experienced to venture into 
Germany without assuring himself of reliable supporters. Well before his arrival, the 
Archbishop of Cologne had undertaken the siege of the town of Boppard, the most
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stubborn of Richard’s opponents. He did not lack arms and men when he needed 
them. The Earl relied on a mixture of symbolic gestures and force to press his claims.
While tliose backing Richard were rewarded with grants -  'so long as they be of good31 39behaviour'  -  troops were deployed against his enemies. The A nnales
Wormatienses give testimony to the effectiveness of this approach: while those
opposing his regime were beset by plunder and warfare, those supporting him were
rewarded with lavish grants and privileges.^^ Few of his opponents found it possible
to resist for long. Oppenheim was taken after a short s i e g e , 34 and by the end of 1258,
35most of Richard’s opponents had surrendered: in July 1 2 5 8  Worms opened its 
gates, as did Speyer in October.^^ By the beginning of 1 2 5 9 ,  Richard had won control 
over the strategic, political and economic heartland of Gennany. Despite his tendency 
to exaggerate, the Earl could rightly claim, as he did in October 1 2 5 7  to the Bishop of 
Lincoln, that he controlled the Rhine all the way to the A l p s . 3 7  At the same time, 
Richard was not blind to the difficulties facing him. As a look at the witness list of his 
early charters will reveal, most of his support originated in the Rhineland. A grant to 
Aachen, for instance, made on occasion of his coronation ( 1 7  May 1 2 5 7 ) ,  included tlie 
Archbishops of Mainz and Cologne, the Bishops of Cambrai, Maastricht, Münster, 
Paderborn, the elect of Liège, the Duke of Limburg, the Counts of Guelders, Holland, 
Kleve, Lützelenburg, Jülich, Loos, Berg and B a r . 3 8  Noteworthy is the absence not 
only of those supporting Alfonso - the Aichbishop of Trier, the Dukes of Saxony and 
Brabant, as well as the Margraves of Brandenburg - but also of those one would 
expect in Richard’s entourage, such as the Duke of Brunswick or the Count Palatine. 
No princes from the North- or South-East were present. Many of those who did attend 
had been amongst William’s supporters and followers, and almost all of them were 
active in the Lower Rhine region. Richard thus faced the task of expanding his 
authority beyond the immediate confines of the Rhineland and the area controlled by 
his close supporters.
Of equal importance was the necessity to prove that he was, indeed, a non­
partisan choice for King. His early charters also list a number of Imperial knights and 
nobles once active in the service of Frederick II and his sons, such as the Bolandens,
31 CPR 1247-58, 553, in a privilege from 11 May 1257 to tlie citizens of Lübeck. Also: Codex 
Diplomaticus Lubecensis. Labeckisches UB, 11 vols., (Lübeck, 1843-1905), I, nrs. 78, 80.
32 Liebeimann, ‘Zur Geschichte', 220.
33 Annates Wormatienses, MGH SS xvii, 59-60.
34 Ibid., 59.
35 Ibid., 60/62.
36 Friedrich Battenberg (ed. ), Die Gerichtsstandsprivilegien der deutschen KOnige und Kaiser,
2 vois., (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 1983), m*. 52.
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38 Theodor Joseph Lacomblet (ed. ), UBfUr die Geschichte des Niederrheins, 4 vols., (Düsseldorf, 
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Münzenbergs and D a u n s . 3 9  Moreover, the support Richard had initially received from 
the Count Palatine also gave him legitimacy in the eyes of those once loyal to the 
Hohenstaufen. This, in turn, may explain Richard’s repeated assurances that he would 
not interfere with Conradin’s claims to Sicily, Swabia and Jerusalem, a promise, 
incidentally, which he never honoured. It should thus not be understood as an 
indication of his hostility towards the Sicilian Business, but rather as an attempt at 
emphasising the non-partisan nature of his kingship.40 Unlike any other claimant, he 
remained above the internal squabbles and feuds besetting Imperial politics. Richard 
tlius faced a difficult situation. His symbolic reassurances to Conradin, and his lack of 
a major military entourage could only be a first step. He still had to convince his new 
subjects tliat he was not only claiming, but also capable of exercising royal audiority.
Where possible Richard tried to ease the way towards acceptance of his 
authority. Worms, for instance, was offered 1,000 marks and the confirmation of its 
privileges when it surrendered.^! This proved to be the right choice. Richard was 
soon acknowledged even in the Hohenstaufen’s heartland, with privileges surviving 
for Nuremberg in Franconia and the abbey of Maulbronn in Swabia.42 At the same 
time, once Richaid had established his authority in an area, he exercised it fully. This 
is exemplified by the case of the abbey of St Gisela in Maastricht. His chancellor, 
Bishop Nicholas of Cambrai, was ordered to undertake everything necessary to 
safeguard the abbey’s liberty and possessions.43 Similarly, the Burggrave of 
Landski'on, after having his claims to the Imperial castle of Landskron confirmed in 
1257, was ordered to provide troops for the siege of Worms in 1258.44 Accepting 
Richard as King also meant accepting that he would fully exercise his royal rights and 
privileges. Where feasible, the King also tried to expand Imperial territory. A number 
of privileges survive from Richard’s reign, confirming or granting towns and abbeys 
Imperial privileges or taking them under Imperial protection.45 This means that they 
were taken out of the control of local nobles or princes, and into that of the Empire, 
granting them not only an increase in status, but also in freedoms and liberties. 
Furtheimore, Matthew Paris reports that Richard also tried to take back towns into his
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protection which had been pawned by his p r e d e c e s s o r s . 4 6  Some circumstantial 
evidence survives to back these claims. In 1 2 6 0 ,  for example, Richard guaranteed to 
pay off the debt for which Hagenau had formerly been consigned as s e c u r i t y . 4 7  
Lacking a territorial basis in Germany, Richard had to rely on these Imperial enclaves 
to provide him with the necessary strength and support. By mid 1 2 5 8 ,  he had thus 
made sufficient iin-oads to claim at last tliat most of Germany had come to accept him.
At the same time, he must have been awaie of the danger stül posed by Castilian 
claims. Alfonso had to be entiiely overcome before Richard could feel safe. Worms 
and Speyer, for instance, had only been willing to open their gates because the King of 
Castile had failed to come to G e r m a n y . 4 8  Theirs was not an isolated example. After 
William’s death several towns had declared that they would only support a King who 
had been elected u n a n i m o u s l y . 4 9  This was reflected in Richard’s grants for Friedberg, 
Wetzlar and Frankfurt.60 Not only were they promised never to be alienated from the 
Empire, but Richard also conceded that, should tlie Pope recognise another King, tliey 
were free to switch allegiance. Richard had won their support, but as long as a rival 
candidate remained around whom opponents could rally, the foundations of Richard’s 
authority were dangerously weak.
This added urgency to Richard’s efforts to be crowned Emperor by the Pope, 
thus winning final approval for his claims. However, before that could be achieved, 
relations with France had to be settled. Matthew Paris reports that Louis IX reacted to 
Richard’s election by fortifying castles in Normandy.^l Furthermore, the St Albans 
clnonicler continues, Louis decided to capture Richard’s messengers and to undermine 
his support in G e r m a n y , 5 2  fearing that otheiwise war might be waged on F r a n c e . 6 3  
This also meant some support for Alfonso in Germany, although no diiect link can be 
e s t a b l i s h e d . 64 Most of Alfonso’s followers outside Italy were based along the 
Empire’s western b o r d e r s . 6 5  in September 1257, for instance, Albert de la Tour
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SA 163received Aiies and VienneP^ More importantly, in October Alfonso appointed the 
Duke of Brabant as his Imperial vicar.^^ The Duke had already proved himself a 
reliable ally to Louis IX. Similarly, in September 1258 Alfonso received homage from 
the Duke of B u r g u n d y , a n d  in November Count Guido of Flanders, who had 
established his claims with the help of Charles of Anjou, accepted Alfonso as King.5'9 
If nothing else, the King of Castile was perceived as someone championing Louis’s 
cause. This, in turn, posed difficulties for Richard. To overcome his Castilian 
opponent in Germany, he needed recognition from the Pope, and his coronation as 
Emperor. That, however, was unlikely to be granted while his candidacy was viewed 
as a menace by the Capetians. Consequently, Richard had to ensure that Louis would 
discontinue his support for Alfonso, and this could only be achieved by showing that 
he did not plan to use his new found dignity against the Capetians.
Richard had to demonstrate his good intentions. He did so by trying to solve tlie 
still simmering conflict over the Flemish inheritance. Should John de Avesnes have 
hoped that his eminent role in Richai'd’s affairs would lead to support for his claims in 
Flanders, he was to be disappointed. In September 1256, John had been forced to 
accept Louis’ arbitration confirming his loss of Flanders and N a m u r , 6 0  and in 
November 1257 he and his brother Baldwin renewed their acceptance of this 
agreement.^ 1 It is safe to assume that Richard had exerted some pressure on his allies 
to do so. In spring 1258 the Earl himself promised Countess Maigaret that he would 
strive to revoke William’s sentence which had deprived her of all Imperial fiefs, but 
did so under the condition that she would offer personal homage. However, this did 
not prevent Richard from confirming the Duke of Luxemburg in his recent conquest of 
Namur, claimed by Margaret of Flanders.^^ Nonetheless, the Earl stayed clear of 
openly assisting the Avesnes brothers in actions which would further alienate Louis
I X . 64 Thus, the way was paved for negotiations with tlie King of France.
Henry III, too, had little interest in a renewed outbreak of hostilities, and 
stepped up his efforts at finding a permanent settlement almost immediately after 
Richard’s coronation at Aachen.^^ This eventually resulted in a meeting between
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164English, French and German proctors at Cambrai in 1258, and ultimately the Treaty of 
Paris. Richard ratified the settlement as Earl of Cornwall, but also tried to emphasise 
his special status, and suggested that he and Louis IX enter a separate agreement. In 
the spirit of the treaty of Catania, the two rulers were to promise mutual support, 
friendship and assistance. To underline his position, Richard was not represented by 
his brother’s proctors, but by his own Imperial protlionotary. Although no evidence 
suiwives that this proposed agreement was concluded, Richard had settled his relations 
with France, and could now more confidently approach the Pope.^^
66 Hampe, ‘Ungedruckte Briefe’, 673-90, at 685-6; Annals o f Burton, AM  1 ,469-70.
VIII.2 Imperial ambitions and English rebels (1259-68)^7
Immediately after his coronation, Richard announced to the citizens of Rome 
that he wished to become Emperor.^ ^  He promised to restore jurisdictions and 
honours, expel rebels and ensure that law and justice be upheld. This was probably 
directed against the regime of Brancaleone which had fallen foul of tlie papacy and had 
begun to collaborate with Manfred. Granting Richard his wish may have been viewed 
as likely to add impetus to the flagging campaign against Manfred and his Ghibelline 
allies. This could explain the favourable reception Richard found with various 
members of the papal curia. After all, by supporting Plantagenet candidates for both 
the Imperial throne and the crown of Sicily, the papacy would have created a situation 
it had striven so hard to remedy - the same dynasty mling lands to the North and South 
of the papal states. It seems, though, that many believed the possible advantages to 
outweigh potential risks. Letters by a number of cardinals survive, either urging 
Richard to come to Rome quickly, or pressing Alexander IV to lend the Earl his 
suppor t .Richard,  too, prepared to recruit supporters within Italy. Contacts were 
made with the patriarch of Aquileia,70 Azzo of Este,7 1  Ubert P a l l a v a c i n i , 7 2  and 
Thomas of S a v o y . 7 3  The Earl left little doubt as to his intentions, and, as in the case of 
his German election, he tided to prépaie the ground politically and diplomatically before 
venturing south.
Initially, he met with some s u c c e s s . 7 4  L i  April 1 2 5 9 ,  Alexander IV promised to 
send a legate to Germany to exhort the princes to adhere to R i c h a r d . 7 5  A papal letter 
survives in which the Duke of Burgundy is admonished to assist Richard, King of the 
Romans m imperatorem proinovendo?^ This is the more interesting, as John had 
initially done homage to Alfonso. Similarly, the same year, the Archbishop of Cologne
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was praised for the support shown to Richard and exhorted to continue doing so.77 in781260 the Earl is said to have left for Germany to plan his coronation as Emperor. A
visit was certainly planned: in October 1259 Richar d, 'going to the court of Rome on
the affairs of himself, the King and the realm' had been allowed to tallage his manors79and boroughs in England. Similarly, in September 1260, Richard wrote to the80citizens of Bologna to announce his imminent aiiival. This co-incided with hectic
diplomatic activity aimed at France. Before the Earl’s departure, envoys aiiived from
Louis IX,81 and contacts continued during Henry Ill’s sojourn in Gascony later that
y e a r . 82 Henry III even felt confident enough to ask Louis IX for money to repay a
loan he had received from Richard. Although this was part of the subsidy promised
in the Treaty of Paris, the fact that the King of England could ask his Capetian
counterpart to support the Earl’s planned coronation as Emperor deserves attention,
signifying botli the changing nature of Anglo-French lulations, and the importance of a
peaceful settlement for Richard’s Imperial projects. However, nothing was to come of
the proposed journey. In mid-June, the Earl left for the c o n t i n e n t , ^4 but in October he
85unexpectedly returned, as the situation in England had begun to worsen. During a
parliament earlier tiiat month, Heniy of Almain, Richard’s eldest son, had begun to act
as Simon de Montfort’s proctor, in opposition to Henry III. Various initially
competing factions began to work together, pressing their claims against the King.
Henry Ill’s Justiciar was deposed, and a baronial candidate was elected instead. The
situation was alarming enough to prompt Richard’s immediate return. As was to be
repeatedly the case, political developments in England interfered with the Earl’s
ambitions in Europe.
The full effects of Richai'd’s continuing entanglement in English politics were
not to be known until some years later. In the meantime, in spring 1261, he was
elected senator of Rome,^^ and was urged by various cardinals to come quickly to 87receive his crown. In April 1262, however. Urban IV declaied a change in papal
88policy, and announced that he was unable to favour either him or Alfonso. The 
Pope’s decision had not been hasty or rushed. For some time, Richard’s failure to
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come to Rome had caused u n e a s e .  ^9 if a date can be fixed to pin down a change in 
attitude, it was probably the council held in 1261, dealing, amongst other things, with 
the German double election.^O From then on. Pope Urban IV avoided committing 
himself. By August 1263 he officially declared that he remained unable to decide, and 
announced tiiat both Alfonso and Richard were from now on to be addressed as elected 
Kings of the Romans.^ 1 A thorough investigation of their claims began, which was 
never concluded. This was as much the result of a series of misfortunes - successive 
pontiffs had the habit of dying at inopportune moments - as of developments in 
England. In 1264, for instance, a decision had to be postponed because Richard, held 
captive by Simon de Montfort, was unable to authorise his proctors. Once tliis problem 
had been overcome. Urban IV died, just when he was ready to announce his 
decision.92 His successor, Clement IV, declared that he first had to consult the 
records. He gave 1 June 1269 as the date for his final decision, but died in November 
1268. Although a new pontiff was elected in September 1271, he was not consecrated 
until late March 1272, just a few days before Richard’s death. It would thus be 
mistaken to view Richard’s failure in Rome as an indication of major weaknesses in 
Germany.
Similarly, the reasons which had led to Urban’s change of mind were connected 
not so much to the affairs of Germany, as to the dangers besetting Henry III in 
particular, and Christendom in general. 1260/1 were years of crisis. Constantinople 
had fallen to the Greeks, a Mongol invasion was feared,af fai r s  in the Holy Land 
had taken yet another turn for the worse^4 and waves of flagellants swept across 
Northern Italy.^^ Manfred still ruled Sicily, and even began to widen his circle of 
contacts to include the Muslim rulers of E g y p t . 9 6  Moreover, he also found support in 
the W e s t . 97 What the papacy needed was strong and effective leadership. Whoever 
was to become Emperor had to be a formidable hammer of heathen and heretics. 
Furthermore, by the early 1260s, it had also become clear tliat Henry III would be 
unable to make good his promises with regard to Sicily, and Urban IV began to look 
for other potential champions against Manfred, eventually settling on Charles of 
Anjou. Thus, Urban’s negotiating position was strengthened, and it may have become 
possible to drive a stronger bargain with whoever wanted to become Emperor. As will
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shortly be seen, the Earl of Cornwall was in no position to give Urban tlie military and 
political leadership he wanted.
Richard’s success in Germany rested upon the revenues from his English 
estates. They allowed him to recruit and reward followers, hire troops and buy back or 
acquire Imperial lands. Any disturbance in England would thus have serious 
repercussions abroad. Richard’s English links had enabled him to pursue his Imperial 
ambitions, but they also meant that he could not avoid involving himself in his 
brother’s affaii's. The events suirounding his return to Germany in 1259 may be cited 
as an example. While staying at St Omer, the Earl was met by envoys who demanded 
diat he peifonn an oath to the Provisions of Oxford before returning to E n g l a n d . 9 8  To 
increase pressure, no ships were permitted to cross the Channel, and disobedience to 
these orders was made a capital o f f e n c e . 9 9  Richard, however, refused to comply, 
unless he received a royal mandate to do o t h e r w i s e .  100 The reasoning employed even 
before this encounter was revealing. In November 1258 the Earl’s brother requested 
tliat he sign tlie P r o v i s i o n s .  101 After all, Heniy III declared, despite being King of the 
Romans, Richard remained a baron of England, and, as such, had to comply with its 
l a w s .  102 The Earl’s return had been far from smooth, and it did not bode well for 
things to come. Matthew Paris reports how the Earl’s German entourage was 
bewildered by the treatment he received from his fellow-countrymen, and how they, 
consequently, disregarded his a u t h o r i t y .  103 i n  this, he may have been exaggerating. 
However, the King of Romans continued to be hindered by the fact that he was also 
Earl of Cornwall.
By 1263, when Urban IV finally ended papal support for Richard, the situation 
had worsened c o n s i d e r a b l y .  104 in June, the Bishop of Hereford had been dragged 
from his cathedral and incarcerated by Simon de Montfort’s partisans. Soon after, the 
estates of Henry’s seneschal were plundered, and baronial forces came to occupy 
much of the South-East. Even in the North, umest was feared. The ensuing turmoil 
soon engulfed Richard. The Earl made several attempts at mediating between Simon 
and H e n r y .  105 Not only did his efforts meet with little success, he was also 
reprimanded for his failure by the Pope. In September, Urban IV ordered Richard to 
come to the King’s defence. Harsh words were used: although the Earl had not 
procured, he nonetlieless condoned the recent v i o l e n c e .  106 Although royal control was 
eventually restored, Richard’s position was weakened. He had not given a
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169performance which could have reassured the papacy that he was the right choice to lead 
Christianity against its many foes. His actions fell short of the whole-hearted military 
support the Pope had come to expect, and his attempts at negotiating failed. The events 
drastically underlined Richard’s dependence on England with its increasingly volatile 
politics.
Furthermore, this was not the only poor performance given by Richard. When
exhorting the Earl to come to his brother’s assistance in 1263, Urban IV also refened
to various German knights who had come to fight Henry III. A clue to their
provenance may be given by a sepaiate warning which Urban issued to the Archbishop
of Cologne. The prelate was ordered to comply with any decision a recently dispatched
papal legate would make regarding E n g l a n d .  1^7 Archbishop Engelbert II also posed
the biggest challenge so far to Richard’s authority in Germany, when he began to
support Frederick II’s grandson Conradin. In May 1262 Conradin held a diet at Ulm
claiming the duchy of Swabia as his i n h e r i t a n c e .  1^8 From then on events developed
quickly: in early June, Urban IV thanked the King of Bohemia for giving warning
about plans to elect Conradin as a n t i - K i n g .  109 xhe situation was serious. Various
nobles and towns in Swabia sided with Conradin giving him control over much of the
111area between St Gall and Augsburg. More importantly, the Count Palatine came to
his assistance. Richard reacted quickly, and set out for Germany in June. Lacking 112military resources, he took to alliances and symbolic gestures instead. While
Richard was at Aachen in August 1262, he confirmed King Ottokar of Bohemia in his
-  disputed -  possession of Austria, thus demonstrating in whose power it was to grant113or receive Imperial lands. The same day, a memorandum was issued listing the 
Imperial Insignia Richard had presented to St Mary’s at Aachen.^ This emphasised 
Richard’s position as properly crowned and consecrated King.H^ Moreover, he 
scored a major success when he negotiated a truce between the Duke of Brabant and
107 Ibid., 396-8.
108 f^otae Historia Sangallenses, MGH S S i , l \ .
109 Epistolae, III, nr. 520.
110 Ibid., nr. 520; Constitutiones, nr. 403.
111 Notae Historia Sangallenses, MGH SS i, 71; RI, nr. 4791; Helmut Maurer, ‘Die Anfange der 
Stadt Tiengen und das politisclie Kraftespiel am Hoclirhein um die Mitte des 13 Jahrhunderts’, 
Alemannisches JahrbiicJi 1964/5,119-158, at 141.
112 CR 1261-4, 175-6. Henry III, writing from France, tells his brother tliat he cannot send the 
promised subsidies (30. 9. 1262).
113 Jindrich Sebanek and SasaDuskova (ed. ), Codex diplornatrius et epistolaris regni Bohemiae, vol. 
V,1 (Prague, 1974), m". 345.
114 Wilhelm Mummenhoff (ed. ), Regesten der Reichsstadt Aachen (einschliefilich des Aachener 
Reiches und der Reichsabtei Burtscheid), 2 vols., (Bonn, 1937-1961), I, nr. 174; Albert Huyskens, 
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Aachen’, Annalen des Historischen Vereins fiir den Niederrhein cxv (1929), 180-204, at 202-4; the 
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170one of his local opponents. 116 Thus, the last and most important of Alfonso’s117partisans had been won over. In October, Richard reached Alsace. Old supporters118 119were won back and Conradin retreated. Even the Count Palatine was
t e m p o r a r i l y  120 brought to heel. 1^1 Although no military encounter followed, this had
been enough to thwart Conradin‘s ambitions, and he remained confined to parts of
Swabia and the domains of the Duke of Bavaria. Although this may have sufficed to
safeguard Richard’s claims in Germany, it was not enough to win over the Pope. The
episode also underlined Richard’s continuing dependence on his brother: without
Henry IB, tlie Earl had üttle or no military muscle to flex. To Urban, prevarication may
have seemed the best option.
In this, he was to be proved right. Despite his best e f f o r t s ,  122 Richard had to
become embroiled in English affairs. In 1264, for instance, thre Earl had been
involved in negotiating the Mise of A m i e n s ,  1^3 and he acted as regent during the
King’s absence in France the same year. However, all efforts at settling the conflict
peacefully came to nothing. In May 1264, royalist and baronial forces clashed at
Lewes, with the two Kings and their sons taken prisoner by Simon de M o n t f o r t .  124125This marked the nadir of Richard’s relations with the curia. What saved his
kingship at the time was that Alfonso was in no better situation. Castile had recently
been invaded by the Muslim rulers of North Africa, while Alfonso also faced
considerable internal o p p o s i t i o n .  126 in 1265 Clement IV wrote to the Archbishop of
Seville, urging him to induce Alfonso to abandon his claim to the Imperial throne.
Clement declared that he did not ask this because he preferred Richai'd; rather, a third127and more powerful candidate was to be appointed in their stead. However, the 
royal victory at Evesham in 1265 prevented Richard’s imminent demise. He 
nonetheless remained weakened. In a letter, probably dating from the period between 
1265 and 1268, he wrote to the brothers Philip and Werner of Falkenstein explaining 
that, due to his long absence in England during the recent war, he had been unable to
14811e.
117 Ibid., ms. 5409-5416.
118 Wilhelm Wiegand (ed. ), UB der Stadt Strafiburg, 2 vols., (Strasbourg, 1879-86), I, nr. 507; RI, 
nr. 5413.
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120 g y  1265 be was already siding wiüi Conradin again, Monumenta Boica xxx (Munich, 1834), nr. 
804.
121 RI, nr. 5402.
122 Denholm-Young, Richard of Cornwall, 121-3.
123 Royal Letters, II, nr. 608.
124 The comse of events as seen from a baronial perspective, ‘The Song against tlie King of Ahnain’, 
Thomas Wright (ed. ), Political Songs of England from the Reign o f John to that o f Edward II, 
Camden Society, (London, 1839; repr. wiüî a new introduction by Peter Coss, Cambridge, 1996), 69- 
71.
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126 O’Callagahn, The Learned King, 182-94; Richard P. Kinkade, ‘Alfonso X, Cantiga 235, and the 
Events of 1269-78’, Speculum Ixvii (1992), 284-323 for continuing unrest.
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171see to tlieir w i s h e s ,  l^o The following years were spent restoring what had been lost
during the Earl’s captivity, and settling relations between Henry HI and the survivors
of Evesham. However, Richard remained weakened in his Imperial ambitions. The
Pope in Rome and his legates in Germany continued to ignore him. Little heed was
paid to Richard’s projects, affiliations and a m b i t i o n s .  129 Thus, Richard’s visit to
Germany in 1268 was, probably, also undertaken with the aim of proving to the curia
that he stiU marshalled tlie support and recognition necessary to become Emperor.
In this context, it remains necessary to differentiate between Richard’s standing
with the papacy, and his position in Germany. The curia was looking for someone to
lead Christian forces against the Church’s many foes. Whoever was to become
Emperor had to drive Manfred from Sicily, the Muslims from Palestine, the Greeks
from Greece and the Mongols from Europe. In comparison, being King of the Romans
did not pose much of a challenge. All a successful candidate had was to make his
presence felt. There is little doubt as to Richard’s continuing ability to do so. As
already demonstrated, despite lacking a stiong military entourage in 1262, he had been
able to overcome Conradin’s support with relative ease. Similarly, in 1266, when130rumours spread about the impending election of another anti-King, it was not even
necessary for Richard to appear in person. His captivity appears to have had limited
impact. For instance, some charters survive, in which those issuing grants date their
privileges as having been given ‘régnante Romanorum rege Richardo’, long after news131of his defeat at Lewes must have reached Germany. In late June 1264, four weeks
after the event, a peace was agreed between the Archbishop of Mainz and the Count
Palatine, which still looked to Richard as tlie ultimate source of authority within the
E m p i r e .  132 Only the Count Palatine and Duke of Bavaria, Conradin’s sponsor and
guardian, seems to have been willing to take advantage of Richard’s prolonged
absence. In 1267, for instance, he declared tliat, the Empire being vacant, he would act
as Emperor in his l a n d s .  133 Even he, however, came to recognise Richard again in
1 2 6 9 . 1 3 4  Although there was a decline in the frequency with which Rihard issued
charters during the 1260s, business still continued as usual. He retained the company135of his Imperial chancellor, he was met and consulted by envoys from Germany.
Privileges were still issued and conflicts settled. Peter of Savoy received the Kiburg 
i n h e r i t a n c e ,  136 a settlement between the Duke of Luxemburg and the Countess of
128 Bohmer, Acta Imperii Selecta, nr. 384.
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134 /?/, nr. 5455a.
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136 R f  nrs. 5427-8; Cox, Eagles, 363-72 for tiie wider context.
Flanders was p r o c u r e d ,  137 and Aachen was allowed to purchase royal bathing 
privileges. 138 Richard’s prospects of becoming Emperor may have become bleak, but 
he still faced little serious opposition in Germany. This was the basis on which his 
triumphant visit of 1268/9 was to be built.
VIII.3 Triumph (1268-72)
By the time of Richard’s fourth visit to Germany in August 1268, his opponents 
were either d e a d  139 or beset by domestic problems which left them little room to 
pursue their Imperial ambitions. Most princes initially hostile had come round to eitlier 
requesting his help or quietly accepting him. Those still opposed to his regime lacked a 
focal point around which to rally. The Earl of Cornwall was thus free to exercise his 
authority. Coinciding with the final phase of papal deliberations on who was to 
become Emperor, the sojourn was designed as the apex of Richard’s reign. As soon as 
he anived, Richard underlined the breadth of his success. The inheritance of Brabant 
was settled, and first contacts were made with Italy. 140 However, the most significant 
manifestations of Richard’s new freedom of action were his marriage to Beatrice of 
Falkenburg, and the diet of Worms of 1269.^^^ 142Beatrice was the daughter of an important lord in the Rhineland region.
Renowned for her beauty, she also provided a link witli a powerful family in Richard’s
heartland (her uncle being the Archbishop of Cologne). The political dimension is
emphasised by Thomas Wykes: fighting the Germans’ furious insanity, the Earl first
tackled the manifold extortions forced upon travellers and merchants along the Rhine.
Richai'd called a meeting to Worms, where these tolls were banned. For this he was
widely praised by the Germans. Afterwards, foreseeing that this would tie him closer143to his subjects, he mai'ried Beatrice of Falkenburg. Richard thus not only forged 
dynastic links, but also exercised a King’s most solemn duty: the upholding of peace 
a n d  j u s t i c e .  144 Much of this may have been aimed as much at his German subjects as
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173at Clement IV who was due to announce his decision as to who was to be the next
Emperor by June 1269. By maiiying a German wife Richard emphasised his intention
to be more tlian an absentee King, wliile the measures taken at Worms proved that tliis
was more than wishful thinking.
The diet’s pronouncements do not survive, but on 20 April Richard issued a
decree refeixiiig to the meeting. He declared that, after having received complaints from
the consuls of Worms about a toll called Ungelt (a duty levied on goods which were to
be transported or traded), he had called a meeting, where the Archbishops of Mainz
and Trier, the Bishops of Worms and Speyer, princes, magnates and counts had
sworn not to extort the toll in future. However, abolishing an unpopular tax was
not the diet’s only purpose. A general peace was declared, and all the nobles and
magnates present swore to obey it.^'^^ Richard’s promise to safeguard peace and trade
was as important as the fact that he had been petitioned to do so. He remained the sole
source of royal authority in Germany. Moreover, the diet of Worms put Richard in tlie
tradition of Frederick II, inasmuch as it was the first attempt by a King since 1235 to
establish a general peace, not just for a specific region, but across Germany as a
whole. Although the Worms diet had been attended only by a limited number of clergy
and nobles, mostly from the Lower Rhineland, Richard did not believe this to be
sufficient. He ordered the citizens of Strasbourg to follow the example set by others,
and abolish Ungelt within eight days. Otherwise, they could not be part of the general 147peace. That the implicit use of force was no empty threat is illustrated by a letter
from the Archbishop of Mainz to the citizens of Oppenheim from August 1269, when
he ordered them to equip a war ship to be used against disturbers of the peace agreed at 148Worms. This final sojourn remained the highpoint of Richard’s reign.
Once again, affairs in England forced liim to return. The kingdom, only partially 
pacified after 1265, experienced continuing unrest. Pockets of resistance remained in 
the N o r t h ,  149 and the royal court was torn by a feud between the Earl of Gloucester 
and the Lord Edwaid.1^0 Richard was asked to arbitrate. After the conflict was laid to 
rest, Richard acted as one of Edward’s proctors during his c r u s a d e ,  1^1 and in 1271, 
he acted as regent of England on his brother’s b e h a l f .  1^2 There is no indication, 
though, that the Earl thought liis absence from Germany to be permanent. Quite to the
145 Constitutiones, nrs. 389-90.
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153contraiy: tliere was no slackening in issuing royal grants for Germany. Moreover,
the summer of 1271 saw renewed efforts by Henry III to repay debts owed to his
brother. In preceding years this had been an indication of the Earl's imminent
departure. Also, in Febniary 1271, Henry III urged his son to return. Amongst the
reasons given was that Richard would soon be able to set sail for Rome to receive his155coronation as Emperor. The King of England was not alone in this belief. In a 
contract between the burggrave of Landski on and a local noblewoman from December 
1270, reference is made to tlieir undertaking having to be confirmed by King Richard, 
who was expected to arrive soon.^^6 However, all these expectations came to nothing 
when Richard died in April 1272, an absentee, but a widely accepted King.
VIII.4 The Rule of King Richard
Richard thus encountered few problems in maintaining his claims. However, 
how successful he had been in exercising royal authority - could he actually make true 
his claims of being the ruler of Gennany in deed as well as name ?
Traditionally, any suggestion that Richard’s reign may have been more than a 
mere interlude, and an unhappy one, too, would have been dismissed. His reign has 
been described as an embarrassment or at best as i n e f f e c t u a l .   ^^ 7 Tbis view has rarely 
been c r i t i c i s e d ,  ^ ^ 8  this is not the place to offer a detailed critique of its underlying 
a s s u m p t i o n s .  1^9 However, to understand the impact of Richard’s election and reign, 
some of the structural features of his rule must be considered.
A characteristic element of Richard’s government was continuity. The staff of 
his chancery, as well as many of his officials, had been active under his predecessors. 
His chamberlain, for instance, was Philip of F a l k e n s t e i n ,  160 previously Conrad IV’s 
steward, while his uncle had held the same post under Frederick II, with other
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175members of his family being prominent officials in William’s government. 161 
Nicholas, Bishop of Cambrai, acted as chancellor (an office he had held under William 
of Holland), and John de Avesnes as s e n e s c h a l .  162 gotli had been active in preparing 
Richard’s election, with John also involved in organising William’s relations with 
E n g l a n d .  163 Most significant, however, was the appearance of Arnold of Holland, 
provost of Wetzlar, in Richard’s entourage. He had been protlionotary under William, 
and soon became Richard’s chief diplomat. Amongst other things, he acted as 
Richard’s proctor in negotiating the Treaty of Paris, and represented him at the 
cwria.164 He also accompanied the Earl to England, thus providing him with the 
necessary expertise needed for the King's business. 165 During one stay in England, 
for instance, affairs in Westphalia, 166 Burgundy, 167 and Prussia 168 were dealt with.
A similar part was played by Conrad of Hochstaden, Archbishop of C o l o g n e .  169 His 
influence is reflected in the appointment of Count Walram of Jiilich, the prelate’s 
trusted ally, as Richard’s m a r s h a l .  170 Thus, from the beginning, Richard had been 
suiTOunded by men who would ensure a smooth transition for the new regime, and the 
continuity of effective Imperial government.
This becomes evident in the issues of Richard’s chancery. His charters rarely 
went beyond the confirmation of earlier privileges. His first major grant was issued 
shortly after his coronation, on 22 May 1257 to the citizens of Aachen, 171 and was an 
almost exact copy of an earlier grant by Frederick II. The nuns of Fischbeck had to 
provide documentary evidence for tlieir privileges before tliey could be c o n f i r m e d .  172 
In 1268, the abbey of St Gisela had its charters confirmed, as they had been under 
Richai'd’s p r e d e c e s s o r s .  173 in the case of St Servatius at Maastricht, this meant going 
back to charters dating from the reign of Henry V ( 1 1 0 6 - 1 1 2 5 ) . It was 
exceptional, however, for Richard simply to copy eailier grants. More commonly, he 
rephrased or emphasised what he deemed necessary to confirm, putting forth 
alterations, limiting grants in geographical scope or to a certain period of time. This
161 Jacob, Untersuchungen, 32-5.
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was no different from the way his predecessors had issued and confirmed charters and
privileges. 175
The preservation and, to some extent, enlargement of the royal domain remained 
the underlying principle of Richard’s g r a n t s .  176 Little was given away that had not 
been lost a lr e a d y .  177 Historians have voiced much concern regarding, for example, 
Richard’s privileges for the citizens of C o l o g n e .  178 Following the grants given by 
W i l l i a m ,  179 the Earl promised not to lead armed men into the city, except for his 
entourage who would be armed modestly; no diets were to be held, nor castles or 
fortifications built. This has been viewed as a sell-out of Imperial rights, 180 but by 
1257 Cologne had already ceased to be a major venue for Imperial diets or sojourns. 
Conrad IV had been tliere only twice, Henry (VII) once, and even Frederick II just 
three times.181 Richard himself went three times. The exception was William of 
Holland who issued charters at Cologne on nine different o c c a s i o n s .  182 Richard 
confined himself to confirming the status quo and he confirmed what could not be 
changed. New privileges were issued on a limited scale and with limited value. The 
Teutonic Knights, for example, were freed of all tolls for wine and otlier goods which 
they shipped along the Rliine. Even that, however, was little more than the extension 
of a grant by William, who had awarded them similar rights in the county of 
H o l la n d .  183 The support which he thus gained cost him little.
Furthermore, strong efforts were made to establish efficient government. Before 
his first return to England in Februaiy 1259, Richard authorised the Archbishop of 
Cologne, Conrad of Hochstaden, to administer royal rights in the election of 
b i s h o p s .  184 He may have followed the example set by Frederick II, when the 
Archbishop of Cologne acted as regent for the infant Henry (VII), or Conrad’s eminent 
role in the government of William. When relations with Conrad’s successor 
deteriorated, a similar position seems to have been held by the Archbishop of 
M a i n z .  185 Beyond that, Richard seems to have elaborated the institution of Imperial
176
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Vicars as introduced in Frederick II’s Reichslandfrieden of 1 2 3 5 . 1 8 6  Various nobles 
were appointed to exercise authority on the King's behalf: Philip of Falkenstein was 
entrusted with the administration of the Wetterau region; Bishop Werner of Strasbourg 
was to oversee A l s a c e ;  187 and Philip of Hohenfels took responsibility for the area 
suiTOunding Boppard and W e r d e n . 1 8 8  For 1 2 6 2  Herman of Geroltzeck was appointed 
advocatus by Richard along both banks of the Rhine from Basle to Wissembourg. 189 
In 1 2 6 1  the Count Palatine was ordered to take care of vacant Imperial fiefs, until the 
King r e t u r n e d .  1 9 0  it is difficult to determine how effective these measures were. 
Certainty can only be won by a detailed examination of their immediate, local 
c o n t e x t .  191 However, it appears that Richard tried to ensure that even in his absence, 
reliable agents would act on his behalf. Moreover, he aimed at laying the foundations 
for effective control over the royal domain, foreshadowing many of the policies later 
pursued by Rudolf of Habsburg.
Richard became a much needed arbitrator, thus fulfilling one of the most 
important functions of a medieval monarch. His most notable involvement was in the 
war between the citizens of Strasbourg and their B i s h o p .  1 9 2  The townspeople had 
allied with various nobles, including Rudolf of Habsburg, against the prelate over 
what they perceived as his tyranny. With Richard’s support, a temporary agreement 
was r e a c h e d .  1 9 3  Other instances of royal arbitration include his confirmation of a 
settlement between the chapter and townspeople of Cambrai in 1 2 6 0 , 1 9 4  and the 
negotiation of a peace between Worms and neighbouring nobles the same y e a r .  1 9 5  i n  
itself this was an indication of how he continued to be perceived as possessing not 
only the title, but also the authority of a King. As his reign progressed, Richard’s 
confirmation of transactions between individual princes was regularly requested. When 
the town of Hameln was sold to the Bishop of Minden, his consent was s o u g h t .  1 9 6  At
177
^86 Kaii-Friedrich Krieger, Die Habsburger im Mittelalter: von Rudolf I bis Friedrich III (Stultgait, 
1994), 34.
^87 After the demise of the bishop in 1262, tlie scultetus of Hagenau was entrusted with tlie office, 
until the new Bishop took it over again in 1270. II. Kaiser, ‘Ein unbekanntes Mandat Konig Richards 
und die Anfange der Landvogtei im Elsass‘, Zeitschrift fUr die Geschichte des Oberrheins xix (1903), 
337-9.
188 Annales Wormatienses, MGH SS xvii, 60.
^89 Bellum Waltherianum, MGH SS xvii, 111.
190 Monumenta Boica, xxx, nr. 802.
191 The problem posed by the traditional perception of Richard as a mere figurehead witliout effective 
control is exemplified by Alois Gerlich, ‘Rheinische Kurfilrsten und deutsches Konigtum im 
InteiTegnum‘, in: Geschichtliche Landeskunde HI,2 (FS Baimann] (1967), 44-126, at 107. For the 
diffiulties involved in reaching a reliable picture of the degree and extent of royal government in 
tliirteenth century Germany: Fred Schwind, Die Landvogtei in der Wetterau: Studien zu Herrschaft und 
Politik der staufischen und spdtmittelalterlichen Kônige (Marburg, 1972), pp. 92-4.
Bellum Waltherianum, MGH SS xvii, 113; Johann Daniel Schoepflin (ed. ), Alsatia aevi 
Merovingici, Carolingici, Saxonici, Salici, Suevici Diplomatica, 2 vols., (Mannheim, 1772), I, nr. 
593.
193 Ibid., I, nrs. 613-4.
194 a /, I, nrs. 559, 561, 569.
195 H . Boos (ed. ), Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Worms, 3 vols., (Berlin, 1886-93), I, nrs. 288-9.
196 Otto Meinardus (ed. ), UB des Stiftes und der Stadt Hameln bis zum Jahre 1407, 2 vols., 
(Hanover, 1887-1903), I, nr. 51.
Worms, in 1268, he authorised the sale of lands amongst local n o b l e s . ^97 ii was not 
unusual for Richard to be approached to invest abbots and bishops throughout 
Germany or to enfeoff lay princes. In June 1258 Richard granted the Imperial fees 
appertaining to his See to the Bishop of Ratzeburg in Mecklenburg. 198 in February 
1272, the Bishop of Verdun was granted the Imperial lands and possessions held by 
his s e e .  199 1267 Richard dealt with the inheritance of Brabant. The Duke’s first­
born son suffered from recurrent fits of madness. Therefore, Richard had been 
petitioned that, under these circumstances, the Duke’s second son be allowed to 
succeed. This was granted, on condition that the new Duke would later do personal 
homage to R i c h a r d .200 To petition a King for the confirmation of transactions and 
grants was not just a formality: he was still expected to offer protection and support. 
His subjects would not have approached Richard had they not felt he was capable of 
supporting them, and had they not considered him the rightful and proper King of the 
Romans.
Even those who were initially opposed to Richard’s candidacy came to seek his 
support and recognition. The examples of Brabant and Flanders have already been 
mentioned. However, a similar case can be made for towns, which did not require him 
to change the laws of succession, or to revoke earlier royal mandates. After his 
coronation, for instance, Frankfurt had been reluctant to accept R i c h a r d . 2 0 1  In 1262, 
however, the same chaiter which granted the Dominicans in Frankfurt the privilege to 
collect timber from neai'by Imperial woods, also contained instmctions for the town’s 
mayor to let them do so.^02 %(§ implies that Richard had enough clout to press 
through his orders inside the city w a l l s . ^ 0 3  a  similar development can be observed 
with regard to the Annales Wormatienses, one of the few narrative sources who 
concern themselves with Richard beyond the event of his election. For-1257, a 
gleefully hostile account is given. Richard is considered to be an impostor and usurper 
-  "pro rege se gerebaf.^^^ His activities in the Rhineland are described as tliose of a 
tyrant: his opponents were oppressed by continuous warfare, while his supporters 
received privileges and liberties. By the time of the Earl’s entry into Worms, the 
chronicler’s stance had softened.^^^ No more doubt is voiced concerning Richard’s
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179legitimacy as King. Richardus rex entered W o r m s . ^ ^ 6  in 1260, the King was 
involved in settling a conflict between the town and neighbouring ministeriales, and 
was addressed as rex?'^^ The Annals are the only German chronicle mentioning the 
diet of Worms in 1269. In comparison to Thomas Wykes’ account of the same 
meeting, the entry in the, Annales is sober and restrained. They only state that the much 
disliked Ungelt had been abolished by tlie King in the presence of various prelates and 
nobles, and that a general peace had been sworn. Nonetheless, the change in attitude 
remains clear.
If nothing else, Richard had won the recognition of those areas within the 
Empire which constituted its economic, political and administrative core. This is more 
than many otlier kings of the thirteenth century could claim -  William of Holland, for 
instance, had to conquer Aachen before he could be crowned. Among his 
contemporaries, Richard was perceived to be the rightful King of the Romans. He was 
approached for the confirmation of land transactions, of grants and charters, about 
episcopal and abbatial elections, the succession in temporal fiefs, and was asked to 
arbitrate and lead negotiations. He extended the royal domain, aimed at safeguarding 
what was left of Imperial lands, and sH'ove to uphold peace and justice in his realm.
VIII.5 England and Germany (1257-72)
Richard’s caieer cannot be separated from liis brother’s Sicilian ambitions. After 
all, his candidacy for the German throne had initially been little more than a means to 
an end. It was to ensure that no ruler of Germany would hinder English ambitions in 
the Mediterranean. Ultimately, it proved more successful than his brother’s Apulian 
venture. By 1265, it was the sole remnant of Henry I ll’s once grandiose 
MediteiTanean ambitions. As such, Richai'd’s reign deserves a more detailed coverage. 
Nonetheless, the impact his career had on England, as well as its place within the 
wider context of Anglo-Imperial relations have yet to be considered.
Most English chroniclers took an ambiguous view of Richard’s adventure. The 
Annals o f Burton, for instance, listing the raesosn given by the barons against the 
Sicilian Business, included Richard's absence amongst the evils besetting the realm.
The kingdom was deprived of counsel, funds and men.^^8 Matthew Paris, too, 
viewed Richard’s departure with unease. Although he gleefully reported the Earl’s 
successes, he also complained that he was plundering England to satisfy the Germans’
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g r e e d . 709 R is difficult to verify this from the surviving evidence. Although Henry III 
assisted Richard, he did not load him with riches. The grants made on his behalf did 
not strain the English royal purse. In fact, they fell well short of the efforts undertaken, 
for instance, in the context of the Sicilian Business. This can, of course, come as no 
surprise. For one, it helps to underline the priority still enjoyed by the planned 
conquest of Apulia. Beset by the papacy and facing the reluctance of his barons, Heniy 
was, moreover, in no position to make generous grants. Secondly, when elected, 
Richard could already count himself amongst the richest men in Europe.710 Matthew 
Paris is probably exaggerating when he estimates the Earl's treasure at £70,000.711 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Earl needed little financial help from his brother. 
Most grants thus took tlie form of safe-guarding Richard’s claims, or of awarding 
privileges which cost the King little. In 1257, for instance, Richard was freed of the 
customary feudal service in W a l e s , 7 1 2  and in 1259 he received venison from the 
King’s estates, and was allowed to tallage lands formerly part of the royal 
d e m e s n e . 7 1 3  It was not until 1260 that any major financial contiibutions were made, 
when Henry III considered pawning his insignia to repay a loan made by his 
b r o t h e r . 7 1 4  Even after 1265, when financial grants were awarded on a more regular 
basis, they noiinally took the form of simply repaying accumulated debts more 
q u i c k l y . 7 1 5  The Earl himself received little direct support from his brother.716 in fact, 
Richard was using his German resources to alleviate shortages in England. Under 
1258, Matthew Paris reports tliat 50 ships with provisions were dispatched by the Eaii 
to combat the famine threatening E n g l a n d . 7 1 7  Furthermore, some indication survives 
tliat, during the baronial wars, German mercenaries fought alongside Henry III and his
brother.718
As far as Richard’s wise counsel was concerned, its absence seems not to have 
been missed too much. The Earl was frequently vilified for his hostile stance on the 
Provisions of Oxford. Several chroniclers blamed Richard for the movement’s 
f a i l u r e . 7 1 9  r  was, in fact, the King who mostly relied on the Earl’s advice. In 1260 he
180
209 CM, V, 629-30, 660-1. These comments were also taken up by John of Wallingford: England 
was deprived of money, weapons and food due to his foreign followers’ avarice: John de Wallingford, 
MGH SS xxviii, 511. There may be some truth in this: In 1257, tlie Annals o f Dunstaple report, due 
to an unexpected shortage of cash, Richard ordered his woods in England to be sold: AM, III, 206. 
However, Ais still does not constitute a subsidy from Henry III.
210 Bappert, Richard von Cornwall, 3,
211 CM, V, 630.
212 CPR 1247-58, 571.
213 CPR 1258-66, 57; CR 1256-9, 291.
214 CPR 1258-66, 74.
215 CR 1264-8,463,470-1. However, Richard also received wardships: CR 1268-72, 29; and receipts 
of judicial eyres in Cornwall: CPR 1266-72, 244.
216 However, Henry was less reluctant to promise rewards to Richard’s officials. Arnold of Holland, 
for instance, Richard’s prothonotary, was granted 20 marks a year until he could be rewarded witli a 
more well-endowed ecclesiastical office: CPR 1258-66,141.
217 CM, V, 673.
218 Wright, Political Songs, 70.
219 Flores Historiarum, II, 447; Chronicon de Bello, MGH SS xviii, 554.
was entrusted with the defence of the r e a l m , 7 2 0  ^nd in 1 2 6 4 ,  Richard acted as Henry’s 
regent in E n g l a n d . 7 2 1  Prior to the baronial take-over in 1 2 5 8 ,  English envoys to 
Germany were attested with some f r e q u e n c y . 7 2 2  The Earl himself inquired regularly 
about the King’s a f f a i r s , 7 2 3  and even during his absence, his officials solicited grants 
and privileges. In September 1 2 5 7 ,  for instance, a Roger de Stanes was pardoned for 
homicide, at the instance of the King of the R o m a n s , 7 2 4  and in 1 2 5 8 ,  at Richard’s 
request, a London merchant was allowed to import w i n e . 2 2 5  This implies that the 
Earl’s proctors maintained a continuing presence at court. It also suggests an eagerness 
on Henry’s part to consult and inform his brother about the affairs of England. During 
tlie Earl’s absences in 1 2 6 0 ,  with Simon largely in c o n t i o l , 7 2 6  and 1 2 6 2 ,  possibly due 
to the brevity of Richard’s sojourn, no similar frequency of contacts can be 
established. When in England, Richard regularly witnessed Henry’s g r a n t s , 2 2 7  and 
was involved in averting the worst results of both the King’s and Simon’s 
intransigence. Due to the very nature of his kingship, Richard had little interest in 
exacerbating an alr eady volatile situation. As a consequence, he spent most of his time 
in England arbitrating and negotiating, between Simon and Henry, between his son 
and the Kings’ supporters, and between the Lord Edward and the Earl of 
G l o u c e s t e r . 2 2 8  Richard could not safely govern his kingdom while England was 
threatened by revolt. This, rather than any hidden sympathies for the reformers, 
predestined Richard, once again, for a role as mediator and go-between. When his 
efforts came to naught, he had little choice but to assist his brother, rather than Simon 
de Montfort and the barons. Contemporaiy (and modern) complaints about Richard’s 
betrayal of the baronial cause fail to take into account the specific ciicumstances under 
which he a c t e d . 7 2 9 this context, it may also worth noting the emphasis Richard put 
on his difference in status. During his regency in 1 2 6 4 ,  the Earl dated even official 
English correspondence by his Imperial regnal y e a r s . 7 3 0  The Earl of Cornwall 
remained involved in the affairs of England. His advice, however, was sought by the 
King, rather than Simon de Montfort and the reformers.
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It comes as no surprise that most of Henry Ill’s contacts with Germany were 
arranged via Richard of Cornwall. The Earl relied on his brother to provide the 
necessary backup in his attempts at winning support in Germany. Thus, the citizens of 
Ltibeck were granted trading privileges ‘as long as they be of good behaviour to the 
said R i c h a r d ’ , 7 3 1  and those of Groningen received theirs during the Earl’s life­
t i m e , 7 3 2  while the merchants of Brabant were assured that they could trade safely in 
England, despite any contention that might exist with the D u k e . 7 3 3  xhe Earl’s 
sojourns in Germany were often preceded by English grants to his Imperial subjects. 
Thus, in 1 2 6 0 ,  a day before Richai'd’s second departure, Henry III confirmed the 
privileges of those Germans who owned the Gildehalla Teutonicomm in L o n d o n . 7 3 4  
Similarly, in 1 2 6 2  grants were made to several north German t o w n s , 7 3 5  just as safe- 
conducts were issued for the Eaii’s e n t o u r a g e . 7 3 6  Although Henry was unable to 
provide generous military or financial help, he assisted his brother in rewarding those 
on whose support Richard depended in Gennany. This may explain plans to marry 
Edmund Crouchback to one of the daughters of Guido of Flanders in 1 2 6 1 . 7 3 7  After 
all, Guido had originally been amongst Alfonso’s partisans, and Richard’s promise to 
restore Countess Joan’s claims to Imperial Flanders made only slow progress. 
Amongst those who were brought back into the range of English diplomacy by 
Richai'd’s elevation was the Aichbishop of Cologne. Notably absent from Henry’s 
diplomacy in Germany since his consecration, Conrad of Hochstaden led the 
delegation which in 1 2 5 7  came to escort Richard to G e r m a n y . 7 3 8  This resulted in the 
knighting of various Cologne men by the King, and a number of grants being made to 
members of the Archbishop’s e n t o u r a g e . 7 3 9  Furthermore, as Cologne cathedral had 
been destroyed by fire in 1 2 4 8 ,  a mandate was issued for the Archbishop’s 
commissioners to collect funding for the church’s rebuilding in E n g l a n d . 7 4 0  with that, 
however, Conrad’s role ended. In March 1 2 5 8 ,  a merchant from Cologne, who had 
been sent at the Archbishop’s behest, received two r o b e s . 7 4 1  No evidence for further 
contacts survive. Relations between the English court and Germany were dominated 
by Richai'd’s needs.
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183At fii’st sight, the Duke of Brunswick remained the sole exception from tliis rule.
He was not present at the Earl’s coronation, nor did he witness his charters or provide 
him with troops. He also stands out as tlie only German prince who continued to deal 
directly with the English royal court. At the same time, not too much should be read 
into this. The Duke’s lack of involvement in Imperial affairs was not untypical. None 
of the north German princes took an active part in Imperial p o l i t i c s . 7 4 2  xhe Duke of 
Saxony and the Margraves of Brandenburg, for instance, did not even attend the 
meeting at which Alfonso was elected King, and had the Aichbishop of Trier act as 
their proctor i n s t e a d . 7 4 3  still, this does not explain why someone tiaditionally so close 
to Henry III and his court did not utilise this to further his own interests with his new 
King. Considering the general lack of sources it will probably be impossible to solve 
this puzzle for good. Nonetheless, the Duke’s apathy does not necessarily indicate 
hostility to Richard. In fact, circumstantial evidence survives to suggest an early 
acceptance of Richard’s authority. In 1 2 6 0  the Duke was part of a Landfrieden 
covering parts of W e s t f a l i a . 7 4 4  The participants agreed to seek royal consent and 
confirmation for their agreement. This was highly unusual for a mere local 
Landfrieden. No similar clause can be found in comparable agreements for Hainault 
( 1 2 0 0 ) ,  Brixen ( 1 2 2 6 )  or the Pax Bavarica ( 1 2 4 4 ) . 7 4 5  B y  implication, the Duke was 
not opposed to accepting Richard as King. After all, he still found it necessary to 
solicit his agreement to this treaty. Furthermore, in 1 2 7 0 ,  Richard enfeoffed Duke 
Albrecht of Brunswick with lands recently sold by the Count of Dassel, but pertaining 
to the E m p i r e . 7 4 6  Even though the Duke was not required to do personal homage for 
his new lands, the fact remains that he considered it necessary and advisable to solicit 
Richard’s c o n f i r m a t i o n . 7 4 7  a  fonnal declaration of fealty may not have been deemed 
necessary, as Duke and King had probably met on an eailier occasion. In 1 2 6 2  Henry 
III had made a grant on the occasion of the Duke’s marriage with a sister of the 
Margrave of M o n t f e r r a t . 7 4 8  The couple was expected in England by Easter 1 2 6 3 . 7 4 9  
When tliey eventually anived in the autumn of 1 2 6 6 ,  they received lavish gifts, and 
initiated various grants for German m e r c h a n t s . 7 5 0  Considering Henry Ill’s close 
relationship with his brother during these years, it seems unlikely that he would have
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received and supported someone who was openly hostile to Richard. Within these 
parameters, relations with the Duke of Brunswick would thus fit into the already 
established pattern of diplomatic support for Richard meted out by his brother, the 
King of England. It was in this context, that English relations with Germany were 
organised during the years of Richard’s reign. The aim was to assist and support tlie 
King’s brother who, after all, had begun his caieer in Germany at the behest of Henry 
III.
Richard’s reign in Germany showed him at his best. We can witness him 
drawing on his considerable abilities as a diplomat and negotiator.751 Throughout his 
career he had preferred compromise and arbitration to battle, and this did not change 
after his election as King of the R o m a n s . 7 5 2  por most of his reign Richard governed 
by arranging truces and settlements, and he won more supporters by negotiation than 
by war. This was complemented by an acute understanding of financial m a t t e r s . 753 
His expeditions to Geimany were always well prepared and well-funded. This enabled 
him to overcome the difficulties posed by his lack of an indigenous power base. He 
had no allodial lands in the Empire from which to draw troops or funds. Instead, 
Richard had to rely on his natural skills and abilities, and it is mostly to them that he 
owed whatever success he achieved.
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Conclusion^
Henry I ll’s reign marked the closest proximity between England and the 
Continent yet. His aims and ambitions, his policy and diplomacy formed and were 
formed by the events which defined tlie history of thirteenth century Europe. His 
efforts to recover his lost inheritance at one point or another involved the Emperor, the 
King of Bohemia, the Dukes of Austria, Brabant and Brunswick, the Pope, the King 
of Castile, the Counts of Toulouse, Provence and Flanders. His lack of success was as 
frequently the result of his inability to deal with his barons at home, as of 
developments abroad which were beyond his contiol. It would be mistaken, though, to 
view him as simply incompetent. His diplomacy was informed by an acute 
understanding of the contemporary political scene. He knew when to act and who to 
enlist in his support.
This is well illustrated by his undertakings during the 1220s. Henry was aware 
that Frederick II would be unlikely to support those who in the past had opposed him 
and his family. Instead, old contacts were revived and alliances re-formed. English 
diplomacy centred on those who were most likely to assist the Plantagenets in their 
aims and ambitions, that is, the Geiman regency council under Aichbishop Engelbert 
of Cologne. Even after the prelate’s murder, efforts were not abandoned. That these 
projects did not have the desired result was not Henry’s fault. He as much as his 
German allies under-estimated the degree to which Frederick H still dominated German 
affairs, and few could have envisaged the political tuimoil which would result from the 
Emperor’s delayed cmsade. At the time, the couise of action pursued by Henry and his 
regents was not without its risks, but it also was the one most likely to achieve what 
the Plantagenets needed most: potent allies abroad.
A similar single-mindedness is apparent in events after 1235. In many ways, 
Frederick’s marriage with Isabella had given Henry III what he always wanted: a 
formal alliance with the Imperial Court. Although his hopes that this could at one point 
be used against his Capetian foes failed to materialise, the King of England continued 
to help and assist, advise and counsel his new ally. English troops and English funds 
contributed in no small degree to Frederick’s wars in Italy. English diplomacy aimed at 
easing the tensions which increasingly beset relations between Pope and Emperor. Nor 
did Heniy III act on his own. He was joined by the King of Hungaiy and other mlers. 
As fai* as Germany was concerned, he now had achieved his objectives. Consequently 
those who in previous years had dominated exchanges with Germany diminished in 
significance. The Archbishops of Cologne, the Dukes of Brunswick and Brabant were 
overshadowed by Frederick II and his court.
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187This orientation did not change when Frederick was excommunicated again in 
1239. This loyalty to the Emperor was, however, thrust upon Henry. No alternative 
existed but to assist his brother-in-law. At the same time, the King of England was 
forced into a difficult balancing act. He could alienate neither Frederick who remained 
his sole hope of support for a military recovery of Poitou and Normandy, nor the 
Pope. However, he did not cease in his efforts, and involved himself with more or less 
success in the negotiations and diplomatic efforts which dominated European politics 
during these years. This did not change after 1245 and the Emperor’s deposition at 
Lyon. Hemy III refused to acknowledge as rightful rulers those who at the Pope’s 
command tried to expel Frederick and liis family from Germany. No contact was made 
with the Archbishop of Cologne and those who sided with Frederick’s enemies were 
soon abandoned by the English court. Once more, this was as much the result of 
loyalty as a necessity. Not only did it seem likely that peace might soon be established, 
but Frederick also promised to advance the King of England’s nephew. The possibility 
of having Hemy Ill’s nephew controlling Arles and Burgundy more than anything else 
would have given him the means to make good the losses he had recently suffered at 
tlie hands of the Capetians.
The yeai* 1250 marked a water-shed. Frederick II died, while Henry III, bereft of 
Ills old allies and friends was forced, for the time being, to abandon plans for a niüitaiy 
recovery of his inheritance. Instead his policy veered towards the Mediterranean, 
elaborating and building on contacts and interests he had acquired over the previous 
decade. The fir st step in that direction was liis taking of the Cross in 1250. In the midst 
of his preparations for that campaign, the opportunity presented itself to take hold of 
the crown of Sicily, too, thus beating the Capetians in the race to fill the vacuum left by 
the collapse of the Hohenstaufen. However, this soon proved to have momentous 
consequences, hi the long ran, Henry was forced to abandon his aim of fighting the 
Muslims. Rather, he was drawn in to the quagmire of the papal-Hohenstaufen conflict.
Not only did he have to fight his old friend’s sons and successors in Sichy, but his 
brother, Earl Richard of Cornwall, also seized control of Germany, with a good 
chance of being made Emperor.
These glorious prospects, however, faltered, when the financial consequences of 
the Sicilian Business, together with tlie King’s ineptitude in England and his patronage 
of foreign relatives, erupted in a baronial take-over of government in 1258, and civil 
war in 1263. The Sicilian project had to be abandoned, and Richard’s dreams of 
succeeding Frederick II as Emperor were destroyed by his involvement in English 
politics. What had begun as a glorious step towards ensuring the greatness and 
hegemony of the Plantagenet house ended in humiliation and defeat. However, such an 
outcome had been neither unavoidable nor was it entirely Henry’s fault. His projects 
and ambitions still stand out as one of the most wide-ranging and imaginative policies 
pursued by a medieval ruler of England. As such, alone, they merit credit.
If we consider Henry's undertakings in conjunction with the problems and 
difficulties besetting Frederick n, we are able to sketch some of the main concerns of 
contemporary European politics, and we see how increasingly one power came to 
dominate Latin Christendom, at the expense of botli England and the Empire. For 
neither the actions of Frederick nor those of Henry III can be understood without 
giving at least some consideration to the Capetian Kings of France. In Henry Hi's 
case, they mattered as the object of his political alliances, the enemy he could not fight 
on his own, and who required him, over and over again, to postpone his plans, to 
change his tactics and, in the end, even his strategy. Similarly, Frederick II depended 
heavily on the Capetians. Without their financial and military assistance he would have 
had little chance of assuming the throne. The rise of support he found in Germany 
coincided with a pouring forth of funds from France, and only Otto IV's crushing 
defeat at Bouvines gave him the militaiy advantage he had been lacking until then. His 
political fortunes rested on the military and financial support he had received from 
Philip Augustus of France. It may therefore not come as a surprise that this was to 
dominate his attitude towards the Capetians. In 1223 and 1227 he agreed to ban 
anyone supporting tlie King of England against tlie King of France. Even Louis VIB's 
actions in Languedoc could not test his loyalty. To a large extent this was also a 
necessity. The fact that the regents of Louis IX had remained neutral had thwarted 
papal attempts at installing an anti-King during his first excommunication, and after 
1239 he could rely on their continuing intercession on his behalf. More importantly, by 
alienating Louis IX, he would have faced the spectre of a papal candidate supported by 
the expanding fiscal and militaiy power of the Capetian crown. As his own career had 
taught, the Capetians were too powerful an enemy for anyone who wanted to keep the 
tlirone of die Empire.
This also explains why Henry III and Richard of Cornwall, once they faced a 
situation similar to that encountered by Frederick n, adopted similar means. In the case 
of Henry III, the need to organise his crusade, and later to ship troops to Sicily 
initiated renewed efforts to find a permanent and lasting settlement of his claims in 
France. After all, immediately following his announcement that he was to go on 
crusade he sent envoys to the regents of France, and asked for a practically unlimited 
extension of the existing truce. He could not dream of leaving his realm for a 
prolonged period of time, or of acquiring new lands in the Mediterranean, while 
relations with France remained wary or even hostile. More important are the parallels 
between Richard and his Hohenstaufen predecessor. The Earl of Cornwall did indeed 
face a rival candidate who, at least initially had been able to count upon the indirect 
support of the King of France. However, unlike Frederick II, Richard could not draw 
on men whose loyalty to him and his family had been tested and formed over several 
generations. He lacked a native power basis or indigenous military support. He could 
therefore not afford a prolonged, expensive campaign in which he had to rely on the
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untested loyalty of his new subjects. Even before he set out to assume his new throne, 
we thus find him negotiating with the King of France, and pressing for the settlement 
which was to result in the Treaty of Paris. In fact, he even suggested to enter an 
agreement not unhke the Treaty of Catania, concluded between Frederick II and Louis 
V in fifty years earlier. Richard, too, was unable to maintain his hold on the German 
throne without assuring himself at least of the neutrality of Louis IX.
As we have seen, this had several consequences for Henry Ill's role in Europe. 
As much as he courted the Emperor, their aims were too divergent. The King of 
England expected Frederick to attack the very power on whose backing his own 
position and rule rested. This does not mean tliat Heniy's initiatives were ill-advised or 
badly thought out. The events of 1225, when he had lost Poitou, showed how a 
ruthless French monarch could exploit close relations with the Emperor to the 
detriment of the Plantagenets. We should therefore also remember that avoiding even 
closer links between Hohenstaufen and Capetians was a goal as much worth pursuing 
as was an attempt to improve relations with Frederick II. The maiiiage negotiations of 
1225, our best documented episode, may be cited as an example. Even if Henry 
ultimately failed in ensuring an Imperial maiiiage either for hhnself or his sister, he had 
at least thwarted the prospect of a marriage between Frederick's heir and a Capetian 
princess. Furthermore, we have to take into account that we view these events with 
hindsight. We know that Henry never achieved what he was hoping for, and it is easy 
to see long-term structural developments, which may not have been as evident to 
contemporaries. For instance, whenever Heniy tried to increase his ties^with the 
Emperor, he had good reason to hope that he might be able to achieve at least some 
success: in 1225, in 1227, in 1235 and in 1242/3. All too often events and 
developments outwith Henry's control thwarted his ambitions. He could not foresee 
that the Emperor was to be excommunicated in 1227 or that Innocent IV was to take an 
even more unrelenting stance towaids the Emperor than Gregory IX had done. Failing 
to consider this means that we expose ourselves to the dangers of historical 
determinism. Events did not inevitably take a prescribed course towards a predestmed 
end.
This leads us to a more detailed consideration of the ways and techniques in wliich 
Henry III and his Imperial counterpart organised their diplomatic relations. For one, 
we can notice a strong conservatism in the strategies pursued. Ever since Henry II in 
the twelfth century, the Emperor had formed part of a triangular system of alliances, 
being courted by the Kings of both England and France. During the reign of Richard I 
and John this culminated in efforts by the Angevins to decide the choice of Emperor. If 
successful this would have opened up the possibility of shifting the balance of power 
in Europe strongly in their favour, and we should therefore not be suiprised that this 
ultimately led to Philip Augustus' support for the candidacy of the then Frederick of 
Sicily. As one may expect, the consequences this had for Henry III were disastrous, hi
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190this respect, the loss of Poitou was the result of Richard the Lionheart's uninvited 
meddling in the affairs of the Empire. Nonetlieless, as outlined above, there was no 
viable alternative to pursuing a policy of closer links with Germany. It also comes as 
no surprise that much of this was originally done by concentrating on the Imperial 
princes, rather than the Emperor himself. Men like Peter des Roches and Hubert de 
Burgh had played too prominent a part m the affairs of John and Otto IV to be easily 
accepted by Frederick II. This the more so, as England was clearly the weaker part 
which had very little to offer to the Hohenstaufen Emperor. This also means that the 
question as to what extent we can differentiate between Henry Ill's actions and those 
of his regents remains, in this context at least, largely superfluous. There simply was 
no room for changes of strategy. If Henry III wanted to prove himself, to show any 
independence of spirit, he had to find other areas.
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent the Khig himself was responsible for the 
course of action ulthnately to be taken. Henry HI did not act alone.^ Moreover, unlike 
many of his undertakings at home, his foreign affairs were frequently the result of 
extensive deUberalions. The King consulted his officials and nobles, and he acted only 
after haven taken the advice of those whose experience he could trust. At the same 
time, what we have discussed with regard to the Sicilian Business does not form an 
isolated incident. The King was more willmg to tnist those who either had themselves 
profound experience of European politics, or those who held lands abroad and who 
possessed the necessary familiarity, the knowledge and expertise to guide him in his 
decision. In short, English magnates only played a subordinate role. For most of the 
period after 1239 this means that Henry relied on his Savoyard relatives. They 
frequently appear* on the witness lists to his grants and mandates. In 1242/3 their wide- 
ranging contacts were used to build up the alliance immediately prior to Henry's 
planned attack on Poitou, Peter of Savoy planned an important part in preparing for the 
King's crusade, and his brothers assumed an eminent position in the planning and 
execution of the Sicilian Business. This was evident not only in their own 
involvement, but also that of their dependants and familiar es. After all, Henry Ill's 
proctor, responsible both for securing papal support in his campaign to the Holy Land, 
and for treating about the offer of the throne of Sicily, was John de Amblione, from a 
monastery in Savoy, a clerk of the Counts. Their expertise was thus as needed as it 
was welcome.
Nor was it unusual that 'foreign' proctors were employed to treat Henr*y's affairs.
Other examples would include the Zudendorp family of Cologne, the Saraceni of 
Rome, or even Peter de Vinea in his dealings with the Emperor. The latter's case is 
also helpful in illustrating another aspect of the organisation and maintenance of
2 For the personnel involved in English emdieval diplomacy, though concentrating almost exclusively 
of the period between Edward I and the outbreak of the Hundred Year s war: G.P. Cuttino, English 
Diplomatic Administration, 1259-1339, Second edition, (Oxford, 1971), 127-89.
191diplomatie intercourse. As we have seen, Peter was a regular recipient of an English 
money-fief. This was not only a reward for his own services, or a sign of respect to 
Ms lord, die Emperor, but was also perceived as entailing further obligations. After all,
Peter was one of the primary addressees at Frederick's court when Henry El tried to 
draw the Emperor into an alliance against Louis IX in 1242/3. We may assume that 
similar considerations may have guided the grants made to the Teutonic Knights, the 
clerks of the Duke of Brunswick or Henry de Rumenham from the court of the Duke 
of Brabant. At the same time, Peter remained to some extent an exception. Unlike the 
others mentioned, he was a fairly prominent figure, placed at the highest level of 
Imperial politics, a close advisor to the Emperor, and, as such, largely in a league of 
his own, closer in significance to the Counts of Savoy or Jean de Avesnes than the 
Zudendorp merchants of Cologne. This does, however, not necessarily mean that the 
latters' significance has been exaggerated. Their eminent role within the Archbishops' 
administration was beyond doubt, and they remained the main go-betweens in Anglo- 
German relations for most of the 1220s. In 1225, for instance, the Chancellor of 
London, writing of his visit to the Duke of Austria, maintained that without the 
Zudendorps' support he would not have reached the ducal court alive. The recipients 
of English fiefs could thus serve to support and assist in the planning and execution of 
diplomatic mission. Unfortunately, no evidence survives to illustrate whether Henry de 
Rumenham, for instance, had played a similar* role in dealings with Brabant, and no 
letters survive from those who had been sent to the duke of Brunswick in 1247 to 
recruit miners and engineers. A tliird use ought to be considered. That is the provision 
of information and news. The King depended on merchants and travellers for* reports. 
Although tliis does not always become explicit in the sources we have, due frequently 
to the ver*y nature of the available record material, it may yet be implicit, for instance, 
in receiving men like Simon de Cambrai or the Duke of Limburg when he went on 
pilgrimage to Canterbury, In the absence of regular* news bulletins men like these, 
pilgrims, merchants and officials passing through, were the men on whom a ruler had 
to rely to gauge important information.
As far as the regular* staff of diplomatic intercourse was concerned, the picture 
becomes more confusing. We do not find ambassadors in the sense of men whose sole 
duty it was to represent a r*uler's mterests abroad, or who took up permanent residence 
at a foreign court. The under*takings of Richar d of Cornwall's proctors in England after 
1257 are clearly an exception, due mostly to the fact that he was not only an English 
magnate, but also the King of England's brother. Nonetheless, we can witness an 
increasing specialisation, certain figures who reappear again and again. In the 
Emperor's case this included the family of the advocate if Aachen and, most 
importantly, Walter of Ocra, and in Henry Ill's John Maurisell. From 1239 onwards it 
was Walter who increasingly dominated the Emperor's diplomatic initiatives. He was 
sent to the King of France to in the attempt to wm Capetian support for a truce with the
curia, and he was in England, trying to counter the papacy's propaganda offensive, 
and aiming to convince the King and his barons not to sent the funds Gregory 
requested. John, too, made a frequent appearance, at the French royal court, in 
negotiations with Alfonso of Castile or in the context of the Sicilian business. In both 
cases, however, this was only par t of their wider remit within the King's or Emperor's 
administration. Walter as well as John were quite generally counsellors, with a variety 
of tasks. In Walter's case this included matters such as securing the Emperor's 
advance to Lyons in 1247, or brokering the marriage between Manfred Lancea and a 
Savoyard princess. He was sent to Germany to muster support on Frederick's behalf, 
and he filled an important role in the administration of Sicily. Finally, his official title 
was that of Chancellor of Jerusalem. Similarly, John had more tlian merely one job to 
do, exercising a judiciary as well as an administrative role. We thus have a system of 
amateur-diplomats, men who normally held other positions, and who might not 
necessarily be members of the royal or imperial bureaucracy, but who were frequently 
used for missions to foreign mlers. This does not mean that experience was not 
valued: in 1225, for instance, Walter Mauclerk was probably chosen exactly because 
he had significant experience, having been at the curia on King John's behalf, and the 
Zudendorps had mostly their past expertise to recommend themselves. But diplomacy 
remained just one amongst a number of tasks for the King's officials.
This has to be viewed within the context of yet another important aspect of 
diplomatic intercourse. For not all envoys were of equal rank, nor is what we find in 
official records the whole story. Important missions were often the subject of extensive 
preparations, of which very little survives in the extant records. Walter Mauclerk's 
mission, for instance, seems to have very suddenly, all we know is that he departed 
for Germany in February 1225. However, his letters as to his doings in Cologne 
mention that, when he arrived, he aheady found one of his clerks waiting for him, 
who had briefed the Zudendorps about the course of action which was to be taken. 
Furthermore, by the time he met Engelbert, emissaries had already been sent from 
Cologne to the Imperial court to pursue English affairs. This, though, is all we know 
about the preparations for Walter's embassy. We do not know who his clerk was, and 
no record survives for the date of his departure. We may assume, however, that this 
was not untypical. Important embassies, like those to Antwerp in 1227, Vaucouleurs 
in 1236 and 1237, or that to Germany in June 1256 were probably preceded by 
advance missions who prepared the ground for the high-ranking officials which were 
to head the embassy proper. This may have been particularly the case when high 
dignitaries such as the Earls of Cornwall or Gloucester or the Archbishop of York 
were involved. Nonetheless, this is an assumption which is based solely on its high 
degree of plausibility.
The financing of such diplomatic exchanges seems to have been largely a matter of 
tire court who dispatched them, at least as far as England was concerned. In the case of
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technicalities of diplomatic intercourse. Once more, the most detailed material survives 
for Walter Mauclerk's 1225 embassy. Although he and the chancellor of London 
frequently complained as to the great sums which they had to fomard and their own 
continuing penuiy, funds were forthcoming on a regular basis. It is worth noting that 
many of Uiese additional payments were procured via merchants commuting between 
England and Germany. This extensive use of trading contacts, evident already in the 
regular employment of the Zudendorps by both the English court and the Archbishop 
of Cologne, is thus further underlined. Nor was the 1225 mission an exception. For, 
as we have seen, from 1239 onwards some of the most important clues we have to 
English involvement in attempts at mediating between Pope and Emperor is via the 
payments procured by Florentine and other merchants. At the same time, it appears tJiat 
not all rulers were as generous as Henry III in providing for their ambassadors. For 
we frequently find grants to Imperial and other envoys to provide them with funding, 
ranging from five to fifty marks, for their* retur n journey. Naturally, this may form par t 
of an exchange of gifts, expressing one partner's esteem for the other. This could also 
explain gifts such as that of robes 'like the King's valets wear* them' to low-ranking 
foreign envoys, or cups and other silver* artefacts. Giving splendid gifts was a matter 
of showing respect, and of impressing those one received with one's generosity, 
largesse and wealth.
This leads to the final point which we have to consider m the context of medieval 
diplomatic exchanges, that is what actually happened once an embassy arrived. The 
most detailed descr*iption of any such encounter* is given in Walter* Mauclerk's letter 
from Cologne. No epistle of similar detail survives for any of the other projects and 
negotiations discussed here. Once he an*ived he met his cleric, but he was unable to 
meet the archbishop. Instead he had to remain and wait, until Engelbert returned from 
some important matters he had to attend to. Eventually, the prelate returned and was 
willing to meet his English colleague. However, their* conference was not held in 
Cologne itself, at tlie episcopal palace or* the cathedral, hut in the abbey of Altenberg, 
just outside the city walls. Meeting Engelbert in front of one of the altars, the two 
prelates began their exchange. Even when allowing that Walter was not giving a 
detailed protocol, we still can see some of the behaviour and gestures involved. They 
began with an exchange of pleasantries, until the Bishop alluded to the purpose of his 
visit. Engelbert assured him that proper measures had already been taken to arxange the 
planned mariiage, and a possible alliance. The Archbishop also pointed out the number 
of suitors asking for* the hand of young Hemy (VII), and the sums on offer for a 
successful marriage, but he was unwilling to venture any suggestion as to lire amounts 
the King would have to offer in order to be successful. With this, their meeting was 
concluded. As little as this tells us, we can still see a language which is polite and 
works with allusions. How typical this was, however, remains a matter of conjecture.
194Having considered the technicalities, the language and organisation of diplomatic 
intercourse, we should finally turn to Henry HI. What do his relations with Germany 
tell us about his wider political plans, hopes and ambitions ? Naturally, tlie subject of 
this thesis has been only a very small part of Henry's actions and undertakings, and 
any judgement as to his personality or general ability would thus have to be 
preliminaiy. However, we can see a King who presents a very different picture from 
the one we normally encounter in his domestic policies, but one who grappled with 
similar problems. As much as King John and Magna Carta dominated Henry's 
domestic affairs, so the loss of Nomandy dominated his doings on the continent. As 
at home, so was he faced abroad with a situation which was none of his own doing, 
for which he could take no responsibility, and where very few courses of action were 
open to him. The one he chose in the end was conservative, but it was pursued both 
with sheer indefatigable optimism and an acute awareness of chances and 
opportunities. At the same time, Henry was not reckless, did not plunge into ill 
thought out schemes, and showed little bravado or liking for risky adventures. He may 
have admired Richard the Lionheart, but he did not share his uncle's reckless 
confidence in his own invincibility and undisputable superiority. As a consequence, 
however, he had to see his old friends and supporters one after another won over by 
Louis IX and the Capetians. Caution had not paid the rewards one may have expected. 
Similarly, whenever Heniy took a chance, events outside his control had a habit of 
interfering, making his neatly thought out plans falter. In many ways the Sicilian 
Business was both a continuation of these earher tiends, as well as a new departure. It 
was an opportunity which suddenly presented itself, but which fitted into a wider 
political concept pursued, quite successfully, for some time. In the end Henry III 
failed, for the same reasons he had failed in 1242/3 and 1253, that is his inability and 
unwillingness to put liis relations at home, with the barons and nobility of England 
onto a new footing. Whereas abroad, from about 1245 onwards, he had taken steps 
into a different direction, at home he continued to avoid addressing the issues and 
problems he had inherited from Ms father, pursuing a policy which was aware of Kang 
John's failure, but which was unwilling to depart from the very tenets which had 
brought by that failure. Hemy IE ti’uly was his father's son.
Finally, it becomes clear that neither the actions of Henry IE nor those of 
Frederick II can be viewed in isolation. Ignoring their wider, European context means 
to set aside the very factors which moulded the policies and ambitions of the English 
King and his Imperial counterpart. Only if this background is ignored do Henry’s 
actions abroad appear as foolish and incompetent. Put in their wider context, they 
bespeak imagination, pragmatism and resolution. Historians of thirteenth-century 
England can ignore her European connection, but they do so at tlieir own grave peril.
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